THREE PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA

(published: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1987 ((Post-Graduate and Research Department Series, No. 30. "Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures" [Third Series]))

I. THE FIRST VĀRTTIKAS IN THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA
   pp. 2-12 [1-13]

II. THE TEXT HISTORY OF THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA
   pp. 13-34 [14-42]

III. THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
   pp. 35-57 [43-71]

REFERENCES
   pp. 58-63 [72-80]

ABBREVIATIONS
   p. 64 [81]
I. THE FIRST VÄRTTIKAS IN THE MAHĀBHĀSYA

1. Introduction: The difficulty of identifying vārttikas

Academic disciplines, like other human institutions, have a tendency to become the guardians of their traditions. Indology is no exception. In the 19th century the pioneers of our field laid the foundations without which none of us would be able to carry out the work we are doing. What was done, by few people and with so few tools, is indeed impressive. What our 19th century predecessors did was to formulate theories sometimes based on little evidence. We cannot blame them for this. Without initial theories there is nothing to check, nothing to improve upon, and ultimately very little for Indologists to do.

The traditional tendency in our discipline has the unfortunate consequence that these initial theories have in many cases come to be looked upon as facts which one is not allowed to challenge unless one has very strong evidence. The formulation of other theories which are equally plausible, yet equally uncertain, is often looked upon as reproachable speculation. This is regrettable, for it may, and indeed does, lead to situations in which one scholar blames another for being speculative, while at the same time accepting without question theories propounded in the 19th century. It should be clear that a theory formulated in the 19th century is not, for that reason, more acceptable than one formulated in the 20th.

This criticism against a prevailing tendency in Indology does not apply to all Indologists. Many are refreshingly open to other points of view. They demonstrate this in their work, and in their reactions to the work of colleagues. Yet it is still worthwhile to state explicitly and emphatically that much of what we do, and ought to do, is, with as much care as possible, to formulate and test theories. The theories we have to test are both old ones, which may date back to the 19th century or even earlier, and new ones which we formulate ourselves. This applies also to what I am going to speak about today. We shall be comparing several competing theories as to which are the first vārttikas in the Mahābhāsyā, and then try to choose the most plausible one among them.

We start from the well-known theory that the Mahābhāsyā as we have it is not the work of one single author. The majority of scholars nowadays believe that most of the text was composed by someone called Patañjali. Embedded in the Mahābhāsyā are the so-called vārttikas, short nominal phrases as well as some verses, which where not composed by Patañjali. Most of the prose vārttikas are thought to have been formulated by someone called Katyāyana who, obviously, must have lived before Patañjali.
It is not immediately obvious that the manuscripts and editions of the Mahābhāṣya contain the work of two, and possibly more, authors. Only in some exceptional cases is a vārttika explicitly ascribed to someone different from Patañjali. Indeed, there is reason to think that for many centuries no one was aware of the multiple authorship of the Mahābhāṣya. (Here and in what follows I will often use the term ‘Mahābhāṣya’ in order to refer to all that is contained in the manuscripts and editions, including the vārttikas.) Or they were aware of it but did not divide the text into vārttikas and Bhāṣya in the same way as we do. Bhartṛhari - perhaps the first commentator on the Mahābhāṣya and certainly the first one part of whose commentary has been preserved - appears to have ascribed different parts of the Mahābhāṣya proper to several authors. He certainly uses the word vārttika more than once to refer to passages from the Mahābhāṣya proper. Other authors may have followed the presumed example of the Mahābhāṣya when they called their work ‘Vārttika’, even though it contained both short nominal phrases (similar to Kātyāyana's vārttikas) and explanatory prose. Some examples are the Tattvārthavārttika by the Jaina author Akalaṅka, and the Sāṃkhya work Yuktidvipikā which is also known by the name ‘Rājavārttika’. Other works again followed the style without adopting the name ‘Vārttika’.

It is not my intention to pursue these questions further at present. They have been dealt with in an article called "Vārttika" which will appear in the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens. I merely wish to draw your attention to the fact that the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya do not indicate what is a vārttika and what is not. The later commentators on the Mahābhāṣya occasionally identify vārttikas, but not until Kielhorn an attempt was made to identify each and every vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya, and to establish a general criterion by which to identify them.

Kielhorn formulated this general criterion in a book which came out in 1876 and bore the title "Kātyāyana and Patañjali: Their Relationship to Each Other, and to Pāṇini". Briefly stated, Kielhorn recognizes as prose vārttikas those sentences which are accompanied by explanatory remarks, by a paraphrase which usually repeats the words of the vārttika. Kielhorn applied this criterion in his edition of the Mahābhāṣya, which has remained the standard edition of this text. The vārttikas are here printed in bold type, and are therefore easily distinguished from the text of the Mahābhāṣya proper.

By and large Kielhorn's criterion has been accepted by scholars in the field. Occasionally a question has been raised concerning the correct formulation of the criterion and its correct application in particular cases. This was perhaps most recently done by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (1981: 140-41 n. 452), with regard to P.

---

1 The article has meanwhile appeared in WZKS 34 (1990), 123-146.
2.3.67 vt. 2 which, though explained by Patañjali, is explained with the help of different words.

Of perhaps more interest in this context is Kielhorn's habit of adding an explanation (which in these cases is identical with the vårttikas) where he thought that a certain phrase was a vårttika, thus staying in agreement with his own criterion. The vårttikas 8 to 15 on P. 1.1.21, for example, do not occur in any of [4] the manuscripts used by Kielhorn (I, p. 78, l. 8 f.; see note on p. 511). The vårttikas 5 to 7 on P. 1.1.58 (I, p. 154, l. 12 f.) are similar; most manuscripts do not repeat them. A perusal of Kielhorn's critical notes reveals numerous cases where vårttikas have been added against the evidence of the majority of manuscripts. In all these cases Kielhorn has himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based! Of course, Kielhorn has a theory to explain why many of his manuscripts do not treat presumed vårttikas as such: since the comment in the Bhāṣya is in these cases identical with the vårttika, scribes did not bother to repeat this; they added a figure 2, in which place later a stop came, which in its turn disappeared altogether from many manuscripts.²

This example shows, I think, very clearly the way of working of one of our illustrious predecessors in the last century. Kielhorn did not just report what he found in his manuscripts. On the contrary, he formulated a theory about the authorship of the different parts of his text, and on the basis of this theory he subsequently felt entitled to go to the extent of deviating from his manuscripts in some cases. It would be beyond the scope of this lecture to discuss whether or not Kielhorn was right in doing so in each and every instance. Perhaps he was, perhaps he wasn't. But I will not in general terms argue with his method of trying to get beyond, or behind his texts by formulating theories which occasionally may even suggest readings which differ from those his manuscripts provided.

Nor is it my intention to argue, more in particular, with Kielhorn's criterion for identifying vårttikas. I accept that all phrases which are subsequently explained with the help of the same words are indeed vårttikas. I am not sure that all vårttikas underwent such treatment by Patañjali. This may or may not have been the case. This question is not however going to be [5] of much relevance for the specific problem which is going to be discussed in this lecture.

---

2. The first vārttika according to tradition

The main question of this lecture is: Which is the first vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya? According to Kielhorn and several commentators on the Mahābhāṣya it is:

\[
\text{siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇe dharmaniya-maḥ yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.}
\]

It is discussed, in three parts, from p. 6 l. 12 to p. 9 l. 22 in volume I of Kielhorn’s edition.³

The reason to think that this is the first vārttika lies in a passage in the Mahābhāṣya. The word *siddha*, it is argued, is here synonymous with *nitya* ‘eternal’. The question is then raised why the ambiguous term *siddha* is used rather than *nitya*. The answer is as follows (p. 6 l. 28 - p. 7 l. 2):

\[
\text{maṅgalārtham/ maṅgalika ācāryo mahataḥ śāstraughasya maṅgalārthaṁ siddhaśabdam āditah prayunjte maṅgalādini hi śāstrāṇi prathante virapuruṣakāṇi ca bhavanty āyuṣ-matpuruṣakāṇi cādhyetāraś ca siddhārthaḥ yathā syur iti/}
\]

For the sake of [having] something auspicious. The teacher, being intent on something auspicious, uses the word *siddha* at the beginning of the great stream in the form of the science [of grammar] in order [to have] something auspicious. For sciences which begin with something auspicious spread and are such that the men [who study them become] valiant and long-lived. [The use of *siddha* indicates:] ‘May those who study [this science] reach their aim (*siddhārtha*)’.

[6]

This passage seems to indicate that the vārttika *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe* ... occurs at the beginning and must therefore be the first one. No commentator on the Mahābhāṣya has disputed this conclusion. Indeed, the vārttika is referred to as ‘the first vārttika’ by Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī (*ādyam vārttikam*, MPV I, p. 76 l. 2), while Nāgeśa emphatically states that all that precedes the vārttika derives from the author of the Bhāṣya (*itaḥ pūrvaṁ tu ... bhāsyakāraṣyaiva grantha iti bodhyam*, NSP I, p. 55b, l. 10-11).

³ Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: ix) argue that this is not one vārttika but three. A discussion of their arguments and of their way of dividing the vārttika(s) is beyond the scope of this lecture.
3. Bhandarkar's objections

Objections against this position were raised more than a century ago by R.G. Bhandarkar (1876). Bhandarkar argued that before the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe etc. there is at least one other vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya, viz. the sentence

\[ imāni prayojanāny adhyeyam vyākaraṇam \]

"These are the uses, grammar should be studied" (Mbh I, p. 5 l. 11)

The reason for thinking that this is one of Kātyāyana's vārtikas is that this sentence is followed by iti and preceded by the words

\[ ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā anvācaṣṭe \]

This expression, Bhandarkar maintained, "occurs in several places of the Mahābhāṣya, in all of which we have to understand Kātyāyana by the term ācārya" (p. 345).

Moreover, "in all these instances the sentence indicated by iti, which stands in the place of an object to the verb anvācaṣṭe, is a vārtika, for it is explained just before by Patanjali, as all vārtikas are" (p. 346).

4. Weaknesses of Bhandarkar's arguments

This last remark shows immediately why Bhandarkar's alleged vārttika could not be acceptable to Kielhorn. Kielhorn's criterion is that a vārttika is followed by an explanation. The sentence imāni prayojanāny adhyeyam vyākaraṇam, on the other hand, is preceded by an explanation.

Bhandarkar's other argument, too, shows some weaknesses which can easily be brought to light with the help of the better tools which we now possess in the form of a good edition of the Mahābhāṣya (by Kielhorn) and of a Word Index (by Pathak and Chitrao). To begin with, most of the manuscripts on which Kielhorn based his edition do not have the words suhṛd bhūtvā in the passage under consideration. This does not necessarily mean that they are a later addition. The later tradition believed that there could be no vārttika on these early pages of the Mahābhāṣya, and this fact may have induced too observant scribes to droop the words that would prove the opposite. One might argue that suhṛd bhūtvā was added only because all other occurrences of the two

---

4 Bhartṛhari's commentary offers no help in determining the presence or absence of these words.
words ācāryaḥ anvācaṣṭe, with only one exception,\(^5\) are accompanied by the phrase suḥṛd bhūtvā, but this argument is not very strong. If a scribe was knowledgeable enough to remember the usual co-occurrence of ācāryaḥ anvācaṣṭe and suḥṛd bhūtvā, he should also remember that suḥṛd bhūtvā comes always after ācāryaḥ and before anvācaṣṭe. In our passage, on the other hand, the order is: suḥṛd bhūtvā "cārya (idaṁ śāstram) anvācaṣṭe. Yet the absence of these words in many manuscripts somewhat weakens the main thrust of Bhandarkar's argument.

Bhandarkar also overlooked one passage (Mbh I, p. 208, l. 16, on P. 1.2.32) where the expression \(\text{tad ācāryaḥ suḥṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe} [8]\) obviously refers to Pāṇini. The sūtra under discussion here is P. 1.2.32 \(\text{tasyādīta udāttam ardhaḥrasvam}\), which describes the correct pronunciation of the svarita accent. Patañjali observes that without this sūtra one would not know how much of the svarita is udāṭṭa, and how much anudāṭṭa. The Bhāṣya then continues:

\[
\text{tad ācāryaḥ suḥṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭa iyad udāṭṭam iyad anudāṭṭam ...}
\]

Therefore the Ācārya, out of friendliness, explains 'This much is udāṭṭa, this much anudāṭṭa’ ...

The Ācārya here can only be Pāṇini. However, the sentence \(\text{imāni prayojanaṁ adhyeyam vyākaraṇam}\) certainly does not derive from Pāṇini, so that Bhandarkar's argument is not necessarily weakened much by this fact.

In spite of the weaknesses in Bhandarkar's arguments we cannot easily discard them altogether. Whether or not the words suḥṛd bhūtvā origianlly occurred in the sentence which introduces the presumed first vārttika, all manuscripts agree that the word ācārya belongs there. This word ācārya usually refers to Pāṇini, sometimes to Kātyāyana or someone else, but never, except supposedly here, to Patañjali himself. This is the conclusion reached by Kielhorn (1876: 249 (177) f.) after studying sixty occurrences of the word ācārya. This fact is puzzling, and it seems clear that Bhandarkar's case deserves further consideration.

\(^5\) The exception is Mbh. IIIp. 349 l. 4 (on P. 7.4.24 vt. 1). With suḥṛd bhūtvā the words occur Mbh. I p. 208 l. 16 (on P. 1.2.32), p. 315 l. 2 (on P. 1.4.3 vt 6), p. 368 l. 2 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 12), p. 481 l. 3 (on P. 2.4.32 vt. 2); II p. 157 l. 7 (on P. 3.3.127 vt. 2), p. 162 l. 20-21 (on P. 3.3.137 vt. 2), p. 163 l. 12 (on P. 3.3.141 vt. 1), p. 303 l. 15 (on P. 4.3.4 vt. 2), p. 325 l. 7 (on P. 4.3.143 vt. 2), p. 349 l. 15 (on P. 5.1.30-31 vt. 1), p. 359 l. 22 (on P. 5.1.84 vt. 1), p. 406 l. 18 (on P. 5.3.20 vt. 1), p. 409 l. 20 (on P. 5.3.35 vt. 1).
5. Bhandarkar's position modified.

There is one more flaw in Bhandarkar's arguments, which, surprisingly, does not further weaken his case but rather strengthens it, be it in a somewhat modified form. We saw that, according to Bhandarkar, the sentence indicated by \textit{iti} and following the expression \textit{ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe} is always a \textit{vārttika}. This is not completely correct. It is rather Patañjali's paraphrase of a \textit{vārttika}, not the \textit{vārttika} itself, which is introduced by this expression. Sometimes Patañjali's paraphrase is a simple \footnote{E.g., P. 3.3.127 vt. 2 is repeated at Mbh II, p. 157, l. 7; P. 3.3.141 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 163, l. 12-13; P. 4.3.143 vt. 2 at Mbh II, p. 324, l. 7; P. 5.1.31 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 349, l. 15; P. 5.1.84 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 359, l. 22; P. 5.3.20 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 406, l. 18; P. 5.3.35 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 409, l. 20.} repetition of the \textit{vārttika},\footnote{E.g., P. 3.3.127 vt. 2 is repeated at Mbh II, p. 157, l. 7; P. 3.3.141 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 163, l. 12-13; P. 4.3.143 vt. 2 at Mbh II, p. 324, l. 7; P. 5.1.31 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 349, l. 15; P. 5.1.84 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 359, l. 22; P. 5.3.20 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 406, l. 18; P. 5.3.35 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 409, l. 20.} But in other cases it is not. The following cases illustrate this:

(i) P. 1.4.3 vt. 6 reads: \textit{hrasveyuvsthānapravṛttau ca strīvacane}. Patañjali paraphrases this as follows: \textit{hrasvau ceyuvsthānau ca pravṛttau ca prāk ca pravṛtteḥ strīvacanāv eva naḍisāṃjñānv bhavatā iti vaktavyam}. This paraphrase reappears in the final sentence of Patañjali's discussion (p. 315, l. 2-3): \textit{tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe hrasvau ceyuvsthānau ca pravṛttau ca prāk ca pravṛtteḥ strīvacanāv eveti}.

