

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, books and articles focussing on *terrorism* and *counter-terrorism* have multiplied. There has also been extensive research in the area of *conflict resolution*. However, a study of some of the representative publications reveals that while there is an abundance of literature on *counter-terrorism* and *conflict resolution*, virtually no studies have been undertaken on the transition from a state's policy of *counter-terrorism* to a policy of *conflict resolution* in dealing with terrorism. That is, the field of counter-terrorism has been studied exclusively while conflict resolution has also been studied as an exclusive area. However, no attempt has been made to analyse why a state feels the need to *shift* from a *counter-terrorism policy* to a *policy of conflict resolution*. A study of some of the relevant books on Northern Ireland also reveals that while the British counter-terrorism responses and policies in Northern Ireland have been studied exclusively and the Northern Ireland peace process has been analysed as an exclusive area in itself, no work has been undertaken to explain why the British Government felt the need to *shift* from a *policy of counter-terrorism* towards a *conflict resolution policy* in Ireland. The aim of the research project is to show that the *Northern Ireland peace process* is an ideal case study of the shift in the British Government's policy from *counter-terrorism* to a policy of *conflict resolution*.

The books which have been reviewed are *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues* by Gus Martin, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, 2003; *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images* by John McGarry and

Brendan O'Leary, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA, 1995; *Peace at Last? The Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland*, by Jörg Neuheiser and Stefan Wolff, Berghahn Books, New York, 2002; *European democracies against terrorism* by Fernando Reinares (ed), Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2000 and *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (ed) by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1997.

Gus Martin's *'Understanding Terrorism'* has various sections – Part I *'Terrorism: A Conceptual Review'* gives an introduction to terrorism. It deals with the historical perspectives on terrorism and explores definitions and causes of terrorism and the morality of terrorist violence. Part II *'The Terrorists'* deals with terrorism from above: *state terrorism*; terrorism from below: *dissident terrorism*; *leftist terrorism*; *the terrorist right*; *religious and criminal terrorism* and *international terrorism*. Part III *'The Terrorist Trade'* deals with terrorist objectives, methods and tactics and the role of the media. Part IV *'Final Analysis'* deals with terrorism in the United States; the options regarding responding to terror and the future of terrorism. Chapter 13 *'Responding to terror: The Options'* has been important for my research. It analyses the difference between counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism and the various counter-terrorist options and sub-options. This is an extremely well researched book. However, it focusses exclusively on terrorism and counter-terrorism and does not focus on the transition from the counter-terrorism policy of a state to a policy of conflict resolution.

John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s book *‘Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images’* analyses that there is in fact a conflict about what the conflict in Northern Ireland is about i.e. a ‘meta-conflict’. In other words, there is little consensus among scholars as to whether the conflict is fundamentally theological, cultural, economic or ethnic. However, they believe that the theories about the conflict are, in fact, structured and explicable. This is an excellent book which focusses on the external and internal explanations of the conflict, which in my opinion, is the strength of the work. It highlights the fact that due to the conflict about the conflict, the proposed solutions differ widely ranging from full integration of Northern Ireland into Great Britain, to devolution, independence, repartition and eventually to Irish unification. However, the book basically focusses on the *varying interpretations* of the *conflict* and it does *not* focus on the *nature* of the *British response* to the crisis or the *peace process*.

In Jörg Neuheiser and Stefan Wolff (ed) *Peace at Last? The Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland*, the first chapter *‘Introduction: From Sunningdale to Belfast, 1973-98’* by *Stefan Wolff* tries to analyse over thirty years of unsure conflict management that preceded the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement. He shows the reasons for the failure of the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, the limited success of the 1985 Anglo- Irish Agreement and the reasons for the likely success of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The author in the concluding chapter writes on the peace process since 1998. In other chapters, *Stephen Farry* discusses the impact of the Good Friday Agreement on the Alliance Party. *Gerard Murray* gives an SDLP analysis of the conflict (Ch.3), *Peter Shirlow* writes on the implications of the Agreement for the Sinn Fein

(Ch.4) and *James W. McAuley* writes on the impact on the Agreement on Ulster Unionism (Ch.5). This is a good book throwing light on the impact of the Agreement on the major political parties in Northern Ireland. However, the focus of the book is limited- though it focusses on the *Northern Ireland peace process*, it does *not* analyse it as a case study of the shift in the British Government's policy of *counter-terrorism to conflict resolution*.

