
This volume derives from a collection of papers presented at the New Zealand Asia Institute (NZAI) organized conference, of the same name as the book, on 9-10 September 1998. The lineup of speakers included such well-known Indonesians, Indonesianists and Southeast Asianists as Nicholas Tarling, Anwar Nasution, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Hal Hill, Adam Schwarz, Albert Hasibuan, Douglas Kammen, Rizal Ramli (who would go on to become Abdurrahman Wahid’s coordinating minister for economics), and Sidney Jones, with papers delivered in absentia from Peter Carey and Xanana Gusmão (now East Timor’s President). All of the above have made excellent contributions.

On the whole the papers are an interesting and worthwhile collection, and the passage of time does not detract. The chapters are a mixture of political and economic assessments, plus one on Indonesia in the region, while five of the eighteen contributions deal specifically with East Timor. This volume, which appears to have been carefully copyedited, does not seem to have undergone much content editing in places, with the papers appearing very much as they did at the conference itself. Most obvious in this regard is the contribution from Ben Fisher of the World Bank, which has been left in outline or point form, making some of it incomprehensible without the surrounding explanations. Marie Leadbeater’s chapter, entitled ‘New Zealand Foreign Policy on East Timor’, is a well-written exposé based on primary source material, in which she takes to task various New Zealand officials for their attitudes – especially a former New Zealand Ambassador to Jakarta, whom she accuses of ‘blatant racism’ for saying, amongst other things, about the East Timorese that ‘[c]onsidered as human stock they are not at all impressive’ (146). However, the chapter is completely devoid of references for this primary material and contains a lengthy unsourced quotation from Noam Chomsky (148). This seriously undermines the credibility of the paper as a book chapter. It certainly makes it unusable for scholars wishing to quote it, which is a great pity.

These problems aside, the reader will get a sense of some first-rate thinking on Indonesia’s past, and cautious predictions for the future, as the following examples indicate. Hal Hill’s chapter is pithily summarized in its title: ‘Indonesia: From “Chronic Dropout” to “Miracle” to “Catastrophe”?’. Hill gives great insights into the origins of Indonesia’s
crisis – both external and internal. Sri Mulyani and Ali Winoto’s chapter is frankly honest about a host of domestic problems, while Anwar Nasution provides good insights but tends to glide over Indonesia’s hidden budget deficit – or the “extra budget” spending, as he terms it (44). Well-known lawyer, academic, parliamentarian, and human rights activist, Dr Albert Hasibuan, has written a contribution that moves across various themes and, surprisingly, expresses fear of Indonesia’s burgeoning freedom: ‘According to the latest figure sixty-five parties have been formed [for the 1999 election]. So the question remains whether the current freedom has been misused and become counterproductive to the development of civil society and democracy?’ (96). In the end around 150 parties emerged but only 48 were allowed to contest the general election. That Hasibuan should be so concerned about the proliferation of parties as society’s response to political freedom, rather than the formation of a coherent electoral system with a percentage threshold to sort out the winners in a fair contest, is somewhat curious. Nonetheless, this chapter does reveal something of Hasibuan’s thinking, which is probably indicative of the views and concerns shared by even liberal Indonesians.

While the Preface claims, with justification, that the themes of this conference remained relevant from the conference’s conception, perhaps the major omission is the failure to look at regional issues more comprehensively. East Timor’s prominence in the volume makes it all the more stark that dramatic changes in centre/region relations are not covered, while the troubled regions of Aceh, Papua (Irian Jaya) and Maluku deserve greater treatment – although Sidney Jones, in her chapter on East Timor, does touch on these themes. It would seem, and perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that greater emphasis could have been placed on regional issues.

*Indonesia After Soeharto* is a mixed assortment of contributions. While many are solid academic pieces, others have their weaknesses, as noted above; others are by practitioners, and several would be counted as activist literature. Gusmão’s address *in absentia* to the conference would count amongst the latter, and makes a great addition to the volume. Chris Tremewan, at the time director of the NZAI, tells the reader in the Preface that the conference was planned before the fall of Soeharto, and notes that the President’s departure from office in May 1998 ‘confirmed … our remarkable prescience’ (5). But rather than being honoured as a prophet, perhaps the more remarkable achievement was to pull together some extremely well-regarded scholars and practitioners to a highly successful two-day conference in New Zealand (which your reviewer was fortunate to have attended). Furthermore, while one can sympathize with the difficulty of piecing together such a volume, and all the contributions are useful in their own way to those interested in Indonesia, it is a shame that a stronger editorial hand was
not exercised over the production of this particular set of conference papers.

Reviewed by ANTHONY L. SMITH
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Indonesia has undergone remarkable economic and political challenges since 1997. This edited collection, by Indonesian and Australian academics and Indonesian civil servants, engages with the implications of these challenges for women. In a series of twenty papers, based on contributions to the annual Indonesia Update workshop held at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, authors explore the relationships between gender, equity and development at a variety of scales and through different lenses.

In the opening five papers, reviews and analyses of the political and economic changes since the end of Suharto’s New Order examine the legacy of his regime, the chaos of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, and the media and political response to the installation of Megawati Sukarnoputri as the country’s president in 2000. Subsequent papers review specific institutional and policy changes affecting women, Indonesian engagements with feminism and Islam, and case studies of women’s art and literature, labour market participation and migration as well as analyses of the family planning programme, and community development in Nusa Tenggara. Authors present richly detailed accounts drawing on personal experiences (in the case of some Indonesian civil servants and academics), media and statistical analyses. The result is a treasure trove full of up-to-date and thoughtful contributions.

One of the key themes to emerge from this collection is continuity in change. Many of the authors provide examples of how patriarchal gender ideologies and practices formally instituted and implemented during the New Order regime (1965-1998) continue today in different guises. In particular, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in parts of Sumatra, or the rise of misogynistic practices in the name of cultural tradition in Sulawesi, give cause for concern. Despite the major legal and programme achievements of the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment under the Gus Dur administration, it seems that many challenges continue to face those who would ensure gender equity in development at the local level.
A critically important aspect of these challenges is the prevalence of violence against women and many authors refer to it in their contributions. The economic crisis of 1997-98 and the mass rape of Chinese women in parts of Java and Bali highlighted the intersections of ethnic tensions and gender-based violence, and their connections to wider aspects of the unequal impacts of economic and political reform. Since these atrocious events, political awareness about gender-based violence has increased and efforts have been made by state government and regionally based non-governmental organisations to raise public awareness and improve support and legal services available to women. These improvements are encouraging, but there is still a long way to go before gender equity is commonplace.

Another encouraging outcome of recent political and economic events alluded to by contributors has been the integration of gender into government departments and monitoring systems. The widespread policy initiative to establish sex-disaggregated statistical records throughout the country is critically important if progress towards gender equity is to be monitored and improved. The challenge remains however, to ensure the rigour and quality of these records as moves to greater decentralization of power are instituted.

While the volume is generally excellent and provides a timely and valuable contribution to the wider field, there are two aspects to which I wish to alert potential readers. Firstly, the book, as with most scholarship on Indonesia, privileges information and analyses from the most populated and politically powerful provinces of the country – Java, Bali and Sumatra. It is quite heavily dependent on perspectives from urban-based middle-class scholars and civil servants in both Indonesia and Australia. While understandable, this orientation (and its implicit orientations) should be noted.

Secondly, the independence of East Timor hardly receives a mention and there is an absence of any analysis of the relationships between gender, equity and development throughout its independence movement and subsequent installation as a new nation state. Given the importance of East Timor to Indonesia and its profile internationally, this absence was disappointing. Thirdly, and linked to this point, there is no analysis specifically of women’s involvement in other independence movements in West Papua and Aceh. Perhaps this is to be expected given the contributors involved. However, such an analysis would have enriched the volume as a whole and contributed to understanding one of the key tensions evident in the book - the relationship between centralised systems of governance and desires to increase regional and local government autonomy.

The relationship between political and economic reforms (reformasi), decentralisation and greater regional autonomy (autonomi daerah) and diverse cultural and ethnic traditions on the one hand, and the transformation and democratisation of women’s groups throughout
the country on the other, remains to be seen. From the papers in this book, there is a new form of politics emerging under Megawati which, while having continuities with past regimes, is far more heterogeneous and less predictable than its predecessors. In some respects, this diversity enables a flourishing of localised development responses by women which are specifically targeted and relevant to their own conditions and realities. Alternatively, however, it could be argued that without any clearly defined or accepted understanding of Indonesian feminism and without a strong feminist figurehead in Megawati as the country’s first female president, the future relationship between gender, equity and development remains to be seen.

The book’s structure and orientation moves through different scales of analysis and covers this rich array of issues. All chapters are well written and edited. They represent thorough appraisals of the current state of play with respect to different cross-cutting themes. The editors have also done an admirable job of providing references between the chapters, so that key themes or events become connected. The result is one in which the diversity and dilemmas of the current situation with regard to gender and development are highlighted, but not reduced to simple summaries or conclusions.