(ii) P. 2.4.32 vt. 2 reads: \textit{anvādeśaś ca kathitānukathanamātram}. It is paraphrased: \textit{anvādeśaś ca kathitānukathanamātram draṣṭavyam}. This paraphrase occurs again in the next line (p. 481, l. 3-4): \textit{tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe 'nvādeśaś ca kathitānukathanamātram draṣṭavyam iti}.

These cases make clear that the sentence \textit{imāni prayojanāny adhyeyanāṃ vyākaraṇam} must be considered a paraphrase rather than a \textit{vārttika}.

But what is paraphrased? Quite clearly the section of the Mahābhāṣya that deals with the uses of grammar, i.e., p. 1, l. 14 - p. 5, l. 4 in Kielhorn's edition. This long section contains two headings which might easily be looked upon as \textit{vārttikas}. Both contain features that indicate that they were not written by the author of the Mahābhāṣya. We shall look at them one by one:

(i) p. 1, l. 14: \textit{kāṇi punaḥ śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni/ rakṣohāgamalghvasandehāḥ prayojanam/}
THREE PROBLEMS

This is the less peculiar of the two headings. Yet it is remarkable in that the grammatical number of the word prayojana differs in [10] question and answer.\(^7\) This does suggest that the form of the answer was fixed, in other words, that the answer is a quotation from an earlier work.

(ii) p. 2, l. 3-6: imāni ca bhūyah śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanānī/ te 'surāḥ/ diṣṭāḥ śabdāḥ/ yad adhiṭam/ yas tu prayuṅkte/ avidvāṁsaḥ/ vibhaktiṁ kurvanti/ yo vā imāṁ/ catvāri/ uta tvāḥ/ saktum īva/ sārasvatinī/ daśamyāṁ putrasya/ sudevo asi varuṇetī/

Patañjali does not know the precise significance of all the items of this list. This proves that he did not make it himself.\(^8\) Each of the items is the beginning of a quotation, usually from Vedic literature. In some cases Patañjali does not know which quotation is intended:

(ii-a) In the case of catvāri Patañjali gives two quotations from the Rgveda beginning with that word, introducing the second one with the phrase aprāma 'aha "someone else says". The first quotation is RV 4.58.3, which begins catvāri śrīga trayo asya pādā ... The other quotation is RV 1.164.45: catvāri vākparimīta padānī ...

(ii-b) Patañjali does not know the full form of the quotation beginning with daśamyāṁ putrasya. Instead he cites a text which begins daśamyuttarakālaṁ putrasya nāma vidadhyaḥ ...

(ii-c) The pratikā vibhaktiṁ kurvanti does not recur in the quoted line prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ kāryāḥ.

Note that both the headings are treated like vārttika in Kielhorn's sense in that they are explained in full detail in the immediately following Bhāṣya. It is therefore not surprising that [11] at least one author explicitly calls the first of these two a vārttika. Sāyaṇa, in his introduction to his commentary on the Rgveda, makes the following remark (p. 26, l. 28-30):

---

\(^7\) So also Filliozat, 1975: 27 fn. 3. Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: 26 fn. 72), following K. Ch. Chatterji, point out that "the use of the sg. prayojanam is typical of Kātyāyanavārttikas ..., whereas Patañjali commonly uses the pl."

\(^8\) So Filliozat, 1975: 38 fn. 1.
These considerations show that Bhandarkar's arguments, if suitably adjusted, are stronger than Bhandarkar himself may have suspected. There is good reason to think that at least two vārttikas preceded the 'first vārttika', viz. (1) rakṣohāgamalaghasandeḥ prayojanam, and (2) te 'sūrya.../ sudevo asi varunetī/. These two vārttikas fulfil Kielhorn's criterion of being subsequently explained by Patañjali. Moreover, they are ascribed to an Ācārya by Patañjali himself, which shows that he cannot have been their author. But once we have accepted these two (or do they together count as one?) new vārttikas as authentic, there is no reason not to follow Bhandarkar in thinking that also the very first line of the Mahābhāṣya, atha śabdānuśasanam, is a vārttika. This line, too, is explained by Patañjali, and must be considered to fulfil Kielhorn's criterion.

6. Traditional argument rejected.

A major problem remains however. How can we accept three new vārttikas in the very beginning of the Mahābhāṣya when Patañjali explicitly states that the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe etc. is at the beginning?

The answer given by Bhandarkar is "that these aphorisms are simply introductory, while the regular śāstra begins with siddhe śabdārtha... etc. The provision for maṅgala is therefore [12] made in this, and not in the preceding ones, just as Pāṇini secures maṅgala in the first of his regular sūtras, viz. vṛddhir ādaic, and not in the prayāhāra sūtras" (p. 346). Here again Bhandarkar's argument can be strengthened further.

In three places of the Mahābhāṣya Patañjali invokes the idea of maṅgala 'something auspicious'. The first time is in connection with the 'first vārttika' which we studied above; the second time in order to explain the presence of the word vṛddhi at the beginning of the first sūtra of the Aṣṭādhyāyī (I, p. 40, l. 6-9). On both of these
occasions only "sciences which begin with something auspicious" (maṅgalādīṇī śāstrāṇi) are mentioned. On the third occasion (Mbh I, p. 253, l. 5-7), however, "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" are mentioned. Here the context is the inexplicable presence of non-modified bhū in P. 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavah. It is explained as "something auspicious in the middle", a not very accurate characterization in view of the fact that P. 1.3.1 occurs nowhere near the middle of the Aṣṭādhyāyī with its eight books. Even more interesting is that Patañjali here describes the Aṣṭādhyāyī as "having something auspicious in the end". The commentator Jinendrabuddhi on the Kāśikā on this śūtra 1.3.1 specifies that udaya in P. 8.4.67 is the maṅgala in the end, but the fact is that P. 8.4.67 is not the last śūtra of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, not even in Patañjali’s view. We cannot but conclude that Patañjali should not be taken too seriously in this regard.

7. Conclusion.

We see that Bhandarkar’s position can be modified and strengthened so as to lead to the following result. The first vārttikas in the Mahābhāṣya are:

1. atha śabdānuśasanam
2. rakṣohāgamaḷaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam
3. te ‘surāḥ etc.
4. siddhe śabdārthasambandhe etc.

[13]
This list of vārttikas differs from Bhandarkar’s in accepting rakṣohāgamaḷaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam and te ‘surāḥ etc. as vārttikas, while not accepting Bhandarkar’s imāni prayojanāṇi adhyeyam vyākaraṇam.

I have not yet mentioned, in the course of this lecture, the list of initial vārttikas proposed by S. D. Joshi in his article on Bhandarkar and Sanskrit Grammar (1976: 124). Joshi briefly recapitulates Bhandarkar’s arguments, then ends up with the following list of initial vārttikas:

1. atha śabdānuśasanam
2. laukikāṇāṁ vaiḍīkāṇāṁ ca
3. rakṣohāgamaḷaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam
4. imāni prayojanāṇi, adhyeyam vyākaraṇam
Joshi does not in this article reject Bhandarkar's *imāni prayojanāni, adhyeyaṃ vyākaranam*, nor does he recognize *te 'surāḥ* etc. as a vārttika. In their recent translation of the Paspaśāhika, on the other hand, Joshi and Roodbergen (1986) accept only the following two lines as vārttikas:

1. *atha śabdānuśasanam*
2. *rakṣohāgamalaghvasandeḥ prayojanam*

Unfortunately neither of the two positions is sufficiently argued by Joshi (and Roodbergen). Let us hope that the present lecture has now placed the discussion regarding the first vārttikas in the Mahābhāṣya on a firmer footing.
II. THE TEXT HISTORY OF THE MAHĀBHĀŠYA

1. One archetype underlying all manuscripts.

The standard edition of the Mahābhāṣya is the one published by Kielhorn about a century ago and reedited several times in the intervening period. Kielhorn's edition is based on a number of manuscripts which occasionally differ from each other in minor points, but on the whole show remarkable agreement. This agreement induced Kielhorn to state in an article: "According to my own view no evidence has yet been adduced to prove that the text of the Mahābhāṣya as known to us from the MSS. is not the original text of that work, and the only one that ever existed". In the preface to the first volume of his edition, after describing the manuscripts used, Kielhorn observes: "Generally speaking, the text of the Mahābhāṣya is the same in all the above MSS., and the differences in reading which occur are not such as to prove the existence of two or more recensions of the work. Though numerous, they rarely affect the meaning of a passage, and they are in the majority of cases accounted for by the carelessness of individual copyists, or the desire of a student to improve on the text which he was studying".

The situation as described by Kielhorn can be represented schematically as follows:

All the manuscripts used for the edition of the Mahābhāṣya go back to a common archetype which, in Kielhorn's opinion, is the original text written by Patañjali.

---

9 It may here be recalled that the critical apparatus of the third volume of Kielhorn's edition is missing in all printed editions.
10 Kielhorn, 1876a: 242 (170).
2. Archetype not identical with Patañjali's text.

There is evidence which shows that this scheme has to be adjusted. This has been pointed out by V. P. Limaye in his Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya (1974), and more recently, and more exhaustively, by Wilhelm Rau in his book Die vedischen Zitate im Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya (1985). Limaye and Rau found that many Vedic quotations appeared in a corrupted form in all the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya used by Kielhorn. We find, for example, in the Bhāṣya on P. 5.1.119 vt. 9 the following quoted line (Mbh II, p. 368, l. 19):

*nirvṛyatāṁ vai yajamāna* (one Ms. has *jayamāna*) *āśāste apaśūtāṁ gauḥ* (some Ms. drop *gauḥ*)

This occurs at MS 2.18 (p. 10, l. 4) in the form

*nirvṛyatāṁ vai puruśo yamo jāta āśāste 'paśūtāṁ gauḥ*

and must have been the original reading also in the Mahābhāṣya. Another example is the quotation

*śiro me śīryate mukhe*

in all the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.60 vt. 2. [16] The correct reading is

*śiro me śrīr yaśo mukham*

and is found at MS 3.11.8 (p. 151, l. 16), KS 38.4 (p. 105, l. 4), VS 20.5 and TB 2.6.5.3-4. Further examples are discussed on pp. 98 to 101 of Rau's book.

Rau further draws attention to the fact that in a number of cases words in Vedic quotations appear to have been forgotten by the scribe, then added in the margin, and subsequently reintroduced by a later scribe in the wrong place. Of the three instances given by Rau I shall reproduce one. The Bhāṣya on P. 5.4.30 vt. 5 has

*kavyo 'si havyasūdana/ kavir asī/ raudrenānīkena ...*

MS 1.2.12 (p. 21, l. 16 f.) and KS 2.13 (p. 17, l. 17-18) have
This passage gives the correct position of *raudrepānikena*. In the Mahābhāṣya it is misplaced in all the manuscripts.

What can we conclude from all this? It seems obvious that all the manuscripts used by Kielhorn for his edition derive from a common archetype. This archetype, however, was not identical with Patañjali’s original text. It rather was a manuscript which itself stood at the end of a tradition, and into which in the course of the transmission certain mistakes had crept. It is more than likely that this manuscript dated from a time well after Patañjali. All the other manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya which may have existed simultaneously with this archetype manuscript, perhaps elsewhere in India, did not give rise to copies which survived to our time. Our scheme must therefore be modified in the following manner:

![Diagram]

**3. The archetype.**

An attempt to discover the date and place of the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya has recently been made by M. Witzel (1986). His method is as follows. Certain mistakes in Vedic quotations are most easily explained when we take into account that the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya have been written in different scripts in the course of time. Some letters, or combinations of letters, may be very similar to other letters in one type of script, but not in another. Witzel has recognized some of the mistakes as having most probably been made in certain identifiable scripts. He comes to the conclusion that "some of the mistakes reported in Rau’s monograph (i.e., Rau’s book on
the Vedic quotation in the Mahābhāṣya) ... tend to have occurred in one of the Northern post Gupta scripts" (p. 249). "A number of them", [18] he continues (p. 251), "are only possible after the development of early Nāgarī'. The similarity of bh and y, for example is found only in northern scripts, and confusion between the two is most probable after the development of early Nāgarī. It has taken place in the following quotation in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 4.1.85 vt. 6:

\[ bāhikam astu bhadṛaṃ vaḥ \]

This is a corrupted version of AV(P) 9.7.5

\[ bāhikam astu yad rapaḥ \]

Confusion between m and bh is only possible after ca. 1000 C.E. in northern Nāgarī scripts. It is exemplified in the quotation

\[ stobhair janayāmi navyam \]

in the Bhāṣya on P. 3.4.30 vt. 5. The correct reading must be

\[ stomaṃ janayāmi navyam \]

which occurs in several Vedic texts, among them RV 1.109.2.

The change from ca to i, finally, which is possible only in northern and western Nāgarī, has taken place in

\[ mādbhir iṣṭvā indro vṛtrabhā \]

quoted under P. 7.4.48 vt. 1. Here indro stands for candro, as is clear from AV 19.27.2 and AV(P) 10.7.2.

These and other arguments point to a time of about 1000 C.E. for the archetype (p. 252). Its probable homeland could be Benares, Nepal, or Gujarat; from among these Witzel prefers a western origin (p. 251).

There is another period in the text history of the Mahābhāṣya where something similar would seem to have taken place. Witzel refers to it, but many others before him have dealt with the final verses of the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya in this [19] connection. According to these verses the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya had been neglected, but was revived by some scholars, among them an Ācārya named Candra. This much seems clear; once we try to derive more precise information from these verses, difficulties of interpretation arise.

The most important verse of the passage is VP 2.485 (in the numbering of Rau's edition). Goldstücker (1960: 258) translated:

That grammatical document [or manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya], which was obtained from the pupils of Patañjali, then remained for some time preserved in one copy only amongst the inhabitants of the Dekhan. There can be no doubt that if Goldstücker's translation is acceptable, the verse concerned is of great interest in the present context. In that case it seems clear that there was a second occasion where one manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya came to replace all the others. This would have taken place in the period preceding Bhartṛhari, and the manuscript would be the one presumably found by Ācārya Candra.

Goldstücker's interpretation was accepted by Albrecht Weber, who translated (1862: 161):

Der den Schülern Patañjali's entfallene Grammatik-Text 'ne Weil bei den Dākshiṇāya in einer Handschrift nur bestand.

Weber went further and expressed the view that the text of the Mahābhāṣya had been devastated and newly arranged, "so that the possibility of considerable alterations, additions, and inter-[20]polations cannot be denied, and that in every case it remains a priori uncertain whether a particular example belongs to Patañjali, or is owing only to later reconstructions."
This is not the place to deal in extenso with Weber’s ideas regarding the presumed "alterations, additions, and interpolations" in the Mahābhāṣya. Bhartṛhari’s verses do not have to be interpreted in this way, and Weber’s supporting evidence is largely derived from the Rājaratārangini, a text so much later that it seems wiser to leave it out of consideration altogether. Solid supporting evidence is completely lacking.