In *Fernando Reinares* (ed) '*European Democracies Against Terrorism*', in Chapter 2, *David Bonner* writes on the United Kingdom's response to terrorism. He highlights the six facets of the anti-terrorist legislation- proscription, stop, question and search in Northern Ireland etc. He also writes about the impact of the decisions of European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland peace process. *Fernando Reinares* and *Oscar Jaime-Jimenez* write about terrorism in Spain in Chapter 4 and *Luciana Stortoni-Wortmann* focusses on terrorism in Italy in Chapter 5. The book is extremely well researched and also focusses on counterterrorism in Europe. However, though the book deals with the British Government's response to terrorism, it does *not* study the shift in the Government's response from *counter-terrorism to conflict resolution*.

The book '*Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*' (ed) by *I. William Zartman* and *J. Lewis Rasmussen* begins with an introductory chapter '*Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts*' by *I. William Zartman*. This chapter has been of invaluable help to my research. Part One '*Mapping the Field*' includes *Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors*' by *J. Lewis Rasmussen*

(Ch.1) and *'The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field'* by Louis Kriesberg. Part Two 'Approaches to Peacemaking' includes chapters by Daniel Druckman who writes on negotiating in the International Context (Ch.1), Jacob Bercovitch who analyses mediation in international conflict (Ch.2), Richard B. Bilder who discusses adjudication (Ch.3); Herbert C. Kelman who writes on the social-psychological dimensions of international conflict (Ch.4); Ronald D. Fischer who analyses interactive conflict resolution (Ch.5) and Cynthia Sampson deals with religion and peacebuilding (Ch.8). Part Three of the book is entitled *'Practitioners'* and Part Four *'Training'*. This is an excellent book on conflict resolution. However, it does not deal with the transition of a state's policy from counter-terrorism to conflict resolution.

The research project is essentially going to employ an *analytical, historical methodology* incorporating data of both *qualitative* and *quantitative* kind. The study begins with hypotheses formation and subsequently tests these hypotheses in the light of the data collected and systematically analysed according to the standard rules of data-gathering common to the social sciences. The research, being primarily of an interpretative kind, emphasis is more on the qualitative dimensions of the available information. Quantitative evidence, have been used, as and when necessary. The hypotheses constructed in the course of the study have been mostly of open-ended variety, and there has been no attempt to measure statistical variance of the same. Interviews have also been used in order to substantiate the major theoretical points.

The study unfolds in the form of a continuous *meta narrative* as well as a *personal narrative*. The research, therefore, desists from any conscious application of a theoretical

frame. The theoretical arguments and concepts used in the course of the study have been used to confirm the suggested hypotheses only.

The study intends to deal with the following *research questions*-

- (1) What is *counter-terrorism*? What is the short-term and long-term efficacy of *counter-terrorism measures*?
- (2) Can *counter-terrorism measures* be counterproductive? Can counter-terrorism *alienate* the minority community?
- (3) What is *conflict resolution*? Why does a state *shift* from a policy of *counter-terrorism* to a policy of *conflict resolution*?
- (4) What is the *genesis* of the conflict in Northern Ireland?
- (5) Which *factors* have been responsible for the determined stand of both the Protestants and the Catholics to maintain their separate identities and aspirations?
- (6) What has been the *British response* to the crisis in Northern Ireland? Did the British security responses alienate the minority community in Northern Ireland?
- (7) What have been the various *initiatives* taken in the Northern Ireland peace process? Why is the *1998 Good Friday agreement* considered to be a *historic step* in the peace process?
- (8) Has there been a *shift* in the British Government policy from *counter-terrorism* to *conflict resolution* in dealing with the situation in Northern Ireland?