As a teaching resource, the book would be best suited for use in senior undergraduate or graduate courses on Indonesia or on gender and development. It could be a useful reference for more general courses on Southeast Asia. The individual papers could easily be adopted for specific lectures or discussion groups on discreet topics, and practical exercises could be developed out of the many tables and statistics provided throughout.

This book presents us with a valuable and rich source of information about a nation in transition, without resorting to trite overviews or reductionist analyses. It highlights the centrality of gender and equity within development planning and provides insights into specific Indonesian engagements with these concepts and their translation into development practice by a variety of actors at a range of scales. As a result, the collection should be useful to anyone researching or working in Indonesia and will hopefully promote further constructive discussions about the potential ways forward. There are no easy solutions in such a complex country and I sincerely hope that the editors arrange a follow up volume in about five years time so that we may revisit the many issues and analyses presented here.

Reviewed by SARA KINDON
Victoria University of Wellington

This book includes a range of essays that explore various memory projects in late socialist Vietnam. Memory projects are defined here as undertakings designed to reconstruct versions of the past suitable for a myriad of purposes in the present. Not so long ago in Vietnam the past was made to serve one overriding purpose, the struggle against foreign domination, with history constructed in Marxist terms as a narrative of heroic endeavour in pursuit of a utopian future. But with Doi Moi history lost its narrative focus. As Hue-Tam Ho Tai notes in her introduction, ‘if revolutions aim to transform the future, and in doing so rewrite past, so do counter-revolutions. The end of utopia has taken away the telos that had made possible a particular writing of Vietnamese history’ (4). Despite this climate of confusion about the place of the past in the present, an intense commemorative fever has overtaken the country. Museums, monuments, memorials and temples are erected almost daily, yet the stories they tell are no longer shaped by a single national narrative. Families and local communities construct their own versions of the past, which often contrast with those of the state or those constrained by the commercial imperatives of a growing tourist industry. Drawn from a diverse range of sources, such as prison memoirs, commemorative shrines, funerary rituals, tourist sites, art, advertisements and films, the essays in this book all explore the ways in which memory projects are constructed and the multiple purposes they are made to serve in contemporary Vietnam.

Hue-Tam Ho Tai makes a significant contribution to this rich collection of essays. She provides an excellent introduction and also a brief afterword, and is the author of a fascinating essay that explores the gendered nature of remembrance and forgetting. As she notes, ‘the burden of remembering the dead and of imagining war and its place in the collective past has fallen to a post-war population in which women vastly outnumber men. Some are mothers and widows hugging to themselves memories of loss; others are young women deprived by war of the hope of having families of their own ... still others, grown up in peacetime, have little patience with war stories’ (167). Drawing on evidence from historical archives, literature, advertising and museum exhibits, Tai conveys much about the diversity of responses by women to the often traumatic business of memory and forgetting.

Mark Philip Bradley also explores the business of memory and forgetting, but he does so by drawing on the way war is dealt with in contemporary Vietnamese cinema. Beginning with Tran Vu and Nguyen Huu Luyen’s 1987 film *Brothers and Relations (Anh va Em)*, Bradley explores the way in which cinema has been used to challenge official memories of the war, providing instead counter-memories that
seek to foreground familial rather than state claims over the memory of the fallen, while at the same time asking questions about whose sacrifice is worthy of commemoration and what in fact are the legacies of war.

In a section devoted to the construction of memory, Peter Zinoman examines the way revolutionary prison memoirs, from Ho Chi Minh’s 1960 *Prison Diary* onwards, have been used to serve selected political agendas. While giving the impression of revealing highly individual and private experiences, the long tradition of using such prison memoirs to generate support for the government and the Party meant these diaries were governed by political not personal agendas. Their sole purpose was to inspire readers through engagement with the heroic sacrifices made by members of the Party leadership in the wars against the French and the Americans. Christoph Giebel also explores this narrative of revolutionary heroism in a chapter that looks at the commemoration of Ton Duc Thang, the southern revolutionary who succeeded Ho Chi Minh as president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and then became the first president of the unified Socialist Republic. Giebel shows how the construction of a museum-shrine in Ton Duc Thang’s village in the south, which was financed not by the state but by the members of the village, was a deliberate attempt to remind the leaders in the north of the contributions made by southerners to the war effort. In this sense, ‘the shrine stands not as a counternarrative but as a corrective to the Hanoi-centred interpretation of war and revolution’ (11).

In one of the most interesting chapters in the book, ‘The fatherland Remembers Your Sacrifice’, Shaun Malarney examines how members of a small, local community, Thinh Liet commune, became dissatisfied with official ceremonies for their war dead because they did not meet their own rather different needs. In response they supplemented the official ceremonies with their own commemorative services. While the state ceremonies always placed war-dead within a national pantheon of heroes, relatives and descendents were more concerned with ensuring the spirits of the dead safe passage into the other-world through performance of the funerary rites long associated with their ancestral beliefs. The dead were thus made to serve two different communities, two different sets of interests, one heroic one not. But these were overlapping, not competing memory projects.

Nora Taylor devotes her chapter to an exploration of art and aesthetics in the period since World War Two. As Taylor notes, ‘paintings, like monuments and memorials, serve as sites of commemoration in the form of portrayals of historic events and illustrious war heroes’ (109). The art world, of course, has been a highly politicised sphere, firstly through the dominance of socialist realism, but also now, Taylor argues, as the ideal of capturing a “national essence” shapes the production of painting throughout the country. The resurgence of folk art reflects this, as it offers an escape from the recent
revolutionary past, with its strong emphasis on ideology and conflict, into a more ancient and idealised view of Vietnam. It also reflects the increasingly commercialised environment of Doi Moi, where income is often dependent on appealing to foreign tastes. Finally, in a chapter called ‘The Past Without Pain’, Laurel Kennedy and Mary Rose Williams explore the manufacture of nostalgia in Vietnam’s tourist industry. Under Doi Moi, tourism is envisaged as one of the primary means by which Vietnamese will be able to extricate themselves from poverty, thus a new past is constructed to service this industry. War and revolution are not erased from memory, but re-packaged and largely “anaesthetised” so as to appeal to foreign tourists (e.g the Cu Chi tunnels). Similarly, there is a nostalgic exploitation of often hastily restored French colonial architecture, again designed to attract and entertain a largely foreign audience. Kennedy and Williams construct their interpretations of this “past without pain” from a post-colonial perspective, arguing that ‘far from promoting an understanding of Vietnamese people, their valorous history, their culture and way of life, the tourist industry invites foreigners to experience Vietnam from the position of dominance and control that Westerners appeared to lose forever at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Saigon in 1975’ (159).

In her afterword to this interesting collection of essays, Hue-Tam Ho Tai notes that commemoration and the politics of national identity are always closely linked, as are memory and community: ‘The creation of a common past is a means of defining what and who belong, and what and who deserve to be consigned to oblivion. Battles over memory are thus battles over how to draw the contours of community’ (227). These essays give a fascinating insight into the highly conflicted construction of community in contemporary Vietnam.

Reviewed by BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY
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This short video looks at the relatively new trend of young Japanese women opting for jobs in Southeast Asia, Singapore in particular. Since the mid-1990s, working in Singapore (and to some extent Hong Kong, too) has been portrayed in the Japanese media as an ‘exciting and exotic alternative’ to being an OL (‘office lady’) in the traditionally gender-
discriminatory context of Japanese companies. Recruiting firms began specialising in placing Japanese women in Singapore. Special issues of job-hunting magazines on finding jobs in Singapore appeared. A small but growing number of women are leaving Japan in pursuit of their career goals and adventure.

This trend, according to Professor Eyal Ben-Ari, (who provides the main academic analysis in this video), is associated with the ‘second wave’ of Japanese migration to Southeast Asia that began in the 1980s. Whilst the ‘first wave’ came with the establishment of Japanese manufacturing companies in Southeast Asia between the 1950s and 70s, this ‘second wave’ is associated with the increasing number of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia in sectors such as finance and banking.

Typically between their late 20s and early 30s, single and career-minded, these women of the ‘second wave’ are said to be escaping from various negative aspects of Japanese society: the pressure to get married, the uninteresting OL routine of tea-serving and photocopying, and most of all, patriarchy. In Japan, going abroad has often been portrayed as a way out from the dead-end OL job. Studying abroad, marrying a foreigner, or a working holiday in New Zealand, may all been seen in this light. One thing that is different about the subject matter of this video, however, is the destination. Rather than America or Europe, which are usually associated with gender equality and individual freedom, these women are in Singapore, a small Asian island state the Japanese military once invaded. No doubt part of the “Asia boom” over the last several years, this trend seems to be another indicator that young Japanese are freeing themselves from the Eurocentric mind-set that has dominated Japan since 19th century.