In recent years Weber’s position has been revived by S. D. Joshi. Joshi translates VP 2.485 as follows (1976: 138):

The grammatical tradition which had slipped away from the pupils of Patañjali was preserved in the course of time merely in boks among the inhabitants of the South.16

Joshi too is attracted by the supposition "that Candra etc. added to the original Bhāṣya ... and added from a variety of sources, not necessarily grammatical". Here too we may feel doubtful as long as no more solid evidence is presented. But it seems clear that Joshi too derives from verse 485 the conclusion that, if not one single copy of the Mahābhāṣya had been preserved, in any case they were few in number, few enough for Candra to be able to change the text of the Mahābhāṣya effectively.

The opinions of Goldstücker, Weber and Joshi have been seriously criticised in the course of time, most notably by Bhandarkar (1873), Kielhorn (1876a) and Cardona (1978). Yet these criticisms may not contain any solid reason to abandon the thought that the Mahābhāṣya had been preserved in but one, or a few, manuscripts before the time of Bhartṛhari. The evidence [21] so far considered allows us to think that all later manuscripts ultimately derive from the manuscript constituted by Ācārya Candra or one of his colleagues on the basis of the manuscript or manuscripts he found in the South.

5. VP 2.485 needs to be interpreted differently.

In spite of this I am of the opinion that this position is not correct. In an article entitled "On the history of Pāñinian grammar in the early centuries following Patañjali" (1983) I have collected evidence which shows that the Mahābhāṣya was widely studied in the period before Bhartṛhari and before the grammarian Candragomin - who may have been identical with the mysterious Candra referred to in the Vākyapadīya. In this period changes were made in the Dhatupātha, Sūtrapātha and Ganapātha of Pāñini’s grammar, and īṣṭis and upasāṅkhya ānas were added in the commentaries. Many of these changes

16 Joshi accepts the reading: yaḥ patañjaliśisyebhoḥ bhraṣṭo vyākaranāgamaḥ/ kāle sa dāksinātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitah/
changes were made under the influence of the Mahābhāṣya. This makes it hard to believe that there were only a few manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya, all of them in one place, and rather suggests that these manuscripts were present in sufficient numbers all over India, or at least in several parts of India.

6. Variant readings recorded in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā.

There is however more direct evidence pertaining to the fate of the Mahābhāṣya in that period. Bhartṛhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, commonly referred to as Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā or simply Dipikā, records a number of variant readings in the text of the Mahābhāṣya, i.e., in the first seven Âṅnikas on which the surviving part of the Dipikā comments.\(^\text{17}\)

(i) Mbh I, p. 2, l. 19 quotes the verse *yas tu prayuṅkte kuśalo viṣeṣe ...* Bhartṛhari (Ms 4b9-e4; Sw 13.10-24; AL 11.7-14) initially discusses the reading *kuśalo viṣeṣe* also considering [22] the interpretation *kuśalo viṣeṣe*, i.e., *aviṣeṣe*, and then continues: *aneyesaṃ granthaḥ kuśalo viṣeṣair iti*. None of Kielhorn's manuscripts has this reading.

(ii) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 6 has *om ity uktvā vṛttāntaśaḥ śami tyevamādiṁ śabdān paṭhanti*. Bhartṛhari (Ms 5c2-3; Sw 18.13-15; AL 14.23-24) knows both the readings *vṛttāntaśaḥ* and *vṛttāntaśaḥ*: *vṛttāntata iti/.../ tatrādyāditvāt tasiḥ/.../aneyesaṃ vṛttāntaśa iti pāthah/.* Kielhorn's manuscripts have only *vṛttāntaśaḥ*.

(iii) Mbh I, p. 28, l. 18 (on Śivasūtra 5 vt. 5) reads *yad ayuktā vahanty anupadiṣṭaḥ ca śrūyante*. Bhartṛhari (Ms 25d6-7 and 11; Sw 94.1 and 95.1; AL 81.5-6 and 11-12) knows this reading as well as the variant *yad ayuktā vahanty anupadiṣṭaḥ śrūyante*. Kaiyaṭa remarks (I, p. 89): *kvacit tu caśabdo na paṭhyate*. This reading is unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(iv) Mbh I, p. 30, l. 11-12 (on Śivasūtra 5 vt. 10) has *... yah kūpe kūpārthaḥ sa kakārasya ...* Bhartṛhari (Ms 26d8-9; Sw 97.24-28; AL 83.22-84.3) ascribes this reading to ‘some’, and to ‘others’ the same with the last word replaced by *sakakārasya*, or so it seems. It is also possible that the ‘others’ had the same reading but joined *sa* and *kakārasya* into a single compound.\(^\text{18}\)

(v) Mbh I, p. 55, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.5 vt. 5) reads *aparyāptaś caiva hi yāсут samudāyasya nīttev nītanī caimaṅ karoti*. Bhartṛhari knows two readings (Ms 41d8 and 41d12-42a1; Sw 146.11 and 21; AL 125.9 and 17): the first is *aparyāptaś caiva yāсут samudāyasya nīttev*, which corresponds almost completely with Kielhorn's edition; the

---

\(^{17}\) A number of these were already enumerated by Kielhorn in the Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, of his edition of the Mahābhāṣya; see Kielhorn, 1880-1885: III: 23 f.

\(^{18}\) The text reads: *aneyesaṃ granthaḥ sakakārasya*, which is of course ambiguous.
second appears to be corrupt in the manuscript\(^{19}\) but may have to be reconstructed in the light of a remark by Kaiyaṭa into suparṣyāptaḥ caiva hi yāsūṭ samudāyasya ṃttive. Kaiyaṭa’s remark is (I, p. 141): \textit{kesāncit pāṭhah suparṣyāptaḥ caiva hi iti}. This reading does not occur in any of Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

[23]

(vi) P. 1.1.6 vt. 2 \textit{dīḍhyad iti śyan vyatayayena} (Mbh I, p. 56, l. 9) has at least one variant reading according to Bhartṛhari (Ms 42b11-c1; Sw 149.1 and 5; AL 127.10-11 and 13-14), viz. \textit{ṣap vyatayayena} and perhaps another one. Kaiyaṭa (I, p. 142) records the variant reading \textit{sō vyatayayena}. Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(vii) Mbh I, p. 56, l. 18 (on P. 1.1.7) \textit{avidyamānam antaram esām iti} occurs in two forms in Bhartṛhari’s commentary (Ms 42d4 and 6; Sw 150.13 and 18; AL 128.18 and 21): \textit{avidyamānam antaram yeśām} and \textit{avidyamānam antare (?) yeśām}. No second reading is known to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(viii) Mbh I, p. 60, l. 6-7 (on P. 1.1.8) has \textit{nāsikāvacano ‘nunāsika itiṭy ucyamāne yamānusvārāṇāṁ eva prasajyeta}. Bhartṛhari (Ms 45d12-46a1; Sw 162.26-27; AL 140.22-23) knows both the readings \textit{yamānusvārāṇāṁ} and \textit{yamānusvārāṇāṁ api}. Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(ix) Mbh I, p. 66, l. 3 (on P. 1.1.11) has \textit{udāttānudāttasvaritānāṁ}. Bhartṛhari (Ms 50d7-8; AL 156.1-2; CE V.1.21) quotes this (repeating anudāttā- twice), then adds: \textit{anu[nā]sikagrahaṇāṁ apy anyeśām vidyate}. Kaiyaṭa states, similarly (I, p. 163): \textit{kvacid anunāsikagrahaṇāṁ apy asti}. This reading is not known to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(x) Mbh I, p. 67, l. 23-24 (on P. 1.1.11 vt. 5) has \textit{atra hiḍādi dvivacanāṁ tadaṁ ca bhavati pratayalakṣaṇanāṁ}. Bhartṛhari records two readings (Ms 54d3-5; AL 165.11-14; CE V.9.19-22): \textit{tatra hi īḍādi ca dvivacanaṁ tadaṁ ca bhavati pratayalakṣaṇanāṁ as well as atra hi īḍāyantām śrūyate dvivacanaṁ ca bhavati pratayalakṣaṇanāṁ}. Kaiyaṭa records the variant reading \textit{īḍāyantām ca śrūyate} (I, p. 167). Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(xi) P. 1.1.17-18 vt. 2 together with the Bhāṣya introducing and following it read (Mbh I, p. 72, l. 10-13): \textit{kimartho yogavibhāgah/ū vā śākalyasya (vt. 2)/ śākalyasyācāryasya matenaū vibhāśā yathā syāḥ/ū iti u iti/anyeśām acāryāṇāṁ matena v iti/}. [24] All this is missing in Bhartṛhari’s commentary. Surprisingly, Bhartṛhari only knows the reading \textit{kimartho yogavibhāgah śākalyavibhāsā mā bhūt} (Ms 58c9; AL 176.7-8; CE V.18.5), which he apparently did not find in all his manuscripts, and which presents great problems of interpretation (see CE V Notes p. 121). No trace of this Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

\(^{19}\) Cf. AL 125 fn. 7.
(xii) Mbh I, p. 93, l. 8 (on P. 1.1.35) has jñātidhanaparyāyavācī. According to others, Bhārtrāhari tells us (Ms 73d5-6; AL 219.2-3; CE VI.30.26), the reading is ajñātidhanaparyāyavācī. Kielhorn's manuscripts do not know this reading.

(xiii) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3) has tasyāsādhvabhimatasya. Bhārtrāhari (Ms 95a5-6; AL 273.14) may know this reading, besides sādhvabhimatasya, if Abhyankar and Limaye were right in reconstructing: tatra sādhvabhimatasyeti granthaly/ ta evaṃ varṇayanti sādhūnām abhimatasyeti/. Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(xiv) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 6 (on P. 1.1.50 vt. 2) has kvacid vairūpyam. Bhārtrāhari (Ms 104c3-4; AL 298.19, 24-25) knows the alternative reading dvairūpyam. Kielhorn's manuscripts don't.

(xv) Bhārtrāhari (Ms 105c10; AL 301.23) informs us that ‘some’ read the line uḥ sthāne ‘eva bhavati raparasa ca ...(Mbh I, p. 125, l. 17, on P. 1.1.51; repeated p. 126, l. 5, under vt. 2) without eva. Kaiyāṭa, too, knows both readings, with and without eva (I, p. 275); none of Kielhorn's manuscripts does.

(xvi) Mbh I, p. 129, l. 5 kalpipadasamghātabhakto 'sau ... (on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9) is known in two forms to Bhārtrāhari (Ms 107c6; AL 307.15-16). The alternative reading seems to be kalpipadasamghātabhakto 'yam, although Kaiyāṭa (I, p. 282) records the variant kalpapadasamghāta-. No variant in Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(xvii) Mbh I, p. 130, l. 4 (on P. 1.1.52) has kim idam algraḥanam antyaviśeṣaṇam āhosvid ādeśaviśeṣaṇam. Bhārtrāhari [25] (Ms 108b9; AL 309.8) records the alternative reading kim idam algraḥanam antyaviśeṣaṇam/ evaṃ bhavitum arhati/. Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts.

The variant readings by Bhārtrāhari show that he worked with several manuscripts. If the interpretation of Bhārtrāhari's verses which we considered above is correct, we must assume that Bhārtrāhari received his manuscripts, directly or indirectly, from Candra and his colleagues. We would not in that case expect so many variant readings. These variant readings may therefore be taken as an indication that Bhārtrāhari's verses have to be interpreted differently.

7. Peculiar readings accepted in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā.

This same conclusion is supported in another way too. If Bhārtrāhari lived very near the time of the manuscripts from which all later manuscripts derive, we might expect that the text of the Mahābhāṣya which he knew, and to some extent even codified, is the ancestor of the archetype that our present manuscripts go back to. This does not seem to be the case. The Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā contains indications that at times
it accepts without question a reading which today does not survive in any manuscripts, whereas it does not seem to be aware of the manuscript readings known to us.

Some examples of readings peculiar to Bharṭṛhari will now be given. It is to kept in mind that the bad state of our one surviving manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā does not allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions from simple deviations between Bhāṣya passages and their citation in the Dīpikā, as long as these deviations are not corroborated otherwise.

(i) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 28 - p. 6, l. 1 has caturbhiṣ ca prakārair viyopayuktā bhavaty āgamakālēna svādhyāyakālēna pravacanakālēna vyavahārakālēneti. The manuscript of Bharṭṛhari’s commentary cites the first part of this sentence as follows (Ms 6a9; Sw 21.15; AL 17.4): caturbhiṣ ca prakārair vidyopayulko- [26] (or: vidyopakalko-) payuktā bhavati. This is easily emended into ... vidyopayuktopayuktā ... Bharṭṛhari’s following discussion shows that this was indeed his accepted reading:

   caturbhiṣ ca prakārair vidyopayuktopayuktā bhavati/ ardho- (Ms atho-)payuktāpi saty anupayuktā bhavati nishphalatvāt/ athavā loke ekadesopayogād apy upayukta (Ms upayuktopayukta) iti ganyate/ tad yathopayuktam gṛhtam iti/ evam idaṁ naikadesopayogād upayuktam iti/ kim tarhi/ samudāyopayogād upayuktam iti eva kathayati/ 

   Knowledge when used in the four ways [to be specified in the sequel] is used [in the proper sense of the word]. Even when used half it is [properly speaking] unused because it carries not fruit. Alternatively, [something] is ‘used’ in the world even though [only] a part [of it] has been used. An example is: “Ghee has been used.” Here [however] something is not in similar fashion [considered] ‘used’ because a part [of it] has been used. Rather, one speaks [of something] as ‘used’ because the totality [of it] has been used.

This passage distinguishes throughout between two manners of ‘used’, viz. between ‘incompletely used’ and ‘completely used’; only the latter is considered really ‘used’. These two meanings of ‘used’ correspond to the two occurrences of upayuktā in the Bhāṣya passage. Kielhorn’s manuscript A preserves the reading upayuktopayuktā.

(ii) Mbh I, p. 1, l. 18-19 quotes the following line: brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ śaḍaṅgo veda ʿdhyeyo jñeya[h]. Bharṭṛhari cites this in the form brāhmaṇena niskāraṇo dharmaḥ śaḍaṅgo veda ʿdhyeyalḥ (Ms 3c2-3; Sw 10.6; AL 8.18-19), without jñeyah. A priori there is much to support Bharṭṛhari’s reading. The words adhyeyah and jñeyah carry rather different meanings; adhi-i and its derivatives mean ‘memorizing’,

THREE PROBLEMS

22
Knowing, understanding’. Their difference is emphasized in a [27] verse quoted on the next page of the Mahābhāṣya (I, p. 2, l. 15-16); it reads:

\begin{center}
yad adhitam avijñātam nigadenaiva śabdyate/  
anagnāv iva śuskaidho na taj jvalati karhicit\end{center}

What is memorized but not understood is uttered as mere Vedic recitation; like dry fuel where there is no fire, it does not burn at any time.

Moreover, it is the duty of a Brahmin to memorize the Veda (svādhyāyō 'dhyetavyah TA 2.15; ŚB 11.5.6.3, 7.2, etc.), not to understand it.

These a priori considerations are supported by the fact that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Tantravārttika on Pūrva Mimāṃsā Śūtra 1.3.24 (p. 199) quotes the above line, in a discussion on the role of grammar in which lines from the first Āgni of the Mahābhāṣya are repeatedly dealt with, in precisely the form used by Bhartṛhari, i.e. without jñeyaḥ.

Also Kielhorn’s manuscript A is without jñeyaḥ.

We are entitled to conclude that the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya used by Bhartṛhari were without jñeyaḥ.