Chapter 1 '*The Transition from Counter Terrorism to Conflict Resolution*' highlights the *definitional dilemma* with regard to the term 'terrorism'. It stresses on the importance of defining terrorism as only with an universally acceptable definition can terrorism be effectively combated. The chapter points out that the difficulty in formulating an universally agreed definition of terrorism can be attributed to the popular phrase '*one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.*' Chapter 1 defines the term *Counter-Terrorism* and also points out the distinction between 'counter-terrorism' and 'anti-terrorism'. The weaknesses of counter-terrorism strategy have been explained. This chapter also elucidates the various *counter-terrorism options* and *sub-options*. It also defines the term *Conflict Resolution* and explains the *shift* in government policy from *Counter Terrorism* to *Conflict Resolution* in dealing with terrorism.

Chapter 2 '*Genesis of the Conflict*' lays down the historical foundations on which an understanding of the present situation in Northern Ireland can be made. The *roots* of the conflict which can be traced back to the sixteenth century; the *Tudor conquest* of Ireland; the *plantation* of *Ulster*; the campaign by *Oliver Cromwell* against the Catholics; the famous *Battle of the Boyne*; the '*penal laws*' have been explained in this chapter. Besides, this chapter also examines the growth of Irish nationalism. It also explains the literary and intellectual revivalism in Ireland at the dawn of the twentieth century and the resurgence of republicanism during this period. This chapter throws light on the dramatic events of the *1916 Easter Rebellion*; the *1920 Government of Ireland Act* and the *partitioning* of Ireland; the ill feeling, mistrust and segregation between the Catholics and

Protestants of Ulster; the discrimination of Catholics in employment, housing allocations, education etc; the continued enforcement of the 1922 Special Powers Act by the police force, the *Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)* and the *Ulster Special Constabulary (USC)*; the *Cameron Commission Report*, the *Scarman* and *Hunt reports* investigating and reporting on allegations of discrimination against Catholics; the *Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)* campaign against discrimination and the arrival of the British troops in Northern Ireland in August, 1969.

Chapter 3 ‘*Catholics and Protestants - the Politics of Secessionism versus the Politics of Loyalism*’ looks at the inability of the IRA to protect the Catholic population from Protestant mob violence during the August, 1969 sectarian riots in Northern Ireland. It mentions the *Downing Street Declaration* of 20 August, 1969. This chapter also examines the September 1969 *Cameron Report* on the civil disturbance in Northern Ireland on and since 5 October, 1968 and the October 1969 *Hunt Report* on the structure of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the ‘B- Specials’ of the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). Chapter 3 discusses the various factors for the birth of the *Provisional IRA (PIRA)* in December, 1969.

This chapter analyses the role of *religion* as a crucial variable in the polarization between Catholics and Protestants. Chapter 3 also examines the terms ‘*unionist*’, ‘*nationalist*’, ‘*loyalist*’ and ‘*republican*’. This chapter draws attention to the British Army security measures by which the Catholic community was convinced that the British Army was simply a repressive tool of the Protestant majority and of British imperialism and there

was massive recruitment of alienated Catholic youth to the PIRA. In this context, the April, 1970 *Ballymurphy riot*, the July, 1970 *Falls curfew*, internment in August, 1971 have been analysed. Chapter 3 also mentions the rise of the loyalist paramilitary groups; *Bloody Sunday* and reprisal attacks by the PIRA which led the British Government to formally abolish the Stormont government and impose direct rule from Westminster.

Chapter 4 '*From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement*' examines the 1973 Assembly elections; the Sunningdale Agreement; the 1973 *Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA)*; the 1974 *Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)* and the 1975 *Constitutional Convention*. This chapter throws light on the 1975 *Gardiner Report* and the famous *hunger strikes* of the H-Block republican prisoners especially the 1981 hunger strike led by Bobby Sands, the PIRA leader in the H-Blocks. Chapter 4 discusses the controversial '*supergrass*' trials which took place in Northern Ireland and the *1984 Stalker inquiry of 1984*. Besides, the chapter also draws attention to the *1984 New Ireland Forum Report*; the *1985 Anglo Irish Agreement*; the 1988 *SDLP- Sinn Féin talks*; the *Brooke-Mayhew inter-party talks* and the significant *overtures* made by the British Government towards the republicans throughout the 1990s. The chapter also examines the 1993 *Downing Street Declaration*, the 1994 Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the *Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC)* ceasefires; the *1995 Framework documents*. It analyses the *1998 Good Friday Agreement* in depth.