The video alternates interviews with three Japanese women working in Singapore with comments from Professor Ben-Ari, who is an anthropologist researching this trend. It also includes brief interviews with a recruiter and a Japanese male boss of one of the interviewed women. After viewing the video, what struck me most was the discrepancy between the way these women perceive their life in Singapore and the analysis offered by professor Ben-Ari. The interviewed women come across as generally happy and confident. They claim that their working life is ‘totally different’ in Singapore and that they are happier than in Japan. All three mention the limited job prospects for women in Japan as the reason for shifting abroad. Professor Ben-Ari, on the other hand, points out that many women, while supposedly escaping from the traditional Japanese working context and gender discrimination, ironically end up in exactly the same work structure as Japanese companies, because their work skills are usually related to Japanese language and culture. Two of the interviewees indeed have Japan-related jobs (the third one works for The Body Shop). And yet, they all emphasise that they do not feel part of the Japanese community, that they are blending into the Singapore society, and that
they are not typical Japanese like their male colleagues or housewife friends. The video as a whole seems to support the idea that these are a new strain of globalised Japanese women, who are not afraid of seizing opportunity abroad, while also retaining a link with Japan.

It may well be, as Professor Ben-Ari points out, that this video is rather selective. Behind these ‘successful’ cases, there may be many more unhappy Japanese women in Singapore, trapped in the same male-dominant and unchallenging workplace as in Japan, but with less salary. To what extent, then, do these stories represent the collective experience of working Japanese women in Singapore, or in Southeast Asia? This video, lacking in-depth analysis of gender power in Japan or in Singapore, cannot answer this question. What it offers is subjective and generalised statements from the interviewed women that Singapore has less gender discrimination than Japan, combined with the cliché of OLs serving tea and making photocopies. Such a point would have been more persuasive if it were accompanied with some statistics or examples. Without them, this video gives an impression of simply assuming and reinforcing the stereotypical image of Japanese women as uniformly being victims of patriarchy.

Analysis of gender power is a complex task. Anthropologists’ works based on fieldwork such as Dorinne Kondo’s *Crafting Selves* and Yuko Ogasawara’s *Office Ladies and Salaried Men* have challenged the stereotype, offering more complex pictures of Japanese working women, including an examination of the ‘informal’ power women may have over their male colleagues and bosses. To analyse the operation of gender power in a two-culture workplace (such as Japanese companies in Singapore) is even more complex, for gender power becomes intertwined with economic as well as ‘cultural’ power. This is demonstrated in works such as Junko Sakai’s *Japanese Bankers in the City of London* and Heung Wah Wong’s *Japanese Bosses, Chinese Workers*. The *Second Wave* supports the idea that the Japanese women working in Singapore are happy because of the relative gender equality in Singapore. Analysis of the work culture and the power structure in which they work would have added more depth to this proposition. Do the organisations they work for have traditionally Japanese-style management, or do they have a hybrid structure? Where do these women fit into that structure? How do they interact with Japanese bosses and local employees? Does the fact that they are ethnically

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Japanese benefit them in getting promotion or salary-raises? Without asking such questions, we cannot be certain that what is empowering them is indeed gender equality rather than, say, their ‘cultural’ power over the locals.

Of course, a short video like this is not designed to answer, or perhaps even ask, such questions. Overall, The Second Wave is a good introduction to the timely issue of Japanese women choosing to work in Singapore. Studies of female labour migration in Asia have generally focused on Southeast Asian women working in Japan and other affluent areas, mostly as sex-workers, nightclub hostesses, and maids. The recent trend of Japanese women working in Southeast Asia, therefore, is interesting and deserves more attention. This video offers a glimpse of the subjective experience of such women and also contains some interesting insights into the lives of Japanese men and women in Singapore. While we can certainly be sceptical about whether the authoritarian state in Singapore really provides an answer for social repression in Japan, it is clear that for the women who appear on the video, going abroad was the key for their happiness and self-realisation. The images of these outspoken, assertive, and lively women will also be useful as part of a resource for teaching about Japanese women, for it effectively counters the stereotype of submissive and obedient women.

Reviewed by RUMI SAKAMOTO
University Of Auckland


Ahmed Rashid has produced another fascinating account of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. After masterfully explaining Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in his previous book, here he turns his skills as an investigative journalist to the five Central Asian republics adjacent to Afghanistan—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The book is in part another attempt to answer the question posed in his 1994 publication entitled The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?

The book consists of an Introduction and two parts. In the Introduction the author explores the complex meaning of jihad. According to Rashid, militancy is not the essence of jihad, which can be of two types: greater (inward-seeking) and lesser (outward-seeking). The greater jihad as explained by The Prophet Muhammad involves the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being, to struggle to
improve him- or herself. It is also true that Islam sanctions rebellion against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not, and jihad can become the means to mobilize that political and social struggle. This is the lesser jihad. Ahmed Rashid accuses the global jihadi movements, from the Taliban in Afghanistan to Osama bin Laden’s worldwide Al Qaeda to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), of ignoring the greater jihad and adopting the lesser jihad as a complete political and social philosophy. He also asserts that nowhere in Muslim writings or tradition does jihad sanction the killing of innocent non-Muslims, or even fellow Muslims, on the basis of ethnicity, sect, or belief. These arguments can, however, be challenged. First, the jihadi movements almost always start off by restricting and regulating their own life and introducing certain self-imposed codes of conduct. One can disagree whether such norms are truly Islamic and representative of mainstream Islam but as the history of Islamic radicalism has shown the process of change starts from within. The talibs were moulding their spirit in the madrassahs first and only later turned to external action after they had formed the political movement of Taliban. As for greater jihad, its acceptance of radical means of struggle, including use of force, makes it susceptible to violence and extremism. To draw a parallel, Marxist-Leninist writings never envisaged gulags but in practice turned to them in the course of “struggle with the class enemy”.

Part I deals with the history of Central Asia and its indigenous Islamic movements from the sixth century B.C. to the end of the Communist era. It also summarizes the first decade of independence in each of the Central Asian states, examining what the regimes have achieved – and how they have failed. As Rashid points out, it is the prevalence of the various ideas on Islam, in particular, and how they have been received by the various rulers of the Central Asian landmass, that are essential to an understanding of the conflicts that threaten the region today. Early on in the history of Islam two branches of the religion emerged in Central Asia: the traditional, conservative, scholarly Islam of the settled areas and the oasis cultures that were dominated by local rulers and the ulama, and the much looser, less restrictive Islam of the nomads that favoured Sufism and pre-Islamic traditions. Sufism is a form of Islamic mysticism that preaches direct communion with God and tolerance towards all other forms of worship. Even today the nomadic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen tribes are far less Islamicised – and much less susceptible to Islamic radicalism – than their ethnic counterparts in the settled oasis areas, such as the Ferghana Valley.

The author suggests that Soviet rule and Communist suppression of religion contributed to the emergence of Islamic opposition in Central Asia, which grew in strength as a result of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The indigenous Islamic revival that followed the break-up of the USSR was quickly radicalised by the arrival of outsiders, such as the Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia. Rashid’s generally objective and
logical narration is somewhat marred by unfounded accusations that Gorbachev held ‘anti-Muslim views’ (p.40), that the Turkmen republic was ‘for decades governed entirely by Russians’ (p. 36), and that according to the Bolsheviks’ self-determination principle ‘the Russian proletariat could decide not to be part of the tsarist empire, but the non-Russian regions could not decide to secede from the Bolshevik empire that was taking its place’ (p. 33). Unfortunately, the author consistently displays a simplistic understanding of the place of religion and ethnicity in the former Soviet Union throughout the book. A certain anti-Russian bias also dominates his analysis of contemporary Central Asia-Russia relations. He ignores the fact that Russia continues not only to be economically vital for the region but also offers a model of post-Soviet democratisation even if imperfect and controversial.

The bloody civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1997 was Central Asia’s first experience of a political coup by a homegrown Islamicist movement. Rashid explains that Islam was a natural way to encourage Tajik nationalism, for an underground political Islam had thrived in Tajikistan more than in any other Central Asian state during the Soviet period. One could add that Islam was the only way to promote Tajik nationalism in a country where regionalism and regional tensions were paramount and never really addressed by the Soviet Government. The next stage of Islamic radicalisation that has been shaking Uzbekistan and growingly Kyrgyzstan and even Kazakhstan is a result of two phenomena – the exposure of Central Asian states to external influence, not always benign, as well as the dissatisfaction of the public with the corrupt and repressive nature of their regimes. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the pan-Islamic movement of Hizb Ut-Tahrir (HT) represent the impact of these phenomena and pose a serious challenge to the stability of Central Asia. The author skilfully analyses the nature and philosophy of each of the movements, suggesting, for example, that although HT believes in jihad as a means to mobilize supporters against non-Muslims, unlike the IMU it does not advocate a violent overthrow of Muslim regimes. Some analysts, however, question the peaceful nature of HT and refer to a blurred distinction in methods of struggle between HT and the IMU.