[A minor question remains: Did Kumārila obtain his reading from Bhartṛhari or independently from manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya? There can be no doubt that Kumārila knew the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā: he quotes a verse[20] from it which he ascribes to a tikākāra to whom he also ascribes a verse which is found in the Vākyapadiya (2.14). Moreover, both Kumārila and Bhartṛhari quote a line from the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.84 vt. 5 in a context which deals with the first (Paspaṇā) Óhnika of the Mahābhāṣya, both in the same incorrect form, viz. ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyak jñātah[28] suprayuktah sāstrānvitaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati (Kumārila on Pūrva Mimāṃsā Śūtra 1.3.24, p. 189; Bhartṛhari: Ms 4d8-9; Sw 15.10-11; AL 12.15-16). The Mahābhāṣya (III.58.14-15) has the order of the words suprayuktah sāstrānvitaḥ reversed,[21] Kumārila may for this reason be considered as giving evidence that the

---

20 The verse is āngāni jñānamānī upamā cendriyāni ca/ etāni noham gacchanti adhigau viṣamam hitat/ which occurs in the Tantravārttika on Pūrva Mimāṃsā Śūtra 1.3.24 (p. 187), and in the Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā Ms 3a2-3; Sw 8.16-17; AL 7.10-11. See further Swaminathan, 1963: 69-70.

21 We do not have to assume that Bhartṛhari’s manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya had the line in the form given by Bhartṛhari. (i) For one thing, Bhartṛhari tends to quote passages from the Mahābhāṣya other than those he is immediately commenting upon inaccurately. One instance of this has been discussed in Bronkhorst, 1985: 125 fn. 2. Another instance is Ms 7c9, Sw 26.17-19, AL 22.2-3: tathā coktam/ svabhāvata ete śabdānām ete śabdānām kriyate/ tad yathā/ kūpe hastadaksinān iti/. The quotation is from Mbh I.363.11-13 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 1): svabhāvata ete śabdānām eteśv artheśv abhinivātēnān nimitativānān śabdānām kriyate/ tad yathā/ kūpe hastadaksinān panthāḥ/. A third instance occurs in the third Āgni (Ms 31b5-6; Sw 113.15-17; AL 96.4-6; CE III.3.20-22): yathā anadvāhām utdahāri yatvam vahasi śrīvām bhaginī kumbham sācinām abhidhāvantam adraksīṁ iti. This is from Mbh I.152.26 - 153.1 (on P. 1.1.58 vt. 1): tad yathā/ anadvāhām utdahāri ya tvaṁ harasi śrīvām kumbham bhaginī sācinām abhidhāvantam adraksīṁ iti/. (Note that the Yuktidīpikā has the line in a form close to Bhartṛhari’s; cf. Bronkhorst, 1990: 129 with n. 9). (ii) Moreover, this same line is quoted again in
reading without \textit{jñeyaḥ} was found in Bhartṛhari's commentary and in the manuscripts of the \textit{Mahābhāṣya} used by Bhartṛhari, not that this was the only reading in existence in those days.]

(iii) \textit{Mbh I}, p. 6, l. 24-25 has \textit{athavā pūrvapadalopo 'tra draṣṭavyah}. Bhartṛhari cites this as \textit{athavā pūrvottarapadalopo 'tra draṣṭavyah} (Ms 8c3; Sw 29.15; AL 24.16). His immediately following sentence reads \textit{kaḥ punar ayaṃ pūrvottarapadopāyaḥ}, which confirms that \textit{uttara} really belongs here. Further confirmation comes a few lines later (Ms 8c6; Sw 29.22-23; AL 24.22-23) where by way of illustration it is stated: \textit{satyabhāmā-[29]śabdena saha satyaśabdo bhāmāśabdaś ca nispādyate}. Here both \textquoteleftSatya\textquoteright{} and \textquoteleftBhāmā\textquoteright{} are given as abbreviations of the name \textquoteleftSatyabhāmā\textquoteright{}. But in order to obtain \textquoteleftSatya\textquoteright{} on the basis of \textquoteleftSatyabhāmā\textquoteright{}, we need elision of the last part of the compound (\textit{uttarapadalopa}). Bhartṛhari similarly mentions \textit{jye} as an (incorrect) abbreviation of \textit{jyeḥḥā} in the same context (Ms 8c7; Sw 29.24; AL 24.24)\textsuperscript{22} which would be inappropriate without the word \textit{uttara} in the \textit{Bhāṣya}. The reading with \textit{uttara} is not found in any of Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(iv) \textit{Mbh I}, p. 7, l. 20 has \textit{na kvacid uparateti kṛtvā sarvatroparataḥ bhavati dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhāyate}. Bhartṛhari's commentary quotes this as (Ms 9b5-6 & 9; Sw 32.22 & 33.1; AL 27.13 & 19): \textit{na kvacid uparateti kṛtvātaḥ sarvatroparatā bhavati ... dravyāntarasthopalabhāyate}. The element \textit{ataḥ} is found again in this passage as quoted in the commentary on the Nirukta ascribed to Skandasvāmin-Maheśvara (I, p. 16, l. 16 - p. 17, l. 1): \textit{na kvacid uparatety ataḥ sarvatroparatā bhavati}. The element \textit{tu} of Kielhorn's edition was apparently not known to Bhartṛhari, because he explains \textit{dravyāntarasthābhivyajyāyate}, again without \textit{tu}. Skandasvāmin-Maheśvara quote the remainder of the sentence as \textit{piṇḍāntarasthopalabhāyate}, also without \textit{tu}. \textit{Ataḥ} and the reading without \textit{tu} are not found in Kielhorn's manuscripts.

The following example is less decisive, yet deserves consideration:

(v) \textit{Mbh I}, p. 11, l. 4 has \textit{athavābhhyupāya evāpaśabdajñānam śabdajñāne}. Bhartṛhari cites this as \textit{athavābhhyupāya evāpaśabdajñānam śabdajñānasya} (Ms 12a6; Sw 44.13; AL 37.10). The very next sentence begins \textit{yaś ca yasyābhhyupāyah ...}, thus suggesting that the reading \textit{śabdajñānasya} is no error. It does not occur in Kielhorn's manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{22} Also in VP 2.363 (361 in Iyer's edition) and in the \textit{Vṛtti} thereon.
8. **Bhartṛhari’s position in the text history of the Mahābhāṣya.**

The evidence here collected shows, first of all, that Bhartṛhari knew manuscripts which have no apparent relationship with the ones surviving today. It seems therefore most reasonable to place him, not on the main line of transmission of Mahābhāṣya manuscripts, but rather among some of the side branches which apparently existed in his time. This can be depicted as follows:

```
  Patañjali
     /   \
    /     \   
   /       \   
  Bhartṛhari
     /   \
    /     \   
   /       \   
  archetype
     /   \
    /     \   
   /       \   
  extant manuscripts
```

We cannot, however, leave Bhartṛhari without paying some attention to Kielhorn’s manuscript A, which in two cases - (i) and (ii) of section 7 - has the same reading as Bhartṛhari. How is this to be explained?

The most likely explanation is no doubt that a learned scribe, under the influence of Bhartṛhari’s commentary, introduced these readings into the text. There is however another possibility which deserves consideration. It requires that we know something more about this manuscript A and how it has been used in the edition of the Mahābhāṣya. Kielhorn describes his use of this manuscripts in a footnote to his Preface to the First Edition of the Mahābhāṣya, a footnote which was apparently added after the preparation of the second edition, in the following words (I, p. 10, fn.1): "While revising the text for the second edition, I have occasionally compared also the MSS. A. and K., described in the preface of Vol. II.; but I have not been able to use these MSS. throughout." This means that Kielhorn’s edition by itself may not always contain enough information to decide whether readings peculiar to Bhartṛhari are present in manuscript A as well. A closer comparison of manuscript A with the text of the Mahābhāṣya as known to Bhartṛhari remains a desideratum.
Kielhorn describes manuscript A in his Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, which in Abhyankar's edition of the text has been placed in the beginning of Vol. III (pp. 11-33). We read there (p. 11) that manuscript A is "a carefully made and complete copy of the whole Mahābhāṣya, written for Ananta-sarasvatī by one Jāgeśvara at Vṛddhinagara (Vaḍnagar) in Saṃvat 1545 and 1546." What interests us here in particular is that the manuscript came from Vaḍnagar. This is a small town in Gujarat, north of Ahmedabad. Of all the other manuscripts used by Kielhorn none came from Gujarat; all of them came from different parts of India.

This information is of particular interest for the following reason. There are independent reasons to think that Bhartṛhari lived in Gujarat or northern Mahārāṣṭra. I have discussed these reasons in an article which came out a few years ago (1983: 395-397). Is it coincidence that the Mahābhāṣya manuscript from Gujarat is the only one to preserve readings known to Bhartṛhari? It may be so, yet it is tempting to consider the possibility that the text tradition of the Mahābhāṣya as known to Bhartṛhari survived for a long time in Western India, and even influenced - ‘contaminated’ - the text tradition which was to become standard, and which became the basis of Kielhorn's edition of this text.

It may or may not be possible to answer the above question. If it can be answered at all, it is only on the basis of a thorough study of Mahābhāṣya manuscripts from Western India.23


We turn to another important author connected with the Mahābhāṣya; this is Kaiyāta. Kaiyāta is the most famous commentator on the Mahābhāṣya. He lived many centuries after Bhartṛhari, but admits his indebtedness to the latter in the introductory verses of his commentary. We shall see that this indebtedness may have extended farther than we would expect.

There is reason to believe that all the variant readings recorded in Kaiyāta's Pradīpa on the first seven Āhnikas of the Mahābhāṣya were taken from Bhartṛhari's Dīpikā.24 Seven of the variant readings mentioned by Kaiyāta have been noted above under numbers (iii), (v), (vi), (ix), (x), (xv) and (xvi) of section 6. There is only one further variant reading recorded by Kaiyāta in the first seven Āhnikas, viz., on Mbh I, p.

---

23 With the kind permission of the authorities I have been able to inspect two Mahābhāṣya manuscripts in Gujarat: nr. 937 in the Shri Hemachandracharya Jain Jnanamandir, in Patan; and nr. 2796 of the Munirāja Śrī Punyavijaya Collection in the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. Both these manuscripts agree with the majority of Kielhorn's manuscripts, and not with his manuscript A.
24 This was already observed by Kielhorn (1880-1885: III: 24 fn. 1).
76, l. 17 (on P. 1.1.21 vt. 1), i.e., on p. 187 of the edition of the Pradīpa. Here the manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā shows a gap; the whole of the Dīpikā on P. 1.1.21 is lost, as has been pointed out by the editors and translators of this part of the text - V. P. Limaye, G. B. Palsule, and V. B. Bhagavat - in their ‘Notes’ (see CE V Notes p. 145).

The chance that Kaiyaṭa would record variant readings only where Bhartṛhari's Dīpikā does so without following Bhartṛhari is diminishingly small and can be rejected. The extremely bad [33] condition of the manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā, moreover, does not allow us to draw any conclusions from the fact that Kaiyaṭa's formulations sometimes seem to deviate from Bhartṛhari's.

The situation being as described, it is very tempting to develop the following hypothesis. For reasons which will be considered below, Kaiyaṭa followed Bhartṛhari throughout in the matter of variant readings. As a matter of fact, Kaiyaṭa's close adherence to Bhartṛhari in all other matters is patent when corresponding portions of the two commentaries are read side by side. Indeed, the introductory verses to Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa mention [Bhartṛ-]hari's commentary and compare it to the bridge (setu) used by Kaiyaṭa, who is "like a cripple (paṅguvat)", in order to reach the other shore of the ocean which is the Mahābhāṣya.25

We cannot of course exclude the possibility that Kaiyaṭa derived variant readings from other manuscripts later on in his study of the Mahābhāṣya. We do not, however, have any indication that this is what he did. It may well be that all the variant readings recorded by Kaiyaṭa, throughout the Mahābhāṣya, were copied from Bhartṛhari's commentary.

10. The original extent of Bhartṛhari's commentary.

This, if true, provides us with a method to find out what part of the Mahābhāṣya was commented upon by the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā as it was known to Kaiyaṭa. As we know, the opinion has been defended that Bhartṛhari's original commentary did not cover more than the first three Pādas of the Mahābhāṣya. This position has been defended most vigorously by Ashok Aklujkar (1971), who has three arguments to support it. His first argument is that Vardhamāna describes Bhartṛhari as "the explainer of three Pādas of the Mahābhāṣya" (mahābhāṣyatīpādyā vyākhyāta). But [34] Vardhamāna lived in the twelfth century, which is long after Bhartṛhari.26 Aklujkar's

---

25 Joshi and Roodbergen's claim (1986: 4 fn. 8) that the reference is to the Vākyapādiya is completely unsupported and difficult to understand.

26 Note Belvalkar's suggestion (1915: 35 fn. 3) that the ‘Tripādi’ is the Vākyapādiya, and compare this with Helarāja's remark below.
second argument is a line in Helārāja’s commentary which reads: *trailokyagāminī yena trikāṇḍī tripādī kṛtā*. Aklujkar thinks that “it is obvious that *Tripādī* is the same as *Tripādi*” (p. 162 n. 1), but Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1973: I: 376) rightly points out that this evidence is of dubious value.

Aklujkar’s third argument is that I-ching gives the extent of Bhartṛhari’s commentary as 25,000 ślokas. Since the surviving part of Bhartṛhari’s commentary, which covers about two-thirds of the first Pāda, has an approximate extent of 5,700 ślokas, Aklujkar concludes (p. 163): “It is clear then that 25,000 śloka-s could not have been the extent of a work that covered more than three pāda-s.” Aklujkar points out in a footnote that Kielhorn (1883: 226 (185)) and Y. Mīmāṃsaka (1973: I: 373) arrived at the same conclusion.

It is clear that I-ching’s testimony, dating from the seventh century and being therefore the earliest evidence available, carries great weight. Let us look at it more closely. In Kielhorn’s edition the first seven Āhnikas of the Mahābhāṣya - i.e., the part on which Bhartṛhari’s commentary has survived - cover 132 pages. The first three Pādas fill altogether 295 pages, that is slightly more than twice as many. According to Aklujkar's theory, Bhartṛhari’s commentary on the second half of the first three Pādas covered more than three times the number of pages which Bhartṛhari needed for the first seven Āhnikas. Add to this that Bhartṛhari's surviving commentary is extremely elaborate, and it will be clear that the idea that the remainder of his commentary was almost thrice as elaborate is completely unacceptable. The opposite view that his commentary became less elaborate as he proceeded, represents a real possibility, or even a probability.27 [35] I-ching’s account of the extent of Bhartṛhari's commentary is therefore compatible with the view that this commentary originally covered the whole of the Mahābhāṣya.

Aklujkar’s argument is further marred by the fact that he has to provide rather forced explanations in order to account for some seeming references in later authors to parts of Bhartṛhari’s commentary which according to Aklujkar never existed.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of all these problems. We considered the possibility that Kaiyāṭa derived all his variant readings in the Mahābhāṣya from Bhartṛhari’s commentary. Kaiyāṭa records variant readings fairly regularly throughout the Mahābhāṣya. The last one occurs on P. 8.4.68 (III, p. 510), i.e., on the very last sūtra discussed in the Mahābhāṣya. This may be taken as additional evidence in support of the view that Bhartṛhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya originally covered the whole of that text.

---

27 Kaiyāṭa’s commentary is more or less equally divided over the different portions. Barring counting mistakes, it fills 2977 lines in the Rohataka edition on the first 9 Āhnikas, 3342 lines on the remainder of the first 3 Pādas.
11. Further supporting evidence.

The theory that Kaiyaṭa borrowed all or almost all his variant readings from Bhartṛhari is attractive, but further supporting evidence would make it stronger. It is not easy to find such further evidence. Direct information regarding the shape of the Mahābhāṣya as it was known to Bhartṛhari is lacking, apart from the small portion covered by the surviving part of Bhartṛhari’s commentary. We do, however, seem to have some, if ever so limited, information about the Mahābhāṣya as it existed in the centuries before Bhartṛhari. This information is indirect and must be dealt with carefully. A few introductory remarks are therefore necessary.