Chapter 5 '*The Peace Process: Between Crisis and Hope*' discusses in detail the *Northern Ireland Assembly* which was elected on 25 June, 1998 under the terms of the

Northern Ireland (Elections Act) 1998. There is a detailed discussion of *republican dissident groups* in this chapter. Chapter 5 explains the *Drumcree protests* and the murder of the *Quinn brothers*; the *1998 Omagh bombing* and the reactions to it; the *Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998* which was introduced as emergency legislation on 2 September, 1998 in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing.

The chapter discusses the various challenges in the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement with regard to *constitutional issues, decommissioning, policing and instability of the devolved government* in the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.

It mentions two international two international events which discredited the PIRA and tarnished its reputation in the US - the mid-August, 2001 arrest of three senior PIRA members - *James Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly*, by Colombian authorities on charges of training guerillas of the *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*, to use explosives and the *September 11* terrorist attacks in the US following which there was a global backlash against terrorism. Chapter 5 also draws attention to the 23 October, 2001 IRA statement announcing that it would begin decommissioning; the police raid on Sinn Fein's Stormont offices on 4 October, 2002 as part of an investigation into a suspected *IRA spy ring*; the 14 October, 2002 suspension of Belfast's devolved government and reinstatement of direct rule; the November, 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections; the December, 2004 Northern Bank robbery and the thorny issue of IRA criminality which came to the fore with the murder of a Catholic man, *Robert McCartney*, in a bar brawl on 30 January, 2005.

Chapter 5 also discusses the historic statement made by the IRA on 28 July, 2005 formally declaring an *end* to its ‘*armed campaign*’; the efforts made by the British and Irish Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern to restore devolution; the *St. Andrews Agreement*, which was unveiled by the British and Irish governments on 13 October, 2006; the 24 November, 2006 installation of the transitional assembly in Northern Ireland; the storming of the entrance hall of Stormont by loyalist paramilitary killer Michael Stone; the 28 January, 2007 Sinn Féin special party conference (*Ard Fheis*) in Dublin, where for the first time in the history of the party, Sinn Féin voted to support the police in Northern Ireland. The chapter concludes with a section on *challenges* to the peace process by *dissident republican groups*.

After having analysed the situation in Northern Ireland, from the genesis of the conflict through to the present day, the *concluding chapter* then offers an *analysis* as to why the *Northern Ireland peace process* is an ideal case study of the *transition* from the British Government’s policy of *counter-terrorism to conflict resolution*.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism is a monthly peer-reviewed academic journal covering research on terrorism and insurgency. It was established in 1977 as *Terrorism*, obtaining its current name in 1992 when *Terrorism* was merged with another journal titled *Conflict*. It is published by Taylor & Francis and the editor-in-chief is Bruce Hoffman (Georgetown University). According to the Journal Citation Reports, the journal has a 2016 impact factor of 1.071. Last year Northern Ireland suffered 22 terrorist-related attacks; so far this year there have been 39. Last year 17 people in the province were charged with terrorist offences; this year, according to Matt Baggott, the chief constable of Northern Ireland's police service (PSNI), the figure is already 74. There is some bafflement in Northern Ireland about the failure of the security services to squash the problem. A frequent criticism is that the PSNI, formed in 2001 as part of the peace process, is no match for its predecessor, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), when it comes to counter-terrorism. Many old RUC hands were generously pensioned off, taking with them decades of experience. Northern Ireland's modern period of conflict started in the late 1960s and lasted more than three decades. What started as a civil rights movement—Catholics protesting what they saw as discrimination by Northern Ireland's Protestant-dominated government—deteriorated into violence, with the involvement of paramilitary groups on both sides and the arrival in 1969 of the British Army. It was signed by the British and Irish governments, as well as four of the major political parties in Northern Ireland: Sinn Féin, the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance Party. Among major parties, only the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) abstained.