Ahmed Rashid notes that the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States created profound geo-strategic changes in Central Asia. Russia and Central Asian states aligned with the USA expected the defeat of the Taliban to lead to the elimination of the IMU and the weakening of the Chechen separatist resistance. With their military alliance with the United States in place, the Central Asian regimes have stepped up their harassment of Islamic activism in their own territories. The events of September 11 have also dramatically altered the Great Game in Central Asia. China, Russia and the United States are likely to remain rivals in the region but today the superpowers are finding themselves at the mercy of forces they helped unleash but that are now
beyond their control. The threats from Islamic radicals have highlighted the weakness of the three great powers and forced them together in bilateral agreements. The big powers now share a common interest in undermining Islamic militancy in Central Asia and bolstering the military capacities of the Central Asian states.

And yet the Central Asian states, as the author observes, face an uncertain future. The popularity of militant Islam in Central Asia is primarily due to the repressiveness of the Central Asian regimes. These governments refuse to broaden their political base, institute even the mildest of democratic reforms, or allow any kind of political opposition. The Central Asian regimes are at a critical crossroads. They can ignore the lessons from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Afghan state and watch terrorism, instability, and famine increase in their countries as it did in Afghanistan. Or they can take advantage of the global community’s new engagement with the region and rebuild their countries.

The book is highly recommended for both beginners and specialists in Islamic and Central Asian studies.

Reviewed by ROUBEN AZIZIAN
University of Auckland


*Echoes from Dharamsala* is a musical ethnography on the performance and reception of popular music in a Tibetan refugee community in India. It is a study of the musical soundscape of a refugee community in Dharamsala and explores mainly non-traditional music in an attempt to understand the place of music in establishing cultural boundaries and identities. The author, as a Junior Fellow of the University of Texas Anthropology Department, undertook a year’s field research in India in 1994 after purchasing a recording on a previous trip to India in 1993 of a Tibetan playing blues on the guitar. That performer, who she later met, was the inspiration behind the research.

The book has seven main chapters, an introduction and conclusion. The introduction provides an in-depth discussion of the author’s area of enquiry, theory and method, placing an emphasis on ideas from contemporary anthropological theory and ethnographic writings. By outlining very early on two ideas that form the foundation of the research, the reader is given some of the reasons behind the book. That is, according to Diehl’s argument culture is created by expressive
performances, and ‘traditions are selected and ever changing’ (3). Furthermore, the introduction provides an informative discussion around four questions as a way of setting the ethnographic area of study: ‘Why study refugees? Why refugee music? Why refugee youth? Why Tibetans?’ (5).

The focus of the first chapter is on Dharamsala, the main field site of ethnographic enquiry. The importance of this town, which is located at the far north of India, as a crossroads between India and Tibet is outlined early on. As the Tibetan capital-in-exile Tibetan refugees have settled in three broad periods: from 1959 to the mid-1960s; in the mid-1980s; and in the early 1990s. Special attention is given to the idea of diasporic communities, drawing many ideas from the writings of such theorists as James Clifford. The author concludes that Dharamsala is a place where cultures and groups meet, and a space ‘where Tibetans mediate these cultures and groups for themselves as they become both more localized and more cosmopolitan over time’ (56).

The second chapter describes the rich cultural heritage of Tibet. It explores the ways in which Tibetan traditional culture is preserved in exile. Moreover, the discussion outlines the construction of Tibetan heritage and the role of music in government-sponsored events where official performances are differentiated from other types of music making. Including such areas as preservation, public representation, and marketing, the reader is given an outline of the numerous ways in which Tibetan culture is maintained and transformed in its diasporic Indian context. The author asserts that ‘for Tibetan refugees certain sounds have come to be not only associated with, but also iconic of, particular ethnic identities, political affiliations, and moral stances, in addition to more obvious generational distinctions’ (81-82).

Chapter 3 looks at the contemporary musical lives of Tibetans in India. It is here that the writer provides a valuable social analysis of the place of popular music in the lives of current refugees. This chapter gives attention to the extremely popular Hindi film songs and their place in the lives of the refugee community. Diehl describes her experiences playing keyboard in the Yak Band, the ensemble of musicians who inspired much of the ethnography. The phenomenon of Hindi film songs is examined in connection with the way Tibetans seem to be just as attracted to them as many others in South and Southeast Asia. Diehl notes the cross-cultural accessibility of Hindi film songs and that their appeal to Tibetans is simply that they are part of Tibetan (in exile) culture – many Tibetans have only ever lived outside Tibet.

The next chapter continues the discussion of popular music. It looks particularly at dreams of Tibetan independence. The author discusses the use of western popular culture in the refugee community as a powerful ideology that helps Tibetans become modern. ‘Participating in an international pop culture is . . . a way for these refugees to express a solidarity with a wider human struggle through sounds that have a
historical relationship with social change’ (30). For many Tibetans the sounds of western popular music are fundamentally part of their lives. Here, Diehl looks at the globalisation and localisation of western (global) popular music. She explores the ways in which popular music is experienced by Tibetan youth and how it is a medium for social change and community bonding.

The place of Tibetan popular music over the last ten or so years is explored in Chapter 5. A contemporary Tibetan rock-influenced style is examined in terms of its history and social significance in the present-day refugee culture. The chapter focuses on one song writer/guitarist and the experiences of a rock group. Tibetan youth in exile is striving to convince its community that rock music can be part of their contemporary culture at the same time as others are striving to preserve the real and imagined past. Much focus is indeed on the past, and the author has found how the refugee youth is finding new musical emblems of cultural representation that are just as powerful as the musics of the past. The Yak Band is given significance in the musical history and ethnography with its development into a noticeable band in the community. Chapter 6 continues the discussion on popular music, but focuses on lyrics. Here, the author is concerned with the meaning of songs and how they communicate to their audience. Much thought is given to the theoretical analysis of lyrics in popular music studies and ethnomusicology. The author concludes that ‘the lyrics of modern songs contribute significantly and diversely to the ways in which Tibetan audiences listen to and appreciate this new musical genre’ (233).

The place of public music performances is the focus of Chapter 7. This is a new phenomenon to Dharamsala and the Tibetan diaspora and it provides a place for an expression of cultural identity. Furthermore, the author includes a discussion of her own place and perspective as the Yak Band’s keyboard player. Diehl describes her participation in the band as a unique experience where she could study the performance contexts repeatedly, while seeing that each was notably different.

Echoes from Dharamsala is a remarkable book. It is theoretically oriented as well as an intensely descriptive account of everyday musical life in the community. It provides an historical background and contemporary cultural analysis of Tibetans in exile, a theoretical issue at the heart of much current anthropological discourse on diasporas and identity. The book has been thoroughly researched, it is extremely well written, and it includes a number of photographs to help show cultural context. It portrays contemporary issues on Tibet, refugees, diasporas, and field research. (One final comment: the beautiful colour photograph of the Tibetan deity Yongkhor Sung on the book’s front cover is surely in reverse – it shows a left-handed lute player.)

Reviewed by HENRY JOHNSON
University of Otago


Novels about India, in English and written by Indians, are flourishing and are popular far outside of India. If this surprises, it is usually explained that English is one of the official languages of India, and that the British colonial rulers extended education throughout India through the medium of English. The so-called Bengal Renaissance of the nineteenth century was one result of this educational effort as liberal European ideas were adopted by Indians exposed to European thought. Thus enlightened thinking encompassing the ideas of the world is central to Indian education today. Later, when Indians began to resist British rule, and seek first some say in their own government and then independence from foreign rule, English remained an important medium of communication and education. Today English language newspapers are as common and as important as those in indigenous languages, and higher education in English is widespread.

As a result, it has been assumed, it was natural that Indians should begin to write in English, and the novel flourishes as a result of this. But Joshi questions whether the English novel grew out of this kind of situation. She assiduously examines the reading patterns of Indians in the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, and finds that while educational books were an important part of the market, it is obvious that what most Indians were reading were novels, and especially those of a romantic and even melodramatic nature. Here Joshi takes issue with Gauri Viswanathan’s important book, *Masks of Conquest* (1989), for concentrating on British ideology and ignoring Indian responses altogether. The reader is clearly in focus in this study.

Joshi establishes her thesis by a close and detailed examination of library, publishing and distribution records and examination of reviews and notices of new reading in journals and other records. This reveals a clear pattern of the kind of fiction which was popular among Indian readers. She also examines the nature of the fiction being read to see what it was that appealed to Indians, and discerns links with historical literary traditions.

She then shows how early Indian writing grew out of this reading tradition, as Indian authors attempted to satisfy readers already familiar
with these novels from abroad, ‘a process by which first Indian readers and then writers transmuted an imported and alien form into local needs that inspired and sustained them across many decades (p. xviii).’ This is an insightful and illuminating study which provides increased understanding of many of the excellent novels being written today.

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One of the “sights” to see in Calcutta is the Park Street cemetery, with its rows and rows of decaying tombs of English men and women, and too many children to count, who gave their all for the Raj. And what strikes one is not the sheer numbers but the young age of most of them, and the number of tombs containing whole families. Ruling India was, as Collingham reminds us, a very physical experience marked by disease and discomfort and often death.