The Kāśikā contains many phrases and passages which look like quotations from the Mahābhāṣya. In the majority of cases these are identical with their prototypes in the Mahābhāṣya. Sometimes, however, they seem to have been adjusted to the [36] specific needs of the Kāśikā, and are not therefore identical with their prototypes. A third category is constituted by the cases where it is hard to see why changes should have been introduced, yet the ‘quoted’ lines differ from the corresponding lines in the Mahābhāṣya. Some of these last cases might be considered testimony of the, or an, earlier shape of the Mahābhāṣya.

It is known that the Kāśikā made use of one or more earlier works - most probably one or more commentaries on the Aṣṭādhyāyī - which work(s) also influenced the grammar of Candra(-gomin). It is likely that the lines in the Kāśikā which deviate from the Mahābhāṣya were borrowed, not directly from the Mahābhāṣya, but through the intermediary of this other work or these other works.

There is evidence which supports this. Some of the deviating phrases in the Kāśikā are found identically in Candra’s grammar. The following are examples:

(i) All the manuscripts inspected by Kielhorn give the following example in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.3.20 vt. 2: vyādādate pīpilikāḥ pataṅgamukham. The Kāśikā on P. 1.3.20 and Candra on C. 1.4.55 give the same example as vyādādate pīpilikāḥ pataṅgasya mukham.

(ii) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.3.27 vt. 1 (all manuscripts) reads: uttapatē pāṇī/ vitapatē pāṇī/. The Kāśikā and Candra on C. 1.4.74 read this as uttapatē pāṇim (...) vitapatē pāṇim.

---

28 One point has been discussed in Bronkhorst, 1983: 374-75.
(iii) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.4.52 vt. 7 (all manuscripts) illustrates: *bhakṣayanti/ bhakṣayati balīvardān yavān*. The Kāśikā and Candra on C. 2.1.49 have: *bhakṣayanti/ bhakṣayati balīvardān sasyam*.30

(iv) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 2.2.24 vt. 13 (I, p. 242, l. 1; all manuscripts) reads: *keśānāṃ samāhāraś cūḍā asya keśacūḍāḥ*. Some manuscripts of the Kāśikā and Candra on C. 2.2.46 read: *keśasaṃghātaś cūḍā aasya keśacūḍāḥ*.

This enumeration is by no means complete; yet it shows that we have to choose one out of two alternatives. The first one is that the Kāśikā, and presumably Candra, quoted directly from the Mahābhāṣya. In that case we have to accept that the Mahābhāṣya which they knew differed from its present form in certain respects. The second and more likely alternative is that the Bhāṣya quotations in the Kāśikā and in Candra reached these texts through the intermediary of one or more other, earlier, texts. The deviations in the Kāśikā may then bear witness to the state of the Mahābhāṣya in the time before Candra, or they must be explained as due to the carelessness or imagination of the author(s) of these earlier texts.

All this shows that the deviant readings in the Kāśikā must be treated with caution. We should furthermore be aware that the tendency in recent centuries may have been to adjust the text of the Kāśikā to the accepted text of the Mahābhāṣya, i.e., to the text as we find it in Kielhorn’s edition. It is difficult, probably impossible, to determine the extent to which this adjustment has affected the manuscripts of the Kāśikā, but we can form an impression by comparing the corrupt Vedic quotations in the Mahābhāṣya with the Kāśikā. We have seen that Rau could correct a number of these quotations. Most of these quotations do not occur in the Kāśikā, but some do, and they present the following picture:

(i) Rau (1985: 54) proposes the following emendation for a line quoted in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 7.4.48 vt. 1 (III, p. 351, l. 25; p. 352, l. 3): *mādhiṣṭvā candro vṛtrahā*. Both the Mahābhāṣya and the Kāśikā contain the presumably incorrect line *mādbhir iṣṭvā indro vṛtrahā*.

(ii) Rau (1985: 38) proposes to read *dadbhih psātam* for *adbhiḥ psātam* in the Bhāṣya on P. 8.3.37 vt. 2 (III, p. 431, l. 14-15) and in the same supposedly incorrect form in the Kāśikā.

(iii) An interesting case is the line *dārviyā parijman* in the Bhāṣya on P. 7.1.39 vt. 1 (III, p. 256, l. 23). Limaye (1974: 619) proposes the emendation *urviyā pari khyan*. The Kāśikā has both these lines.

30 For a discussion of the meaning of this line in its context, see Wezler, 1986.
Against these cases where the Kāśikā seems to have adopted readings from the recent version of the Mahābhāṣya, there are others where the Kāśikā appears to embody a different, and better, tradition:

(i) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.76 vt. 1 (III, p. 51, l. 22) quotes: na (c)chāyāṁ kuravo ‘parām. The last word must be ‘param, and this is how the line is quoted in the Kāśikā (apparently in all the manuscripts used by the editors).

(ii) The Bhāṣya on P. 6.2.199 vt. 1 (III, p. 140, l. 12) misquotes the line tricakreṇa trivandhureṇa trīrvatā rathena. The first word tricakreṇa belongs at the end, and that is where we find it in the Kāśikā.

(iii) Kielhorn himself was sometimes convinced of the superiority of the reading in the Kāśikā. On P. 5.4.27 vt. 5 (II, p. 434, l. 14) he accepts the reading āyur varcasyam against the evidence of all his manuscripts, on the strength of the occurrence of āyur varcasyaḥ in his manuscript of the Kāśikā on P. 5.4.25. (Note that all the manuscripts used by Aryendra Sharma et al. have vāyur varcasyaḥ, which agrees better with some of Kielhorn’s manuscripts.)

This evidence justifies a certain amount of confidence that the Kāśikā may provide us with independent Bhāṣya readings in certain cases. These readings, moreover, may date back to the time preceding Candra, if indeed they reached the Kāśikā through earlier works.

With this in mind, we look at the Bhāṣya on P. 5.3.45 vt. 1, where we find the illustration pathi dvaidhāni. A number of Kāśikā manuscripts read matidvaidhāni in this context; the reading pathi dvaidhāni in other manuscripts may be explained by the influence from the Mahābhāṣya tradition. The reading matidvaidhāni is moreover recorded by Kaiyaṭa as a variant! Kaiyaṭa never records reading found in the Kāśikā, so we may be sure that this reading occurred at some time in some manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya. The fact that the Kāśikā has this reading may be taken as an indication that it may have been in existence in the time before Candra.

Even more interesting in this connection is Kaiyaṭa’s rejection of the reading paṭukalpā in the Bhāṣya on P. 6.3.35 vt. 4; Kaiyaṭa prefers darśaniyakalpā. But paṭukalpā occurs under the corresponding rule in Candra’s grammar, C. 5.2.31, even though Kaiyaṭa’s criticism of this form would also hold in Candra’s grammar. We may

---

31 Kielhorn is again influenced by the Kāśikā on P. 4.1.66 (II, p. 227, l. 7), where he chooses the reading dhīvabandhū because he finds it in the Kāśikā. Here too Kielhorn’s manuscripts of the Kāśikā differ from those used by Aryendra Sharma et al.; the latter have throughout virabandhū at all the places indicated by Kielhorn, or nothing at all.
conclude from this that here again the variant reading recorded by Kaiyata existed already during the time of, or before, Candra.\footnote{A correct evaluation of this and the next case is hampered by the fact that the third volume of Kielhorn’s edition of the Mahabhasya has no critical apparatus.}

Kaiyata records the variant \textit{dirghaputapratishedha} for \textit{dirghapratishedha} in P. 8.4.68 vt. 1. The \textit{Kasika} on this sutra contains the line \textit{dirghaputayo\vs c\={a}nena viv\={r}t\={e}na akare\={\textperiodcentered}a graha\={\textperiodcentered}am nes\={y}ate}, which may indicate that it knew - directly or indirectly - the \textit{varttika} concerned with the variant recorded by Kaiyata.

These three cases support the view that at least some, and perhaps all the variant readings recorded by Kaiyata existed before Candra, and may indeed have been borrowed by Kaiyata from Bhartihari.

\section*{12. Kaiyata’s manuscripts.}

We turn to the question why Kaiyata borrowed his variant readings from Bhartihari. In order to answer this question we may recall that Kaiyata most probably lived in the eleventh century, not long after the probable date of the archetype of extant Mahabhasya manuscripts. We may further bring to mind that Kaiyata hardly ever has a reading which deviates from the extant manuscripts, except where he records variant readings, i.e., where we suspect the influence of Bhartihari. It seems therefore that Kaiyata used as manuscripts one or more descendants from the archetype and those only. Few variant readings had yet found their way into these manuscripts.

Some remarks by Kaiyata himself support this view. Commenting on the concluding lines of the Bh\={a}sy on P. 6.1.162, Kaiyata expresses the view that the correct order of sentences has been changed due to the carelessness of a scribe \textit{(lekhakapramad\={a}t tu sthan\={a}ntare nyasta\={h})}. On the concluding lines of the Bh\={a}sy on P. 8.4.47, similarly, Kaiyata claims that carelessness of a scribe is responsible for the incorrect shape of the text \textit{(p\={a}tho ‘yam lekhakapramad\={a}n na\={s}ta\={h})}. Kaiyata does not give any indication that he knew a manuscript which had the sentences in the correct order. In other words, he admits that the manuscript(s) he used could have been affected by one single scribe. This leaves two possibilities: either Kaiyata used no more than one manuscript; or he used several, but considered it possible - or even certain - that they all derived from one shared archetype.

To what extent can Kaiyaṭa's position with regard to the text of the Mahābhāṣya be connected with the enigmatic account of [41] the history of the Mahābhāṣya in the fourth book of Kalhaṇa's Rājatarāṅgini? Kaiyaṭa's name suggests that he came from Kashmir, and the Rājatarāṅgini deals with the history of Kashmir. Verses 4.488-89 recount that the Mahābhāṣya had ceased to be studied in Kashmir; a revival was brought about by kind Jayāpiḍa, who was a pupil of the grammarian Kṣīra.33

If we take Kalhaṇa at his word it will not be possible to connect the events here described with the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya underlying the manuscripts know to Kaiyaṭa, and to us. King Jayāpiḍa ruled in the eighth century, and the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya dates from around 1000. But we may consider the possibility that Kalhaṇa's account is not fully reliable here. Apart from the Rājatarāṅgini there is no evidence that Jayāpiḍa did what is here ascribed to him. Nor do we know of a grammarian named Kṣīra who lived in that century. We do know, however, of a grammarian Kṣīra(-śvāmin) in Kashmir who lived in or before the middle of the eleventh century (Belvalkar, 1915: 43; Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: II: 89 f.). If we tentatively assume that Kalhaṇa wrongly attributed an event connected with the grammarian Kṣīrasvāmin, which took place in the eleventh century, to king Jayāpiḍa, and therefore to the eighth century, the three strands which we have considered - the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya, Kaiyaṭa, and the account in the Rājatarāṅgini - come together in the beginning of the eleventh century, in Kashmir. It must of course be admitted that this conclusion is highly speculative, but perhaps these speculations can give rise to fruitful research in the future.


With Kaiyaṭa we have come back at the point from which we started. It seems likely that Kaiyaṭa belongs to the text [42] tradition of the Mahābhāṣya to which also Kielhorn's edition belongs. This text tradition goes back to one shared archetype, which seems to date from a time not long before Kaiyaṭa.

The idea that this archetype itself is a descendant of the text used by Bhārtṛhari cannot be taken for granted. The text commented upon by Bhārtṛhari deviates in some essential points from the text of the archetype. What is more, it is clear from

33 Rājatarāṅgini 4.488-89 read: deśāntarākāgamayya vṛcaksāraṁ kṣamāpatih/ prāvartayaṁ vicchinnaṁ mahābhāṣyam svamaḍale// kṣirābhidhāc chābdavidyopādhyāyāṁ saṁbhṛtaśrutiḥ/ budhaiḥ saha yayau vṛddhim sa jayāpīḍapāṇḍitaḥ//.
Bhartṛhari’s commentary that he used different manuscripts which differed from each other in a number of points.
III. THE MAHĀBHĀŚYA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. The date of the Mahābhāśya.

The Mahābhāśya is an old text; this much we know. But how old is it exactly? In the second lecture of this series we say that the Mahābhāśya was commented upon by Bhartṛhari. It was also clear that the text must have been in existence for quite a while before Bhartṛhari: Bhartṛhari knows a number of variant readings, and what is more, the extant manuscripts of the Mahābhāśya do not seem to derive from the copies used by Bhartṛhari. Then there are the verses at the end of the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapādiya, according to which the tradition of the Mahābhāśya had been largely lost. All this makes clear that the Mahābhāśya already in the days of Bhartṛhari had a long history.

Bhartṛhari lived no later than the fifth century C.E.\(^{34}\) The Mahābhāśya must date from several centuries before this at the latest.

Is it possible to determine the date of the Mahābhāśya more precisely? The question has been much debated,\(^{35}\) and it seems certain that the Mahābhāśya was written around 150 B.C.E., or later. The crucial evidence in the Mahābhāśya consists of some examples, among them the following two:

(i) \(\text{aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam} \) "The Yavana besieged Sāketa".
(ii) \(\text{aruṇad yavanaḥ madhyamikām} \) "The Yavana besieged Madhyamikā".

These two examples occur under P. 3.2.111 vt. 2, and illustrate the use of the suffix \(\text{laṇ} \) in order to describe an event [44] that took place in the past before today, was not witnessed by the speaker but might have been witnessed by him, and is widely known. The Yavana in the examples has been identified as kind Menander. Patañjali must therefore have been a contemporary of Menander, which determines his date to be around 150 B.C.E.

Several scholars have pointed out that this argument is valid only if we can be sure that Patañjali himself introduced these examples. If he borrowed them from an earlier grammarian, they merely indicate that Patañjali lived after this date of around 150 B.C.E.

\(^{34}\) See Cardona, 1976: 298-99, for a brief survey of the relevant literature.

\(^{35}\) For a useful survey see Joshi and Roodbergen, 1976: i-xxxiv.
This is not the place to try to reach a final solution to this problem. It has occupied the minds of prominent Indologists for a long time, without having been definitely solved. This is unfortunate because much depends on the correct solution of this problem. Once Patañjali’s date can be fixed with some degree of certainty, we have a fixed point in the literary history of India, where there is a dearth of such fixed points. We need Patañjali’s date in order to make informed guesses about the date of Pāṇini, and the date of Pāṇini is one of the two main pillars on which traditionally our ideas of Vedic chronology are based.

I must add, however, that most scholars accept that Patañjali lived about 150 B.C.E., and that I shall do the same in the remainder of this lecture. But we must keep in mind that this date is not absolutely certain.

2 The relevance of the Mahābhāṣya for the study of Indian philosophy.

It seems, then, that the Mahābhāṣya existed already before the beginning of the Christian era. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between the Mahābhāṣya and the development of systematic philosophy in India. The treatises which we now possess on the different systems of Brahmanic philosophy all seem to date from the Christian era at the earliest, and in a number of cases from a demonstrably later date. The Mahābhāṣya appears to belong to a period when systematic philosophy in India was in its infancy, or even did not yet exist. It is therefore well worth studying from a philosophical point of view. But I am not going to present you with a complete philosophical study of the Mahābhāṣya during this lecture. That would of course be impossible. I shall rather confine myself to a single question, namely the question of the nature of the word and of the individual sound.