Postmodernism has made us question the self, that elusive entity with which we usually identify. Consequently it has made us look anew at the body, the physical self which is unquestionable as we gaze at it in the mirror each morning. But identity is more than isolated gazing at the self, embodied or whatever, it is a social existence depending on our relations to other bodies and selves. This book examines the social existence of the bodies of those who ruled India for the British, that “thin red line” of soldiers and administrators, and the personality structure of those who comprised it.

Collingham argues that strategies were employed by these few, in order to cope with the extremes of physical existence and to rule the many native Indians, which involved conscious choices about how their bodies were ordered, individually and collectively. Based theoretically on the thinking of Bourdieu and Mauss, with nods to Foucault and Elias, he ‘traces the transformation of the early nineteenth-century nabob from the flamboyant, effeminate and wealthy East India Company servant, open to Indian influence and into whose self-identity India was incorporated, to the sahib, a sober bureaucratic representative of the Crown, This shift [was] from an open to a closed and regimented body …’ (3). This movement from nabob to sahib was marked by the deployment of physical signifiers, which came to determine how one lived and interacted with servants, what one ate, the clothes one wore and sexual relations which were practiced, as the sahibs distanced themselves from the “natives”.

All of this came to an end at the time of the Second World War, not just because ideas and mores “at Home” had changed and Indian aspirations for independence were receiving sympathetic consideration, but because events in India conspired against the carefully cultivated idea of the British body. Defeats at the hand of the Japanese in Asia showed that the body of the soldier was not invincible, the famine of 1943, which was largely cause by the British exploded, the myth of benign rule on
behalf of the “native”, and British soldiers brought in to protect the empire rejected the cult of the sahib’s body. By the 1960s when I first went to India this latter had achieved cult status as stories were recounted of working-class lads toiling away all day maintaining aircraft engines, stripped to the waist and wearing no solar topi. It was not thought possible that an Englishman could survive without that essential item of headgear. The shock to the idea of the body of the sahib was fatal.

This is a well-written and well argued book, with delightful insights to be had along the way. Fanny Parks’s family had 57 servants. Even in the heat of tropical India the sahib would don evening dress every evening and dine on roast beef and suet pudding. This is, indeed, a book to set alongside the Plain Tales from the Raj.

The system of rituals which can broadly be called worship, or puja as it is usually known, forms the basis of Hindu religious practice. It is where I begin my course on the “Introduction to Eastern Religions” because in order to explain puja one necessarily moves out to a broad field of beliefs and practices which precede it historically and underpin it philosophically. To explain puja one needs to explore the whole range of objects to which and to whom worship is offered, the range of reasons why people offer worship to them, and the wide diversity of people who are involved in the practice.

The book under review shares these assumptions with me, and uses the acts of puja as a focus to explore the field of Hindu religious devotion across the length and breadth of the land. In doing so it solves one of the dilemmas faced by the University lecturer – how to convey the colour and atmosphere of puja. It does so because it is crammed with full colour photographs, taken by the author who is himself a photographer. And what photographs! India comes alive before the reader’s eyes. There are pictures of people making offerings, of the gods and goddesses to whom they are made, of the offerings themselves, of temples and homes and roadside shrines – all in the most exquisite colour and detail.

But this is not just a picture book. The accompanying text explains simply what the photos illustrate, the concepts behind such devotion, the evolution of temples and shrines, the major gods and goddesses, the images and symbols employed, the priests and functionaries involved. In fact it turns out to be an excellent introduction to Hinduism in general.

Such explanations are simple but not shallow. It wears its scholarship lightly, but it is not unscholarly. The author is a social anthropologist with a long experience of India, and is fully aware of the need for accurately representing the diversity of religious belief and
practice in Hinduism. This is reflected in the excellent short bibliographies which accompany each chapter as guides to further reading.

I have only one quibble, and that is with the title, obviously chosen with Western readers in mind. The title implies there is one God, whereas Hindus worship many gods and goddesses. But Huyler knows this, and in this respect the book delivers much more than it promises. A highly recommended introduction to Hinduism and to India.

Reviewed by MALCOLM MCLEAN
University of Otago


What is Gandhi’s Way? How does it work? Under what conditions can it resolve human conflicts? The book under review tries to answer these and other questions.

Mahatma Gandhi was born in India in 1869. He went to England to further his studies and qualified as a lawyer. He practised law in South Africa and only returned to his homeland when he was 46 to lead peaceful campaigns against British colonial rule. He was assassinated by a Hindu extremist and died in 1948. To many, Gandhi is regarded as a persistent fighter, a moral leader, and even a saint. He would not shy away from waging a struggle, especially one that upheld such basic principles as worker’s rights or social justice. He fought, however, by using non-violent means such as passive resistance and civil disobedience, and he was guided by what he believed to be the truth of God – the love of all humankind.

Gandhi’s Way, according to the book’s author, ‘is a primer of Mahatma Gandhi’s principles of moral action and conflict resolution’ (back cover). The author claims that it can be used to resolve conflicts at home, in business, and in the local, national, or international arena.

Juergensmeyer – a professor of sociology and director of global and international studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara – divides his book into three sections. Section I, consisting of ten short essays, spells out Gandhi’s reasons for confronting injustice and explains the concepts and theories that underlie the particular style of actions that Gandhi took to combat injustice and resolve conflicts. Section II discusses five cases, ranging from a family feud, a work problem, and an internal fight, to a battle against nuclear weapons and Jewish resistance to Nazi oppression. The last section conjures up four imaginary
conversations between Gandhi and Marx, Gandhi and Freud, Gandhi and Niebuhr, and finally Gandhi and himself, as a way to illustrate the author’s concerns over four questions: Can violence ever be justified? Can anger be true? Is a force of love realistic? And was Gandhi always a Gandhian?

There is no clear-cut explanation as to why Marx, Freud, and Niebuhr were chosen, and not, say, Weber, Fukuyama, or the Dalai Lama. I would have thought that a comparison between Gandhi and the Dalai Lama would be revealing, as to the subtle differences between their inner strengths and apparent divergence between their external circumstances. Of the four conversations, I find the first one between Gandhi and Marx most illuminating, as they had such contrasting views on the use of force. Marx believed that social injustices in society could only be changed through revolutions in the political and social structures in society, while Gandhi believed that it was more important to cultivate inner change. Marx sanctioned the use of violence, while Gandhi was against its use, unless under extreme circumstances, like a situation in which one is being raped. To Gandhi, violent actions can only be used under four conditions (p. 155). First, the action must have the effect of stopping a violent act in progress. Secondly, it must only disable or detain, and not destroy. Thirdly, it must reduce the level of violence rather than increase it. And fourthly, it must initiate a normal Gandhian Way towards conducting a fight.

Underlying Gandhi’s Way is the concept of satyagraha, a term derived from Sanskrit. Satya means truth, and agraha means obstinacy or stubbornness. Together, they mean clinging on or holding on to truth or a commitment to truth. As truth is the love of God, so those who practise satyagraha should extend the love of God to the love of all. In this way, followers of Gandhi should avoid using violence, as violence tends to destroy and cause destruction and human sufferings. Adherents to Gandhi’s Way maintain that the strategy of non-violence works: take a look at the civil rights movement in the United States, labour movements throughout the world, and India’s struggle for independence (p. 126). Sceptics, however, view non-violence as a contributing factor rather than a direct causal one in the process of conflict resolution. Apparently, whether non-violence works or not depends on, among other things, the attitudes and policies of the oppressors: whether or not they are benign, democratic, or even sympathetic to the course of non-violence.

It seems that non-violence as a way to resolve conflicts is more effective when dealing with domestic issues rather than with issues of international politics, where the rules of engagements are less clear and where the use of force to settle differences in expediency is more seductive.

Billed as a handbook, the author keeps his promise by giving a seemingly straightforward, step-by-step approach to resolving conflicts at
various levels, from the inter-personal and inter-group to the international. He lists them as follows: 1. Do not avoid confrontation; 2. Stay open to communication and self-criticism; 3. Find a resolution and hold fast to it; 4. Regard your opponent as a potential ally; 5. Make your tactics consistent with the goal; 6. Be flexible; 7. Be temperate; 8. Be proportionate; 9. Be disciplined; and 10. Know when to quit.

Like other policy advice, such as that found in Sun Tze’s *Art of War* or Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, the relevance of these steps to conflict resolution is difficult to ascertain because of their brevity and high levels of abstraction. The relevancy test depends very much on time, circumstances and the perception of the parties involved in a conflict. From a moral point of view, however, non-violence is clearly much preferable to violence as a solution. It is a means readily available to the weak to fight against the strong, the poor against the rich.

One major lesson that Gandhi gave us is that no one can possibly possess the whole truth. Parties to a dispute often hold some elements of truth. And compromise is often necessary to avoid a direct clash. But fight if need be when basic principles (not power or pride) are at stake, with measured force if it helps to stop further destruction or violence. Furthermore, truth is not something static, it is subject to human experience.

Professor Juergensmeyer is to be congratulated for putting together Gandhi’s ideas in such a simple, user-friendly format, and for subjecting those ideas to tests. He has ultimately provided an invaluable service to a wide, general readership interested in human conflicts and their resolution.

Reviewed by GERALD CHAN
Victoria University of Wellington
The University of Cambridge


How did Europeans imagine China in the period from the first successful Jesuit mission in the late sixteenth century until the failure of the British trade embassy in 1816? During this period – roughly the early modern in European terms (late-Ming through to high-Qing in Chinese terms) – Chinese cultural practices ‘transfixed the attention of philosophers and theologians, architects and designers, venture capitalists and social critics’ (1). It is this European response to China that David Porter explores in his book. In other words, this is a book about the European
imagination, not a book about China. Having said that, it is a very fine book, perhaps the best we now have about this European fascination with things Chinese.

Porter structures his analysis into four spheres of encounter: linguistic, theological, aesthetic and economic. In the first, he explores the perplexity of Europeans when confronted with the Chinese writing system, in the second, the Jesuit-mediated encounter with Chinese thought, in the third, chinoiserie, and, finally, in the fourth, the frustrations of the totally foreign nature of imperial Chinese trade policy. Throughout these chapters he links these various spheres by arguing that an engagement with ‘the cipher of foreignness’ constituted an act of cultural formation, that through engagement with aspects of Chinese culture Europeans came to new understandings of themselves and their own culture. Porter argues that ‘as the predominant focus of European interest shifted in the early eighteenth century from the language and religion of the Chinese to its aesthetic models and trade policies, the prevailing attitude toward China gradually evolved from one of reverential awe to one of increasingly dismissive contempt,’ yet throughout the entire period ‘an implicit model of legitimacy in representation remained a constant point of reference, a common conceptual and rhetorical thread woven through the varied cultural discourses comprising the European experience of the encounter’ (7).

When the first Jesuit reports began filtering through European intellectual circles, the context in which they were interpreted was one of turmoil and crisis: the Thirty years War engulfed the continent while revolution transformed British cultural and political life. The response to this prolonged period of turmoil was a widespread yearning for order and stability, and this yearning was reflected in European understandings of China: ‘the idealized, quasi-utopian society they read into Jesuit missionary reports emerged as a model of the continuity and order they so craved’ (16). Many believed that the turmoil of the times was a reflection of the curse of Babel – a multiplicity of tongues producing linguistic ambiguity and uncertainty throughout Europe. Peace would only be attained if language could be made whole once again, hence the fascination with a form of writing that seemed to transcend the confusion of European vernaculars ‘to convey the timeless essence of ideas and things in themselves’ (16). Porter thus places early interpretations of the Chinese script within the context of seventeenth century European language reform.

From Francis Bacon and John Locke onwards, language reformers argued for an essential equivalence between linguistic and philosophical standards of clarity, precision and transparency. Porter explores how these reformers became captivated by the notion of a non-alphabetic script that might provide the basis for solving the curse of Babel. John Webb argued that Chinese was the primary language; others, such as Jonathan Swift and Samuel Johnson were not so sure,
but they remained intrigued by the foreignness of the Chinese script. Porter moves then to examine the more sophisticated sinology of Leibniz, Andreas Müller, Christian Mentzel, Theophilus Siegfried Bayer and Joseph de Prémare. By the early eighteenth century this search for the perfect language began to abate and the fascination with the Chinese script was moderated by an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the complex nature of Chinese languages and their means of representation. As in so many other areas, it was perhaps the best of the Jesuit accounts of China, Jean Baptiste du Halde’s *Déscription géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine* (1736), that played a major role in clearing away many of the misconceptions about the way ideographs function. Nevertheless, the fascination they exert on outside observers continued (think of Pound, for instance) and Porter has done a great deal here to explain the early nature of that fascination.

The Jesuit missionaries themselves were no so concerned with finding a panacea for a perceived linguistic crisis; their energy being devoted to establishing a stable foundation on which to graft Catholic theology. Just as the language reformers saw in the Chinese script a foundational language, so the Jesuits believed that in the classical Confucian canon there resided a pure and authentic revelation of the divine. And like the Chinese script, the religious practice based on this scriptural foundation was believed to derive from an originary and authoritative source of truth. The singular nature of this truth provided the link between Confucian texts and Christian doctrine, and was the foundation on which the Jesuits built their accommodationist practices. Porter uses well the large body of scholarship devoted to this encounter, but adds the crucial context of the ‘tumultuous history of the Society of Jesus itself and the iconoclasm of Enlightenment challenges to orthodox Christian doctrine’ (81). This context is often ignored in discussions that focus primarily on the Chinese field for the encounter. It helps explain, for instance, the intensity of the Jesuit opposition to the syncretism of the late Ming years and the ferocity of their attacks on Buddhism. But while Porter is correct to direct our attention to the European context for much that the Jesuits did in China, he gives too little attention to their need to counter the metaphysical strengths of post-Song neo-Confucianism with an emphasis on an earlier version of Confucianism that was interpreted as being more moral than spiritual. Only by extracting the spiritual from the moral in Confucianism were the Jesuits able to argue the need for the addition of Christian theology. Their favouring of Zhang Juzheng’s interpretation of the classics over those of Zhu Xi was based primarily on this need to find a place for their own theology, something that was far more difficult to achieve with the richer metaphysics of the more other-worldly Confucianism of the Zhu Xi school. The subsequent misconception in the West that Confucianism constituted a moral and ethical order but not a religion was a direct
result of this eliding of its richly metaphysical character by the Jesuits and the appeal this held for philosophes like Voltaire, who longed to create in Europe a world that the Jesuits encouraged them to imagine as existing in China.

Porter next turns his attention to chinoiserie. By the early eighteenth century the rising tide of imports ‘stirred an interest in Chinese culture among a class of artists and collectors less concerned with the interpretive legibility of the foreign than with the sheer thrill of its exoticism’ (11). With the increasing popularisation of Chinese taste, through the spread of painted porcelains and ornate Chinese style furnishings, the longing for the ancient and the authentic, whether in language or religion, gave way to the delights in engaging in foreignness for its own sake. This also saw a shift in the prevailing genres of representation, from scholarly writings to the decorative arts. Porter quotes Robert Southey’s comment here, from his *Letters from England* (1807), that ‘plates and tea wares have made us better acquainted with the Chinese than we are with any other distant people’ (133). Porter provides an excellent discussion of the richness of chinoiserie, making this section perhaps the best in a very good book. From painting and tapestry to gardens and the new cultural space associated with the consumption of high tea, Porter explores the multitude of ways in which the fascination with things Chinese was manifested in eighteenth century Europe. Much of this is not new, but rarely has it been brought together in such a way as to reveal the extent of the place China occupied in the imaginations of Europeans at this time.

Discussion of high tea leads naturally into the final of the four spheres, the economic, as it was the growing taste for tea in Europe, especially Britain, that became the foundation for the increased commercial interest in China. Initially this was confined to high tea, a predominantly female space in elite culture, where only the fine green teas were favoured. But once black tea, with milk and sugar, came to be taken as a meal substitute by the emerging working classes in the industrialising towns of northern England, the nature of the commercial engagement with China was transformed. All of this tea came from China. It was not until the mid- to late-nineteenth century, when the British established tea plantations throughout their empire, that China tea began to lose its dominance in the world economy, and by this time the European fascination with things Chinese had faded. But the shift to the consumption of black tea in working class families in the late eighteenth century resulted in a dramatic increase in European trade with China. This is a well known story, providing the background to first Opium War, and Porter does not concern himself with retelling it. Rather, he explores more the conflicting ideologies that lay behind the war; a European commercialist doctrine that posited the free circulation of economic and cultural capital as the basis of progress and prosperity.
here encountering the ‘cipher of foreignness’ in an official Chinese doctrine that emphasised control and social hierarchy.

By now the emphasis on authenticity and historical origins that had characterised the response to the Chinese script and the Confucian world-view just a century earlier had been replaced by an economic determinism that placed priority on a free circulation of goods and ideas, which was deemed to be the natural order of things. Porter argues that ‘when this version of the ideal was projected onto China ... the systematic obstruction of circulatory impulses in Chinese society seemed to undermine the legitimacy not only of trade contacts and diplomatic negotiations but also of family ties, the public sphere, and ultimately the Chinese state itself’ (12). Again, Porter makes good uses of recent China scholarship, in this case on the Macartney embassy, but the wider context in which he places this work leads to new insights about the European encounter with China. For instance, Porter suggests that ‘both the Hegelian verdict on China’s place outside the history of civilization and its seeming confirmation in the humiliations of the Treaty of Nanjing appear, in retrospect, as inevitable consequences of the discourses of stagnation, obstruction, and political illegitimacy that emerged in merchant and diplomatic renderings of Chinese culture and society over the course of the eighteenth century. It seems equally clear that the flowering of a complimentary discourse of rights and political freedoms in the social movements and liberal political philosophy of the nineteenth century, with their rhetorical emphasis on progress, the free circulation of ideas, and the sovereignty of the individual, was to some degree preconditioned by the consolidation of a particular form of cultural self-consciousness through the commercialist engagement with China’ (245).