We start from some observations made by Erich Frauwallner in a short article about the infiltration of linguistic theory into the Indian philosophical systems (“Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme”, 1960).36

Frauwallner argued that ideas about the nature of the word entered from grammar into the Brahmanical systems. In this context he mentioned Mīmāṃsā in particular. This system looks upon the constituent sounds of words as being eternal, but denies the existence of a whole word different from the sounds. In this way the eternity of the Veda is meant to be proved, which is odd. Frauwallner explains the difficulty with the help of the influence of Vaiśeṣika ideas on Mīmāṃsā. The idea of the sound as an eternal entity was borrowed from the grammarians. The grammarians, however, also accepted the word as an eternal entity. Philosophical ideas borrowed

---

36 The contents of this article are largely repeated and expanded in Frauwallner, 1961.
from Vaiśeṣika left no space for words as independent entities; only sounds could be accepted as such.

Frauwallner is aware of the chronological implications of this view. It means that the doctrine of eternal sounds is relatively recent in Mīmāṃsā. And indeed, Frauwallner can adduce arguments which make it probable that the Mīmāṃsā sūtras (MiSū 1.1.6-23) in which this view is defended, are a later insertion into the Sūtra text. If we remove these sūtras the remainder fits well together. Sūtra 1.1.5 establishes that the [46] connection between word and meaning is natural (autpattika). Sūtra 1.1.24 takes up this same issue and raises the objection that if such be the case (utpattau), sentences would not naturally have a meaning. Frauwallner draws attention to the similarity in wording between the two sūtras: autpattika in the one, utpatti in the other. He finally points out that the so-called Vṛttikāragrantha, which occurs in Śabara's Bhāṣya on MiSū 1.1.5, ascribes the doctrine that words are nothing but their constituent sounds to Upavarsa, an early commentator on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra.37

Frauwallner compares the eternal individual sounds of the Mīmāṃsakas with the varṇasphoṭa of the grammarians, and thinks that they owe their existence to this concept. The idea of a varṇasphoṭa is however derived from that of a padasphoṭa. This in its turn means that a development must have taken place within the grammatical tradition in the time before these ideas made their appearance in the Mīmāṃsā texts. Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya is unfortunately of little use for studying this development. In Frauwallner's opinion Patañjali has no understanding whatsoever of linguistic theory and of philosophy.

Frauwallner's low opinion of Patañjali has been criticized by subsequent scholars,38 but only in general terms. The question remains whether we can learn anything from the Mahābhāṣya about the problem that engaged Frauwallner, that is, about the nature of sound and word. The remainder of this lecture will be dedicated to this question.

3. The nature of sound and word.

Regarding the nature of sound we can be brief. It appears that Patañjali knew the idea of an individual sound conceived of as an entity, different from its particular pronunciation by various [47] people in differing circumstances. His use of the word sphoṭa confirms this.

37 Frauwallner, 1961: 121 (319); 1968: 38.
Patañjali uses the word *sphoṭa* at only two occasions, both times in connection with individual speech sounds. On P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 he distinguishes between the *sphoṭa*, which is the *śabda*, and the *dhvani*, which is a quality of the *śabda*.\(^{39}\) It is true that the two passages in which Patañjali uses the term *sphoṭa* pose some difficulties of interpretation,\(^ {40}\) but these do not affect the main conclusion that for Patañjali there existed a sound entity different from the ‘noise’ that expressed, or perhaps: accompanied, it.

Patañjali is also aware of the notion of an eternal and unchanging sound (*varṇa*). We find it under Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12,\(^ {41}\) while under P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 Patañjali calls the sounds fixed (*avasthita*).

The relationship between sounds and words is perhaps most clearly discussed in the second Āhniṣṭya of the Mahābhāṣya (I, p. 30, l. 1 ff.). The question raised is whether individual sounds have meaning or not. A number of arguments support the view that they do, among them the observation that a collection (*samghāta*) of sounds has meaning. Other arguments are adduced to show that individual sounds have no meaning, which comes closer to Patañjali’s own opinion that most single sounds have no meaning, while certain verbal roots, suffixes, nominal stems and particles which consist of one sound do have meaning. Somewhere in this discussion Patañjali makes the remark (I, p. 31, l. 10):

\[\textit{samghāta}\text{aika}t\text{at}vam a\text{rthaḥ}\]

This seems to mean: "The collection is one single [entity, and this] one-ness is the meaning."

\[\text{[48]}\]

This remark is very noticeable, because there was no need whatsoever for Patañjali to make it. It is made by way of explanation of an expression in a *vārttika* (Śivasūtra 5 vt. 13) which reads *samghāta\text{kārthyaḥ}i* "because a collection has one single meaning". Patañjali here goes beyond the *vārttika* he is explaining, in that he states that a collection is a single entity. This statement is not further explained, nor does it play a significant role in the discussion.

It is not hard to imagine why Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity. Individual sounds do not occur simultaneously, not even in

---

\(^{39}\) I, p. 181, l. 19-20: \textit{evaṃ tarhi sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvaniḥ śabdagaṇaḥ}

\(^{40}\) See Joshi, 1967: 13 f.

\(^{41}\) I, p. 18, l. 14-15: \textit{nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajanavikāribhir}.
a single word. In another context Patañjali points out that in the word gauḥ the sounds au and h are not there while g is being pronounced, and similarly about the other sounds. For sounds disappear as soon as they have arisen (uccaritapradhvamsinah khalv api varṇāḥ). No single sound is the companion of another sound (na varṇo varṇasya sahāyah). Seen in this way it is hard to assign any form of existence whatsoever to words.

Yet Patañjali looks upon words as existing entities and, what is more, as eternal entities. Part of a vårttika in the first Āhnika reads siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe; Patañjali analyzes this as siddhe śabde 'ṛthasaṃbandhe ca (Mbh I, p. 6, l. 17) and interprets siddha to mean nitya ‘eternal’. In Patañjali’s interpretation therefore (which is almost certainly different from the one intended by the author of the vårttika) the word, its meaning (or denoted object), and the relation between the two are here stated to be eternal. But for a word to be eternal it has to exist first, and this makes it all the more understandable that Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity.

In order to understand what kind of entity a word is we return to the passage where Patañjali explained that the sounds of a word are not pronounced simultaneously. After this Patañjali [49] quotes a verse, then comments upon it in the following manner (Mbh I, p. 356, l. 9-13):

\begin{verbatim}
   buddhiviṣayam evaśabdānāṁ paurvāparyam/ iha ya esa manuṣyah
   prekṣāpūrvakāri bhavati sa paśyatya asmini arthe 'yaṃ śabdaḥ prayoktavyo
   'smīṁs tāvac chabde 'yaṃ tāvad varṇas tato 'yaṃ tato 'yaṃ iti/
\end{verbatim}

The first sentence seems to mean:

The sequence of sounds has the mind as its realm.

A more satisfactory translation would of course be possible if we could look upon buddhiviṣayam as a Tatpuruṣa compound. We could then translate:

The sequence of sounds is the object of the mind.

I am not, however, aware of an instance where viṣaya is a neuter word. The rest of the passage translates:

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize
42 On P. 1.4.109 vt. 10, Mbh I, p. 356, l. 5 f.
43 See note 3, above.
\end{footnotesize}
A man who thinks before he acts, sees: "In this meaning that word must be used, in this word first this sound, then that one, and then that one."

S. D. Joshi, in the Introduction to his edition and translation of the Sphoṭanīrṇāya (1967: 12), concludes from this passage that "the unity of words exists only in our mind". I fail to see how this conclusion can be drawn from the text. It rather states that the mind creates the sequence of sounds while pronouncing a word. This is confirmed by the last quarter of the preceding verse, which has:

\[
buddhau kuryāt paurvāparyam
\]

[The wise one] produces the sequence in his mind.

The fact that the mind creates the sequence of sounds, does not imply that the real word, or the unity of words, exists only in the mind. A better interpretation would seem to be that the mind acts as an intermediary between the non-mental real word and the equally non-mental sounds.

Similar criticism could be directed against Joshi's remark (1967: 10) that "by the term \textit{buddhinirgrāhyah} 'grasped by the intellect' (on Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12) Patañjali indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity". Patañjali describes the word in the very same line as \textit{ākāśadesāhaḥ} 'situated in ether', which seems to prove that no mental entity can be meant.\(^{44}\)

The mind is necessary if we assume that the collection (\textit{saṃghāta}) is a single entity without a sequence of sounds in it. The fact that the mind intervenes between the \textit{saṃghāta} and the sequence of sounds does not entail that this \textit{saṃghāta} is of a mental nature. Patañjali, at any rate, does not say anything of the kind.\(^{45}\)

The kind of \textit{saṃghāta} which Patañjali seems to speak about can hardly be described as a ‘collection’. If our interpretation up to this point is correct, it is rather an entity in its own right and no collection in the literal sense at all. The next question we have to turn to is whether or not Patañjali distinguished different types of verbal \textit{saṃghātas}.

\(^{44}\) I, p. 18, l. 19-20: \textit{śrotopalabdhir buddhinirgrāhyah prayogenaḥbhijvalita ākāśadesāhaḥ śabdāḥ}.

\(^{45}\) The \textit{Vṛttikāra} quoted in the Śābara Bhāṣya rejects the word as an existing entity, even though he accepts something mental, viz. \textit{samskāra}, as an intermediary between sounds and understanding (Frauwallner, 1968: 38-41). The entity rejected by the \textit{Vṛttikāra} appears to be similar to the one accepted by Patañjali.
4. Patañjali’s *padasaµghåta* and *varṇasaµghåta*.

We find the two expressions *padasaµghåta* and *varṇasaµghåta* under P. 3.2.49 vt. 3. The vårttika under which they occur reads: *karmaṇi sami ca*. It is explained by Patañjali in the following manner, correctly as it seems (II, p. 104, l. 2):

\[
\text{karmaṇy upapade sampūrvād dhanter an vaktavyo 'ntyasya to vā vaktavyah}
\]

When [a word denoting] the grammatical object is *upapada*, [the suffix] *aNy* must be prescribed after the root *han* [51] preceded by *sanr*; and *t* must be prescribed as optionally [taking the place] of the final [sound of *han*].

Patañjali then gives two examples:

\[
\text{varṇasaµghå†a˙ varṇasaµghåta˙ / padasaµghå†a˙ padasaµghåta˙ /}
\]

[This explains] *varṇasaµghå†a* [besides] *varṇasaµghåta*, *padasaµghå†a* [besides] *padasaµghåta*.

The grammatical formation here given is peculiar, and has a direct bearing on the philosophical question we are investigating. Normally the word *saµghåta* is derived with the suffix *GñaN* in the sense *bhåva* by P. 3.3.18 (*bhåve*). This is actually done e.g. by Jinendrabuddhi in his *Nyåsa* on P. 7.3.32 (VI, p. 37) and by Bhånuji Dåk∑ita in his *Råmåßram¥* on Amarako∑a 2.5.39 (p. 258-59). What is more, Patañjali himself uses the word *saµghåta* often as a separate word, not being part of a compound, and therefore without a word denoting the grammatical object as *upapada*. In all these cases the above derivation is not valid, so that Patañjali himself must have derived the uncompounded word differently, most probably with the suffix *GHaN* as well. Why then does he derive *saµghåta* differently in these two compounds?

One possible answer might be considered to lie in P. 2.2.14 *karmaṇi ca*. This rule forbids compound formation on the basis of an objective genitive; an example would be *varnåm samghåta˙* and *padåm samghåta˙*. However, the vårttikas and Bhåśya on P. 2.2.14 make clear that this prohibition is only valid where both object and subject are mentioned; it should not therefore prevent simple compounds like *varṇasaµghå†a˙* and *padasaµghå†a˙*.

There is another reason to reject the view that Patañjali merely wants to secure the compounding of *varnåm samghåta˙* and *padåm samghåta˙* in spite of P. 2.2.14. The result in that case would be simply *varṇa*- and *pada-samghåta*. As it is, also the
forms varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta, with retroflex ṭ, are derived. We cannot but conclude that Patañjali here derives some special compounds in some special meanings.

Turning to the meaning we note that varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta are derived with the kṛt-suffix aN. This suffix has the meaning ‘agent’ by P. 3.4.67 (kartari kṛt). Derived with aN the words saṃghāta and saṃghāta in, say, varṇasamghāta / -saṃghāta mean therefore "what collects (sound / sounds)". Derived with GHaÑ, on the other hand, the compound varṇasamghāta would mean "collection of sounds". The later grammarians agree with this distinction in meaning. The Kāśikā on P. 3.2.49, for example, explains the compounds derived with aN as follows (I, p. 221): varṇan samhantī varṇasaṃghātaḥ, varṇasaṃghātaḥ/padāṇi samhantī pada-saṃghātaḥ, pada-saṃghātaḥ//.

What is the difference between "a collection of sounds / words" and "what collects sound(s) / word(s)"? Laddu (1971: 316) proposes to understand the forms derived with aN as "one who collects the sounds, a phonetician" and "one who collects or codifies words, a lexicographer" respectively. But he admits that no trace of such usage can be found in the surviving literature.

Another solution is possible. For Patañjali, as we have seen, a word is an entity in its own right, not just a collection of sounds; for him a word rather "collects sounds", or perhaps "joins a word together". We see that it is not yet clear whether a word is designated by the expression varṇasamghāta or rather by pada-saṃghāta; we shall return to this question later. At this point it is important to understand that for Patañjali a word is no collection in the strict sense of the term, but rather a ‘collector’.

5. The Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9.

We now have to study a passage in the Mahābhāṣya — the only one as far as I am aware — where one of these two terms is used. The expression pada-saṃghāta occurs here as part of a larger compound, which does not fail to evoke problems in its own right. The context is as follows. In the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9 a discussion occurs in which the word nārkalpi figures. This word [53] is derived from nṛkalpa with the suffix iN, by P. 4.1.95 (ata iṁ). Nṛkalpa itself consists of the noun nṛ ‘man’ and the suffix kalpaP, prescribed by P. 5.3.67 (iṣadasamāptau kalpadeśyadeśiyarah). In the derivation of nārkalpi the r in nṛ is replaced by ā (P. 7.2.117 taddhiteśv acāṁ ādel), which is then followed by r (P. 1.1.51 ur an raparāḥ). This results in

nā-ṛ-kalpi.

---

46 This is not the place to discuss the peculiar form samghāta. Note however that Burrow (1971: 550) proposes to see in saṃghāta the non-cerebralized form of the root ghat.
The question is whether \( r \) is part of preceding \( nā \) or of following \( kalpi \). If it is part of \( nā \) there is a difficulty. \( Nr \) in \( nṛkalpa \) is technically called a \( pada \), by P. 1.4.17 (\( svādiṣv \) \( asarvanāmasthanēn \)). But then \( nār \) in \( nārkalpi \) is a \( pada \) too. This would lead to the undesired consequence that \( r \) be replaced by a visarjanīya, by P. 8.3.15 (\( kharavasānayor visarjanīyaḥ \)).

Can this problem be solved by stating that \( r \) is rather part of following \( kalpi \)? Patañjali says no. He explains (I, p. 129, l. 5-6):

\[
\text{kalpipadasaṁghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasya padāntatām vihantum iti kṛtvā visarjanīyāḥ prāṇotī/}
\]

The commentators agree in interpreting \( padasāṁghāta \) here as \( pratyayasamudāya \) ‘collection of suffixes’. This is understandable, for \( kalpi \) is the result of combining the two suffixes \( kalpaP \) and \( tāN \). This interpretation would justify the following translation:

That [sound \( r \), even though] part of the collection of suffixes \( kalpi \), cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this expression \( kalpi \)] is the final [sound] of a \( pada \). As a result [substitution of ] visarjanīya would take place.