Not only does this book tell us much about the European fascination with China during the early modern period, it also reveals the extent to which there are underlying paradigms that continue to shape Western responses to China down into the present. As Porter notes, the discussions on trade issues and human rights that have dominated public discourse over the past decade or more ‘have, from a historical perspective, an unmistakably familiar ring to them ... There are always echoes of missionary zeal in political efforts to “convert” other nations to the creed of Western-style free-market democracy. But the sense of uncanny repetition of historical patterns is heightened in this case on recognizing that the reform agendas being urged on China today are themselves the products of the eighteenth-century history of China’s contact with the West’ (246).

Reviewed by BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY
University of Otago

In the wake of the various freedom movements of the 1960s came urgent calls for the equalisation of gender relations by “liberating” women from the “shackles of male domination”. Over the next thirty years, the focus of the new field of gender studies was consequently reserved for women, as the marginalised “other” in a patriarchal system. Sociological studies on China clearly reflected this trend, as can be evidenced by a plethora of books by, amongst others, Delia Davin, Elizabeth Croll, and Tamara Jacka, on the position of women in both traditional and contemporary Chinese society. The assumption was always that, as the dominant discourse in society must be a male-centred one, reflecting male concerns, aspirations, ideals and real experience of life, there was no need for a separate area of study to analyse notions of maleness or masculinity. It was only really in the 1990s that this intellectual lacuna began to be filled, with a number of scholarly works taking “the male” as the object of study.

Kam Louie’s book on Chinese masculinity adds an important dimension to the debate on links between culture and maleness, and the shifting signifiers of what it means to be male, and, specifically, a Chinese male, both in a traditional setting, and in an increasingly globalised postmodern era. Professor Louie rejects the conventional approach of looking at Chinese maleness in terms of the *yin-yang* binary, because ‘the potential for interminable interactiveness implicit within *yin* and *yang* prohibits gender specificity’ (p.10). Instead, he utilises the *wen-wu* or ‘scholar-militarist/scholarly achievement-martial valour’ dichotomy, which, he argues, is specific to masculinity alone, to elucidate some of the key features of ideal Chinese male types, as they have been generated over the last two and a half thousand years. He takes the philosopher, Confucius, and the God of War, Guan Yu, as the quintessential representatives of, respectively, *wen* and *wu*, and analyses their discrete characteristics as *wen* and *wu* symbols. His assertion is that, traditionally, *wen* has always taken precedence over *wu*, though he also notes that, for a Chinese leader to be truly great, he must have both *wen* and *wu* qualities in good measure. (Having said that, though Mao Zedong and the early Qing emperors might be said to fit into such a schema, I’m not sure whether the founding emperors of, say, the Han and Ming would.) In subsequent chapters, Louie proceeds to analyse a range of literary sources – traditional, May Fourth and post-Mao – to view the *wen-wu* paradigm at work. He then goes on to consider notions of Chinese masculinity from a number of non-mainstream (i.e., non-Chinese male elite) perspectives – Chinese women writers’ literary conceptualisations of the Chinese male since the May Fourth Movement; Chinese males living in a foreign environment, where the *wen-wu*
paradigm no longer computes (Lao She’s *The Two Ma’s*), and, finally, the “kung fu” phenomenon, which has generated new global images of the Chinese male in the form of Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan and Chow Yun Fat.

Obviously, the topic Louie explores is a huge one. It is also one that can be tackled from a number of different angles. Louie has basically adopted a literary/cultural approach, to raise points on facets of the “masculinity” debate that are highly illuminating. After reading this thought-provoking book, I found myself mentally wandering off into intellectual avenues, and asking a lot of questions, such as how the *wen-wu* paradigm was manipulated by the Chinese state, and woven into the very fabric of Chinese cultural consciousness to ensure that *wen* would prevail, in order to reduce any threat to imperial power from the military. Or how the typical ideal male *wen* identity, which in many respects seems to embody as much of a female as a male quality, needed to be propped up and preserved through the infliction of practices such as footbinding on Chinese women, in order to maintain a distinct gap between the genders. But these questions were not ones that Louie originally set out to answer. Those that he did aim to examine have been dealt with beautifully. This is a gem of a book, seminal in its intellectual approach, and written in a language that is both insightful and accessible. With just over 165 pages of text, this might not be considered a large book, but Professor Louie irrefutably proves with his study on Chinese masculinity that size really doesn’t matter.

Reviewed by MARIA GALIKOWSKI
University of Waikato


Over the course of the past two decades, China has experienced processes of change on a scale and of a rapidity the like of which are, from a global perspective, historically quite unprecedented. William Overholt, in his *The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower* as cited in the first of the books under review, argues that during these years, China has undergone both the 1st and the 2nd Industrial Revolutions simultaneously. And, as always in the case of China it seems, one needs to keep constantly in mind the fact that the
number of people directly affected by these momentous changes is very much greater than that involved in equivalent developments in early modern Europe.

If the impact of these changes on the physical fabric of life in China is shockingly obvious to even the most occasional visitor to the country, the sense of dislocation experienced by ordinary Chinese as they go about their day-to-day lives is of course far greater. In Beijing, to take a particularly egregious example, a new map of the city now needs to be produced each month in the vain attempt to keep track of the changes being wrought upon large sectors of the city. By the time of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 – a date that has quickly acquired almost magical properties in the discourse about “modernisation” – less than 20% of the city will be as it was in 1949 and it is said that the city’s successful bid to host this event has seen the plans for the development of the city brought forward by a good 30 years.

Both the books under review seek to understand the impact of such changes upon the built environment in China, and in so doing, at a higher level of abstraction, both pose questions about the nature of the “new” in Chinese history. They do so, however, from very different if mutually illuminating disciplinary and temporal perspectives. Whereas Peter Rowe and Seng Kuan focus upon the ideological aspects of change at the level of the individual building over the entire span of the 20th century, John Logan’s book concentrates on the actual effects of economic developments on the shape of the city in China over the course of the past decade. If the first of these books makes a more explicit attempt to speak beyond its disciplinary boundaries, the second also probably deserves a readership somewhat wider than that usual for a book of its specialised nature, if only for some of its more general conclusions.

One can date the beginnings of the modern profession (and discipline) of architecture in China to 1926 and the establishment of the Society of Chinese Architects by Zhuang Jun (1888-1970), a graduate of the University of Illinois. University departments (at Northeastern University in 1928, at the National Central University in Nanjing in 1930) and professional journals (Hexagon in 1930, Zhongguo jianzhu [The Chinese Architect] in 1932) followed soon thereafter, and from 1929 the Ministry of Labour and Education required that all working architects be registered. Before the development of this professional and Western-derived professional infrastructure, building in China had been the domain of the master builder and the craftsman, working largely to time-honoured traditions passed on from master to apprentice, with only occasional reference to ancient codifications of established practice.1

What few modern Western buildings had been constructed were in the

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main restricted to the concession areas of treaty ports such as Shanghai and had mostly been designed by foreign architects. As part of their effort to legitimise their discipline as an autonomous and professional field of knowledge, the first generation of Chinese architect was immediately forced to navigate their way between the Scylla of their own traditions and the Charybdis of Western modernism. Subsequent generations of Chinese architect too have been faced with the same necessity. Rowe and Kuan seek to understand this process by applying to architecture the reformist formulation “Chinese learning for essential principles, Western learning for practical functions” (Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong), popularised by Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) in his celebrated essay “Exhortation to Study”, first published in 1898. As in the various other domains to which it has been applied, this binary concept proved to be one of immense utility, in large part because of its flexibility and the instability of the actual terms of its own dualistic logic, and early in their study Rowe and Kuan outline the phases through which the specific understanding of the phrase shifted.

It is in these terms that the authors then proceed (pp. 55-86) to a discussion of the four different architectural attitudes towards modernisation that emerged in China during the 20th century. The first approach tended to ignore the host traditions of architecture almost entirely, deeming Chinese-style buildings inappropriate for the institutions and business houses of the modern Chinese city; predictably, the main proponents of this approach were foreign architects then resident in the treaty ports of China, Laszlo Edward Hudec in particular, and its greatest monument is perhaps the Bund in Shanghai. A second attitude, often labelled the “Adaptive Approach” and exemplified in the work of architects such as the American Henry K. Murphy and the Canadian Henry H. Hussey, but also Lu Yanzhi (1894-1929), who designed Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum in Nanjing, Dong Dayou (1899-1973) and Lin Keming (1900-99), shifted the emphasis decidedly in favour of Chinese “essence”, as embodied in among other things the “curving upturned roof”, the “orderliness of arrangement” and the “lavish use of gorgeous colour”. The authors capture the essence of this approach with a quotation from Murphy: ‘I decided that we needed to start out with Chinese exteriors, into which we would introduce only such foreign features as were needed to meet definite requirements, and…, as a result, our completed buildings really are Chinese’ (61). The third approach saw the emphasis between essence and application shift again, further away from traditional forms and towards an attempted merger of East and West. The most prominent protagonist of this approach was probably Yang Tingbao (1901-82) who had been one of Paul Cret’s favourite students at the University of Pennsylvania in the 20s and whose last major work, the new Beijing Library (first approved by Zhou Enlai in 1975 but only completed in 1987), will be familiar to many in the field of Chinese Studies. Within this approach, although the
building materials and techniques employed were decidedly modern and Western (steel frames, reinforced concrete and so on), the detailing tended to be Chinese. The fourth approach was more theoretical than practical and involved intensive archaeological research into the history of traditional Chinese architecture. The leading figures involved in this approach were Liang Sicheng (1901-72), the son of the great Qing dynasty reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929), and Liu Dunzhen (1897-1968).