Yet this interpretation of \( padasāṁghāta \) is not acceptable, for various reasons. The first one is that \( pada \) means ‘word’, not ‘suffix’. In order to appreciate the second reason we must turn to a number of passages in the Mahābhāṣya where Patañjali uses closely similar words and phrases. We first take the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.47 vt. 7, which reads (I, p. 117, l. 1-2):

\[
saṁghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasyegantatām vihantum
\]

[54]

We notice the close similarity of this sentence with the earlier one. Here the addition of the augment \( nUM \) in the nom. nt. dual of such dvigu compounds as \( paṃcāratnīni \) (from \( paṃcāratnī \) ‘five cubits’) is under discussion. The assumption has been made that \( nUM \) is part of what precedes it. Patañjali’s statement here means:

That [sound \( n \), i.e., the augment \( nUM \), though] part of the collection [\( paṃcāratnī- \)], cannot do away with the fact that a part [of this collection, viz., \( paṃcāratnī \)] ends in a vowel [belonging to the pratyāhāra] \( iK \).
The ‘collection’ here is the combination of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion, in this case of the part ending in *i*, *pañcaratni*, and of *nUM*.

Patañjali repeats the same sentence under P. 7.1.73 (I, p. 266, l. 5), where he makes the same point. Here the examples are *pañcatrapunā* and *pañcatrapunāh*. Here too the augment *nUM*, though part of the collection *pañcatrapu-n*, cannot do away with the fact that the part *pañcatrapu* ends in an *iK* vowel.

The expression *samghātabhakta* is used at a few other occasions, always in the following phrase:

\[\text{asau (or: ayaṃ) samghātabhakto na śakyaḥ (or: aśakyaḥ) X-grahaṇena grahītum}\]

X varies with the circumstances. At one place the phrase indicates that the prefix *aT*, though part of the collection (*samghāta*), is not denoted by the term *dhātu* ‘verbal root’.\(^{47}\) The infix *mUK*, similarly, in examples like *pacamāna*, is not part of what is denoted by the expression *adupadesa* "what is taught as ending in *a*".\(^{48}\) Again, the prefix *aT* added to a verbal root belonging to the list *gadādi*, is part of the collection (*samghāta*), yet is not covered by the term *gadādi*.\(^{49}\)

In all these cases Patañjali uses the term *samghāta* to refer to the collection of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion. If we now return to the original passage which contains the compound *kalpipadasamghātabhakta*, we see that the interpretation of the commentators will not do. They think that *samghāta* here refers to the collection of suffixes which constitutes *kalpi*, but that collection is not immediately relevant in the discussion. What is relevant is the collection *r-kalpi*, or, perhaps, *nā-r-kalpi*. The most natural interpretation of *kalpipadasamghāta* in the circumstances seems to me: "collection of *kalpi* with [the preceding] *pada*". If we accept this interpretation, Patañjali’s statement comes to mean:

That [sound *r*, even though] part of the collection of *kalpi* with [the preceding] *pada* (i.e., *nā-r-kalpi*), cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this collection, viz., the sound *r*] is the final [sound] of a *pada*.

Of course, another interpretation is possible as well. One might urge that the collection under discussion is not *nā-r-kalpi*, but merely *r-kalpi*. Patañjali’s *kalpipadasamghāta*

---

\(^{47}\) On P. 1.3.60 vt. 3 (I, p. 286, l. 1).

\(^{48}\) On P. 6.1.186 vt. 3 (III, p. 112, l. 12); and on P. 7.2.82 vt. 1 and 3 (III, p. 303, l. 7-8 and l. 16-17).

\(^{49}\) On P. 8.4.17 vt. 1 (III, p. 459, l. 7).
would then have to be interpreted as: "the padasamghata [which is] (r-)kalpi". This interpretation is open to the criticism that if Patañjali meant rkalpi, he might have said rkalpi rather than just kalpi. If, in spite of this criticism, this last interpretation is accepted, it must be concluded that padasamghata is here used in a peculiar sense. Kalpi, and rkalpi, is no pada in Pāṇini's technical sense, but it can well be looked upon as a ‘word’ in some way. It is at least conceivable that Patañjali, knowing that the term pada would be inappropriate here, chose a term which he knew was used in non-grammatical circles, a term which had not been narrowly defined like Pāṇini's pada, viz., padasamghata.

In support of this interpretation one might adduce the fact that nārkalpi is not the only example which is discussed in this passage of the Mahābhāṣya. Other examples are nārkuṭa and nārpatya. The second halves of these examples are padas, so Patañjali’s choice of a non-technical synonym of pada in order to designate kalpi might be considered understandable. Note that this interpretation of Patañjali’s use of padasamghata presupposes that padasamghata was in use primarily in non-grammatical circles, or at any rate had no technical grammatical meaning. It further makes only sense on the assumption that a padasamghata is not a "collection of words", say a sentence, but rather a single word conceived of as an indivisible entity. On this assumption varnasamghata would refer to a single speech sound conceived of as a single undivided entity.

We must not conclude too much from this possible interpretation of Patañjali’s use of kalpipadasamghatabhakta. This interpretation is far from certain, and, as we have seen, a more conventional interpretation is possible, in which padasamghata does not refer to a single concept at all. The question of the precise interpretation of padasamghata will however engage our attention once more towards the end of this lecture.

6. Comparable ideas outside grammar.

We have to turn to the question whether Patañjali’s ideas stand isolated in early India. We have seen already that Patañjali makes several of his remarks in the context of some vārttikas. But all the points which allowed us to form a picture of Patañjali’s ideas were new in the Mahābhāṣya; they were not, or not clearly, present in the vārttikas. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that these ideas were not yet, or not yet fully, known to Kātyāyana.

In Patañjali’s ideas we can distinguish two separate aspects. For him words are (i) entities with an independent existence, (ii) which are, moreover, eternal. Some
THREE PROBLEMS

authors, such as Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: xi, 114), concentrate on the second aspect, the eternality. They conclude that Patañjali attempts "to introduce the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the nityatva of the word". We have seen already that this position is chronologically not without difficulties, not to speak of the problem that in Mīmāṃsā not the word as independent entity came to be looked upon as eternal, but rather the sounds which constitute it. Joshi and Roodbergen do not discuss these difficulties, and we may conclude that the connection with Mīmāṃsā is unlikely at best.

There is a passage in the Mahābhāṣya which seems to point in another direction. P. 1.2.45 vt. 11 reads:

\[
\text{saṃghāṭarṭhavāc ceti ced drṣṭo hy atadarthena guṇena guṇino ṛthabhāvaḥ}
\]

And if [you say that individual sounds have meaning] because collections (saṃghāṭa) have meaning, [the answer is no] because subsidiary parts that do not serve a certain purpose are seen to constitute something that does serve that purpose.

The Bhāṣya explains the vārttika and then gives the following example (I, p. 220, l. 22-24):

\[
yathā ... rathāṅgāni viḥṛtāni pratyekāṁ vrajikriyāṁ praty asamarthāni bhavanti tatsamudāyaṁ ca rathah samartha evam eṣāṁ varṇāṁ samudāyā arthavanto 'vayavā anarthakaś iti//
\]

For example, the parts of a chariot when taken apart are not each of them fit for movement; their combination (samudāya), i.e. the chariot, is fit [for that]. In the same way the combinations of these sounds have meaning [even though] the parts have not.

This example does not add much to our understanding of the entities called saṃghāṭa by Patañjali, but it suggests an interesting connection with another intellectual current in early India. Another text which, like the Mahābhāṣya, has been brought into connection with the realm of king Menander contains the same example. This text is the Milindapañha.

The Milindapañha is a semi-canonical text of the southern Buddhists which claims to reproduce a discussion between king Milinda — this is the Indian name for Menander — and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena. The oldest parts of this text can safely be assumed to go back to a time not long after Menander, and must have been composed in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent. It is in the oldest parts that we
find the discussion which contains the same example of the chariot. It occurs in a very
important passage of the Milindapañha, the passage namely where Milinda and
Nāgasena meet for the first time. In the beginning of the second book (Lakkhaṇapañha)
(p. 25 f.), king Milinda asks the monk Nāgasena his name. Nāgasena uses the
opportunity to point out that ‘Nāgasena’ is but a conventional term, and that no person
(puggala) can be observed (na h'ettha puggalo upalabbbati). In the ensuing discussion
we learn that neither the hair, nor the nails, nor any of the other constituents of the body
or their combination, none of the five Skandhas nor their combination, and also nothing
outside the five Skandhas is Nāgasena. Then follows the simile. A chariot is neither the
pole nor the axle, nor any of the other constituents or their combination, and also
nothing outside them.

The simile of the chariot illustrates something which became a central issue
among the Buddhists. The simile is found already in a canonical Buddhist Sūtra (SN
I.135), but the problem it illustrates becomes more central in the Buddhist Abhidharma
works. Does the whole exist besides its parts? The Buddhists are unanimous in denying
this. There is no whole besides the parts; no wholes exist at all.51

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the dharma theory which came
to occupy such an important place among the [59] Buddhists. It may be sufficient to
state that the Buddhists came to accept a limited number of dharmas as the only really
existing entities. Everything else, including everything composed of dharmas, did not
exist in the ultimate sense. The dharmas were enumerated, the total number differing
somewhat among the schools. Usually the number of dharmas in the later enumerations
was not far removed from a hundred. Another, probably related, feature of many
Buddhist schools was their claim that everything is momentary; that is to say, in the
ultimate sense only momentary dharmas exist. (There are some exceptions, but it would
take us too far to discuss them.)

The most important Abhidharma school of the Buddhists is known by the name
Sarvāstivāda. Unfortunately but few of the works of this school have been preserved in
Sanskrit, but many — including all their canonical Abhidharma texts — have survived
in Chinese translation. The Sarvāstivāda school became characterized by the
consequent manner in which they tried to think out the dharma theory, whatever the

50 For a translation of this passage see, e.g., Rhys Davids, 1890: 40 f.; Frauwallner, 1956: 66 f.; Linne,
1976: 122 f. This portion belongs to the oldest kernel of the Milindapañha since it occurs in the Chinese
version: T. 1670, vol. 32, p. 696a, l. 9 f. For a translation of the Chinese version see Demiéville, 1925: 97
f. The Chinese and Pali versions are compared in Thich Minh Chau, 1964: 47 f.
51 Something similar is perhaps meant in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.1 vt. 13 (III, p. 3, l. 15-16):
avayavāmakah samudāyah/ abhyantarohi samudāye ‘vayavah/ tad yathā/ vrksah pracalaih samah/ avayavaih
pracalaih/.
result. The best known doctrine of this school is that all the three times — past, present, and future — exist (sarvam asti), but this was not even their most extreme doctrine.

7. The linguistic dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins.

In the present context we are most interested in the Sarvāstivāda ideas about words and language. The belief that only momentary dharmas really exist led to difficulties. It implied that words and sentences, and even individual sounds, do not really exist.

This was not to the liking of the Sarvāstivādins. They solved the problem by postulating the existence of some highly remarkable dharmas, called nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya. These dharmas have been discussed by Padmanabh S. Jaini (1959), who expressed the opinion that they owe their origin to the influence of the theory of sphoṭa and of the Mīmāṃsāka theory of eternal words. This opinion is open to doubt. We [60] have seen already that the Mīmāṃsā theory does not appear to be old. The relationship of the Sarvāstivāda linguistic dharmas to the grammatical tradition will be discussed in a while. Here it must be observed that the nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya are already enumerated in the lists of so-called cittaviprayuka sanskāras in several canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins: in the Dharmakandha (T. 1537, vol. 26, p. 500c, l. 22, cf. p. 501b, l. 21), the Prakaraṇapāda (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 23-24, p. 634c, l. 19-20; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29, p. 699b, l. 23) and the Jñānaprasthāna (T. 1543, vol. 26, p. 774b, l. 5-15; T. 1544, vol. 26, p. 920b, l. 15-25). The first chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda is also known as a separate work called Pañcavastuka;52 here too we find the ‘linguistic dharmas’ enumerated and explained (T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 27-29; T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 998c, l. 25, p. 1001a, l. 28-29; Imanishi, 1969: 8). They are of course a regular feature of later Sarvāstivāda and related works.53

The precise interpretation of the terms nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya varies in the later texts. For our present purposes it is not necessary to study this in detail. One peculiarity of the later interpretations may however be noted: the word pada in padakāya has come to be interpreted to mean ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. Stcherbatsky (1922: 24 n. 1) considered this "a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a

---

52 It is not impossible that the Pañcavastuka was an earlier work which was later incorporated into the Prakaraṇapāda.

three problems

terminology of its own”. Jaini on the other hand thought that this unusual meaning of the term *pada* can be traced to Pali (p. 98 f.). He [61] supports this with an example from the *Samyutta Nikāya*,54 which however does not carry much conviction; there is no reason to doubt that *pada* in this passage simply means ‘word’.55

There is no need to show that *pada* in Buddhism always meant ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’; it did not always have that meaning in the compound *padakāya*. In the *Prakaraṇapāda* — the earliest text which explains the term *padakāya* — *pada* means ‘word’. *Padakāya* is here explained as "a whole of speech sounds" (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 24; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29; T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 28). This interpretation of *pada* is more natural and therefore more satisfactory than ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. It leaves us however with the problem why this word acquired a different meaning later. One would be tempted to think that *nāmakāya* and *padakāya* were at one time synonymous. This, of course, would entail that there was a time when there were not three, but only two linguistic dharmas.

8. The original number of linguistic dharmas.

The conjecture that originally the Sarvāstivādins accepted only two linguistic dharmas tallies well with the fact that Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* enumerates but two linguistic entities, *varṇasamghāta* and *padasamghāta*. It is true that this latter fact should not be given too much weight, but it does give us some extra reason to seriously consider the possibility that the Sarvāstivādins originally had only two linguistic dharmas.

There is some evidence to support this. Before we turn to it, it will be necessary to say something about the Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma texts. These texts, or at least some of them, have not been preserved in the forms in which they were written. The Dharmaskandha, for example, is rather the end-product of a development. Frauwallner (1964: 73-80; 1971: 103 f.) has adduced reasons to think that both the Sarvāstivāda [62] Dharmaskandha and the Pali Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga developed out of a common original text. The details of this development are not known to us, nor do we know when exactly this development came to an end. We only know that the end products of these two developments — the Dharmaskandha and the Vibhaṅga — differ greatly from each other.

In the case of the Dhātukāya some insight into the history of the text is made possible by its relationship to the Pali Dhātukathā on the one hand, and to the fact that

54 SN II.36: ekena padena sabbo attho vutto.
55 Viz., the word *phassa* which figures prominently in the preceding discussions.
this text, possibly in adjusted form, has been included in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda on the other. Frauwallner (1964: 85 f.), who also studied this question, came to the conclusion that a part of the Dhātukāya developed beyond the stage embodied in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda, while another part is further developed in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda. We see that adjustments and emendations were still added in the texts in relatively recent times.

The researches of Yukio Sakamoto (1935) take us to even more recent dates. Sakamoto compared the quotations from the Prakaraṇapāda in the Mahāvibhāṣa with the readings in the Prakaraṇapāda itself, and came to the conclusion that the Prakaraṇapāda still underwent changes after the compilation of the Mahāvibhāṣa.

It becomes clear from the above that most, perhaps all, of the Chinese translations of Abhidharma works which we possess are translations of emended, and therefore non-original, texts. In order to penetrate as far as possible to the earliest form of a certain idea, we must therefore not just use early texts, but where possible early translations as well.

The two Chinese translations of the Prakaraṇapāda which we possess were both made after the time when emendations were introduced into the text, and the same is true of one of the two Chinese translations of the Pañcavastuka, its separate first chapter. The other translation of the Pañcavastuka, however, is old and may have been made by An Shih-kao, the first translator of whom we know. It may therefore date back to the second century C.E. What does this old translation tell us about the number of linguistic dharmas?

The oldest translation of the Pañcavastuka, which is probably the oldest translation we possess of any Abhidharma work into Chinese, knows only two linguistic dharmas. The clumsiness of this translation makes it hard to determine which two Sanskrit terms were here being translated. The first one reads in Chinese ming tzu, which may stand for nāmakāya or padakāya. I shall use the term padakāya for convenience' sake, not because I have any reason to think that this term rather than nāmakāya was used. The second term reads chüeh in Chinese, which literally means ‘cut’ or ‘break’. This translation was apparently chosen to represent the constituent portions of a word, i.e., the vyañjana or rather the vyañjanakāya.

This same old translation of the Pañcavastuka explains the term vyañjanakāya with the words: tzu wei chü. This can be translated as "sound as a totality". This seems to indicate that vyañjanakāya was not considered a Tatpuruṣa compound but rather a

---

56 For details see Imanishi, 1969: 4.
57 So Demiéville, 1953: 446.
58 See T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 1001a, l. 25 f. This conclusion was confirmed by Prof. E. Zürcher, in a private communication.
Karmadhāraya. We saw above that the old meaning of padakāya was, similarly, a collection of speech sounds, therefore ‘word’ rather than ‘collection of words’. We may conclude that vyañjanakāya and padakāya (or was it nāmakāya?) initially named single sounds and single words conceived of as single, indivisible entities.


This conclusion may have an effect on the correct interpretation of the terms varṇasaṁghāta and padaśaṁghāta.

[64]

Let us focus our attention on varṇasaṁghāta. According to Patañjali this term is to be analyzed as varṇam / varṇān saṁhanti. What does this mean exactly? It might be understood in the sense that a varṇasaṁghāta "collects sounds" and is therefore a collection of sounds. Another, equally plausible interpretation is that a varṇasaṁghāta joins a sound together, unites all the constituent elements of a single sound so as to form one sound. A varṇasaṁghāta is then a single sound. The term padaśaṁghāta can similarly denote a single word — conceived of as one indivisible entity — rather than a collection of words. This interpretation has the advantage that it agrees best with the original vyañjanakāya and padakāya of the Buddhists.

Interpreted in this way the two terms varṇasaṁghāta and padaśaṁghāta correspond to the two entities which we know were familiar to Patañjali. The varṇasaṁghāta would be the individual sound, conceived of as an independent entity, and possibly eternal; the padaśaṁghāta would be the word, also an independent entity, and also eternal.

10. The origin of linguistic philosophy.

The above discussion has taken it more or less for granted that Patañjali’s varna- and pada-saṁghāta on one hand, and the vyañjana- and pada-kāya of the Buddhists on the other, are related entities. The similarities between these concepts leave, in my opinion, little room for doubt. But if they are related we must face the question who borrowed from whom. Chronological considerations do not give us an answer. Our present knowledge of the Buddhist canonical Abhidharma literature does not allow us to put a date to the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into their texts. And even the date of Patañjali is not fully beyond doubt, as we have seen. From a purely chronological point of view all we can say is that both options are still open: either
Patañjali antedates the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into the Buddhist scriptures, or vice versa.

But other considerations may yet be strong enough to reach very probable conclusions. It seems clear that Patañjali’s ideas about varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta cannot really be considered his own. They play no role whatever in his discussions and the terms are introduced as examples only. What is more, these ideas are the result of a concern for ontological questions which does not otherwise characterize Patañjali’s discussions. Ontological questions form however the backbone of Buddhist Abhidharma. The lists of dharmas are lists of what there is.

The Buddhist dogmatists were equally interested in what is not there. All composite things and, of course, the human soul or person (pudgala) did not exist in the opinion of the most influential Buddhist sects. This ontological concern could not but confront the Buddhists with the question whether words and sounds exist. The momentariness of almost all dharmas allowed for no possibility that words and sounds, because they are extended in time, had any real existence. The Sarvāstivādins solved the problem by postulating that words and sounds really existed as separate dharmas, and this was an understandable response to a real and possibly pressing problem. It seems safe to conclude that Patañjali derived his ideas concerning the varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta from the Buddhists. This does not necessarily entail that the Buddhists knew the terms used by Patañjali — varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta. The possibility cannot be excluded that Patañjali did not borrow these ideas from the Buddhists directly, but rather through the intermediary of others. This might also explain the differences between the views of Patañjali and those of the Buddhists; especially noteworthy in this connection is the fact that for Patañjali the word is eternal, for the Buddhists momentary.

11. Change of terminology in Sarvāstivāda?

We may yet consider the alternative, and less likely, possibility that varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta were originally Buddhist terms. The Chinese expressions in the earliest translation are so vague that they may translate these two terms, or the more usual vyañjanakāya and padakāya; they do not allow of a decision. We have also seen that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins, or at least some of them, underwent changes in the course of their history. Could it be that these changes extended to individual terms?

The Chinese translation of the Pañcavastuka presumably made by An Shih-kao is our most important source in questions like this. At the same time it is so clumsy and
often unintelligible that we cannot hope to derive much elucidation from it. There is however one case which deserves mention.

The last dharma enumerated under the heading rūpa is normally called *avijñapti* in the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts. *Avijñapti* literally means ‘non-information’, and the term is used to designate a dharma which plays a role in connecting a deed with its result. At the position where we expect *avijñapti* in the Pañcavastukā, An Shih-kao’s translation has the two Chinese characters *pu keng* (T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 998, l. 15). This means literally ‘non-change’ or something like it, and it is hard to see how this can be a rendering of *avijñapti*. However, another term was in use among at least some Buddhists, viz. *avipraṇāśa*. This term was used to designate something closely similar to *avijñapti*.59 The literal sense of *avipraṇāśa* is ‘non-perishing’, and it seems very likely that An Shih-kao found this term in the text he translated.

But *avipraṇāśa* is no Sarvāstivāda term. That is to say, it does not occur in the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts. Probably the oldest surviving text which uses the term is Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 17. This chapter leaves no doubt regarding its general meaning. It is stated that the result of actions comes about on account of *avipraṇāśa*.60 *Avipraṇāśa* is furthermore characterized as a dharma taught by the Buddha.61 It remains however obscure exactly which Buddhists used this [67] term. The commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā do not help us much either. They ascribe the use of this term to ‘others’.62 This is also true of Vasubandhu’s Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.63 The term occurs once in the Mahābhārata, where we read (crit. ed. 15.42.4): *avipraṇāśah sarvesāv karmanāṃ itī nīscayāḥ*. This seems to indicate that it was known to non-Buddhists too.

Lamotte attributes the use of *avipraṇāśa* to the Śāmmitīyas on the basis of a remark by K’uei-chi referred to by La Vallée Poussin (1928: 71). The Śāmmitīyaniṅka-śāstra — one of the few texts of this school that have been preserved, in Chinese translation — does indeed contain a passage which mentions the *avipraṇāśa* (T. 1649, vol. 32, p. 462a, l. 13-14).64 This does not however exclude the possibility that at an earlier time also the Sarvāstivādins used the term. It is in this context noteworthy that Nāgārjuna knows both the terms *avijñapti* and *avipraṇāśa* (see MMK 17.4). This may imply that already in his time *avijñapti* had wholly or largely replaced *avipraṇāśa* among the Sarvāstivādins, so that he borrowed the idea of *avipraṇāśa* from

---

59 For a further discussion of *avijñapti* and *avipraṇāśa* see Lamotte, 1936: 156 f., 162 f.
60 MMK 17.15: *tasmād avipraṇāśena jāyate karmanāṃ phalam.*
61 MMK 17.20: *karmano ‘vipraṇāśas ca dharmo buddhena deśitāḥ.*
63 Lamotte, 1936: 231.
64 See Thich Thiên Châu, 1977: 253-54.
another school of Buddhists, perhaps from the Sāṃmitīyas. Alternatively it may mean that within Sarvāstivāda there were different currents, one of which used *aviprapāsa*, another *avijñapti*.

This second alternative seems to find support in the fact that Nāgārjuna knows only three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, instead of the usual four. They are specified in MMK 7.3 as *utpāda*, *sthiti* and *bhaṅga*, while MMK 7.1 refers to them jointly as *trilakṣaṇī*. The surviving Sarvāstivāda texts enumerate four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*: *jāti*, *sthiti*, *jarā* and *anītyatā*. It would not be justified to draw conclusions from the differences in the way these dharmas are designated by Nāgārjuna and the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts; [68] Nāgārjuna was bound by the restraints of metre and may have chosen the terms accordingly. What is more, he refers to the second one, *sthiti*, using the different designation *sthāna* in MMK 7.34. The difference in number, on the other hand, may be significant. It is true that there were other schools of Buddhism which recognized only three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, and it was indeed usual to refer to a Sūtra according to which there are three of them. This Sūtra is referred to in this context in the Kathāvatthu (1.227; PTS ed. p. 61); and in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (on verse 2.45; see La Vallée Poussin, 1923-31: I: 223 f.). It is however interpreted differently by the upholders of different views. Nāgārjuna’s way of dealing with these *lakṣaṇas* creates the impression that he regards them as existing entities, as dharmas, and this seems typical for Sarvāstivāda. One might therefore tentatively conclude that Nāgārjuna knew a current within this school which accepted only three of these dharmas. An Shih-kao’s translation of the Pañcavastuka, be it noted, has all four of them.

12. Patañjali’s acquaintance with Buddhism.

The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* take us back to the question whether Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, was directly acquainted with Buddhist doctrine. These *lakṣaṇas* are closely associated with the view that everything is momentary. Some passages in the Mahābhāṣya suggest that its author was acquainted with this point of view.65 On P. 3.2.123 vt. 5 it is stated that according to ‘others’ the present time does not exist. This position is supported by a number of verses which are then quoted (II, p. 123, l. 24 - p. 124, l. 9). By way of example the first one will here be reproduced:

\[
\text{na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate} \\
\text{na syandante saritāḥ sāgarāya/} \\
kūṭastho 'yam loko na viceṣṭitāsti}
\]

13. Chronology of the pañcavastuka.

The evidence which we have considered so far supports the view that Patañjali borrowed his philosophical notions regarding the nature of the word from the Buddhists, most probably from the early Sarvāstivādins. This in its turn sheds some light on the chronology of certain developments in Abhidharma Buddhism. We had occasion to point out that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins underwent changes until a late date. This makes the task of disentangling the old from the new in these texts particularly precarious. The occurrence of a certain dharma, or of a set of dharmas, in the Dharmaśāstra — a text whose nucleus goes back to a period soon after the death of the Buddha — does not for that reason guarantee that that particular dharma or those particular dharmas are equally old. They may have been inserted into the text during one of its revisions. Questions of this type might be asked in particular about the linguistic dharmas discussed above: nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya. If our above arguments are correct, we can answer such questions as follows: At least two of these linguistic dharmas figured already in the time of the Mahābhāṣya or even earlier, i.e., possibly in or before 150 B.C.E.

These observations can be extended beyond the linguistic dharmas, to the so-called pañcavastuka. This is the systematization of all dharmas in five categories named (i) rūpa, (ii) citta, (iii) caitasika, (iv) cittaviprayukta sanskāra, and (v) asanskṛta. This categorization of all dharmas represents a major step forward in the development of Abhidharma in that it embodies an attempt to exhaustively collect and order all
elements of existence. Frauwallner (1963: 33-34) has rightly drawn attention to the importance of the appearance of the pañcabastuka in Abhidharma philosophy, and has compared this development with the systematizations of reality in Sāmkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Frauwallner finds it hard to believe that among these three attempts at systematization the Buddhists were the first. He considers it far more likely that the pañcabastuka came into existence under the influence of the Hindu philosophical systems. He draws from this the chronological inference that the pañcabastuka arose around the beginning of our era, certainly not much before it.

The present study provides reasons to doubt Frauwallner's conclusions. The linguistic dharmas occur, in the surviving texts, always in the context of the pañcabastuka system of categories. This cannot by itself be considered proof that the linguistic dharmas were not already in existence before the pañcabastuka, but a closer inspection makes that rather unlikely. The fourth category of the pañcabastuka, viz., that of the cittaviprayukta saṃskāras, contains many dharmas which cannot but be considered the outcome of an attempt to think problems out and solve them. The linguistic dharmas are striking examples. Like the pañcabastuka itself, they embody an attempt to bring order in the mass of dharmas inherited from earlier times. Both pañcabastuka and linguistic dharmas therefore seem to belong to the same period, and may indeed derive from one and the same person. The pañcabastuka, moreover, created in its fourth category a place for such unusual dharmas as the padakāya and the vyañjanakāya. If anything, the pañcabastuka may therefore be older than the linguistic dharmas.

[71]

In view of the above it may be necessary to reconsider Frauwallner's dating of the origin of the pañcabastuka. Frauwallner's chronology was of course highly tentative, and our present reflections cannot claim to have given us indubitable certainty. Yet we now have some evidence, more evidence than Frauwallner could muster, that the breakthrough of traditional Abhidharma to some kind of systematic philosophizing took place around the time of Patañjali, or even earlier. In absolute dates, this may have been as early as 150 B.C.E.

We have come to the end of this lecture, in which we have tried to pierce through the veil which covers the beginnings of linguistic philosophy in India. This veil is too thick for us to reach absolutely certain and clear results, but some increase of understanding may have been attained. Frauwallner still thought that the beginnings of linguistic philosophy had to be looked for somewhere in the development of Sanskrit grammar. He complained about the lack of materials for the period between Patañjali and Bhartrhari, and about the uselessness of the Mahābhāṣya. Subsequent scholars have pointed out that the Mahābhāṣya does contain some philosophical ideas about the nature of the word. The present lecture has tried to specify these ideas, and to trace them back even further. It has led to the remarkable conclusion that linguistic philosophy in India may be heavily indebted to Buddhism, from which it may have derived some of its ideas. An unexpected result of this investigation has been that the Mahābhāṣya may help us date certain early and important developments in Abhidharma Buddhism. It seems not unlikely that the first serious attempts to bring order in the inherited dharmas — which led to the system of categories called pañcavastuka, and to the postulation of a number of new dharmas, among them the padakāya and the vyañjanakāya — took place in a time preceding the date of the Mahābhāṣya, possibly before 150 B.C.E.
REFERENCES


[76]


Kāśīkā. Edited by Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao Deshpande, and D.G. Padhye. 2 parts. Hyderabad: Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University. 1969, 1970. (Sanskrit Academy Series 17, 20 (A. 14, +. 17.).)


[77]


ABBREVIATIONS

AL  Abhyankar and Limaye’s edition of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā
AV  Atharva Veda (Śaunakiya)
AV(P)  Atharva Veda (Paippalāda)
C.  Sūtra in Candra’s grammar
CR  ‘Critical edition’ of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā
KS  Kaṭhaka Saṃhitā
Mbh  Mahābhāṣya (ed. Kielhorn)
MiSū  Mīmāṃsa Sūtra
MMK  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
MPV  Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa Vyākhyānāni, ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya
Ms.  Manuscript of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā
MS  Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā
P.  Pāṇinian sūtra
PTS  Pali Text Society
RV  Rg Veda
ŚB  Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
SN  Saṃyutta Nikāya
Sw  Swaminathan’s edition of Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā
T.  Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka
TA  Taittirīya Arānyaka
TB  Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
VP  Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari
VS  Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā
vt.  vārttika
The young Red Guard tumbled down along with her flag, her light form descending even more slowly than the piece of red fabric, like a little bird unwilling to leave the sky. The Red Union warriors shouted in joy. A few rushed to the foot of the building, tore away the battle banner of the April Twenty-eighth Brigade, and seized the slender, lifeless body.