By the late 40s, as political events began to impinge ever more pressingly upon whatever autonomy architecture had been able to fashion for itself, these four approaches had been reduced to two: one that was explicitly modernist, the other that continued to make use of aspects of traditional Chinese architecture. Options were narrowed even further after 1949 – modern usage was becoming the essence of form in circumstances under which “Socialist Realism” had become the only permitted ideology. By 1955, Mao Zedong’s distinction between the “quintessence” (jinghua) and the “dregs” (zaobo) of tradition had lead into the “Big Roof” controversy (buildings that wore “a Western suit and a Chinese skullcap”) and as economic conditions worsened, both “revivalism” and “formalism” became “terrifying crimes”. The post-76 period saw the choices available loosen up again, and the building boom of the 1990s in particular saw the proliferation of architectural expression in China. In such circumstances, in the hands of some Chinese architects, the meaning of the old formula was almost completely reversed to read: “modern essence and Chinese form”.

Architectural Encounters with Essence and Form in Modern China is an important book in that it seeks to draw architecture into the wider discourse about Chinese culture and modernity. Its text is woven together by a series of imaginary conversations amongst a group of contemporary Chinese architects with differing stances on the issues involved. Elegantly produced, the book is excellently illustrated with photographs of all the major structures it discusses. Appendix A that provides profiles of leading Chinese architects and schools will prove a particularly useful feature. Unfortunately, however, the book excludes from its purview the first phase of the interaction between Chinese and Western traditions of architecture – the Jesuit involvement in the design of the European sector of the Qianlong emperor’s Yuanmingyuan.1

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And although Rowe and Kuan treat briefly with the Song dynasty philosophic origins of the ti/yong dichotomy, they ignore its more proximate history in the late Ming-early Qing period.\(^1\) In fact, generally, for a book that seeks to engage with the mainstream of Chinese studies, this work seems somewhat light in terms of its references; it ignores early work on the Western architecture of the Bund in Shanghai and on the political symbolism of Mao’s mausoleum and seems completely innocent of the findings of the recent burgeoning literature on the history of the city in China.\(^2\)

The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market Reform is a collection of sixteen papers first presented at a conference held in Shanghai in 1999 by scholars from North America, Europe and China itself. It is divided into five parts which, after an introductory section, deal successively with the impact upon the Chinese city of globalisation, of market reform, and of migration, and finally, with the urbanisation of the countryside. Understandably, given both the city’s historical part in the modernisation of China and its predicted future role in this respect, Shanghai predominates; it is the exclusive focus of four of the papers and is referred to frequently elsewhere in the book. Other papers however treat with Beijing, with Hong Kong itself and its role in the Pearl River Delta Urban Region, with Suzhou and with the Fujianese port city of Quanzhou, once the centre of the world trading system. The overall impression gained from these papers is the unsurprising conclusion that although the “new” Chinese city now provides for many of its citizens a much improved standard of living than hitherto, at the same time the combined forces of globalisation and market reform have resulted in cities that are far more segregated in terms of income and status disparities, and a consolidation of the pre-existing East-West imbalance of metropolitan development in China.\(^3\)

Two issues, in particular, serve to give these changes their “Chinese characteristics”: the nature of the urbanisation that has taken place and the asymmetrical relationship between economic and political reform. If the rate of urbanisation in China has been explosive, moving

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3 In their essay in this volume (“The Development of the Chinese Metropolis in the Period of Transition”), Xiaopei Yan et al quantify this imbalance; in 1980, 14 of China’s metropolises were east of the line between the Black River in Heilongjiang and Luxi in Yunnan, and by 1990 only 2 of China’s 34 metropolises had developed to the west of this line (p. 39).
from an overall rate of about 17% at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978 to one of over 30% now, it has also been unusual in its pattern of suburbanisation. There are presently more than 30 Chinese cities with populations over a million, but there are also about 375 cities with populations under 200,000, a process that the Chinese refer to with the expression: “To leave the soil but not the village” (li tu bu li xiang). At the same time, the size of the largely disenfranchised “floating population” of migrants has grown to between 80-100 million. Related to this issue and of equal danger to continued economic development in China is the problem of “Power Persistence” whereby political reform has failed to keep up with economic changes and the mechanisms of the market, far from replacing those of the redistributive economy, have simply grafted themselves onto the exiting institutional framework. Where the centre has withdrawn, its power has been appropriated by either local government bodies or state work units, all at the expense of increased public participation in the processes of urban planning.

In his introductory chapter, John Logan raises these and the more general issue of globalisation as challenges to the Chinese city but understandably can suggest few solutions to the various dilemmas they pose. Rowe and Kuan for their part, in their final chapter, argue that if Chinese architecture is to succeed in its longer-term creative project, “the core elements of “essence” (yi) and “form” (yong) will have to finally come to rest, conceptually speaking – preferably, in forms different enough to enable a productive tension to continue and to ensure an essential role for history in the further production of architecture’ (p. 213).

The question of the sustainability or otherwise of the economic and social changes presently taking place in China is one with major implications for all of us. In their different but related ways, both these books offer an enhanced understanding of the present plight and future prospects of the built environment in China in the context of the rapid transformations taking place there.

Reviewed by DUNCAN CAMPBELL
Victoria University of Wellington


New Zealand used to be an “offshore British farm”, then a Pacific country, and more recently James Bolger proclaimed it Asian – all within a surprisingly short timeframe. Both Australia and New Zealand are inextricably tied to Asia by geography, substantial commercial links
that have emerged in recent decades, and also now quite visible migrant communities from Asia itself.

Entering this discussion, Yongjin Zhang has edited a slim volume of essays that assess various aspects of “Perceptions, Identity and Engagement” with Asia. Zhang himself pens the first chapter, which serves as an introduction to the book. In a succinct three and a half pages, Zhang provides the framework for the subsequent discussion. He finds that, given the importance of Asia, ‘the dearth of scholarship on this very subject is shocking’ (p. 1). In the following substantive chapters, Seth Hartdegen assesses official perceptions of Asia from 1945-1998, Rochelle Bright looks at the debate over whether New Zealand is an Asian country, Ben Simkin surveys the emerging relationship with South Korea from 1962 to 1971, Susie Ong re-examines the recognition of China in the 1950s, and Elizabeth Hoffmann looks at New Zealand’s interaction with human rights issues and institutions in the Asia Pacific. This volume is, on the whole, worth reading. All the contributions offer something, often engaging in original research and, in some cases, primary documentation.

There are, however, some small errors and wider problems with the book that unfortunately cannot escape attention. Ong’s solid piece on the Taiwan/PRC debate makes the mistake of assessing that New Zealand’s departure from the UK on this issue in the 1950s made it ‘disloyal’ to Britain and, by extension, the Crown (a point picked up and repeated by the editor in Chapter One). Both Ong and Zhang have misunderstood the nature of New Zealand’s constitutional ties to the Crown – disagreements with the UK government on foreign policy issues have no direct bearing on relations with the Head of State. While Hartdegen provides a very thorough account of Asia in public statements, and is, by extension, the only author here to engage in any discussion about what constitutes Asia for the purposes of this volume, he may be guilty of a few caricatures. Concern for democracy and human rights may have been more noticeable with the end of the Cold War, but certainly had a place prior to that (note the cases of post-war Japan and the Philippines in 1986). Fear of Communism did not exactly subside in New Zealand with the end of the Vietnam War (see p. 20) – it may have grown worse in some quarters (not least of all for Muldoon), especially during the latter part of the Brezhnev administration and the extension of a perceived Soviet threat after invasions of Afghanistan and Cambodia. But most of all I would challenge the idea that from 1945-1960 New Zealand policy can be characterized as ‘ignorance of, and indifference to, Asia’ (19). During this period, New Zealand had signed the ANZUS Treaty out of concern for an emergent Japan, participated in two major land wars on Asian soil (and was about to engage in two more), while foreign affairs had already done ground work in several Asian countries to secure trade markets (principally in dairy and meat products). “Ignorance” we could debate, but “indifference” is out of
the question. And, finally, there are a few smaller errors that have crept through in the piecing together of the volume itself. Two different dates are given for Britain’s entry into the EEC (1973 being the correct one). There is also a tendency for authors to not identify the position of individuals cited. This will not only be a problem for New Zealanders who are not familiar with a particular official, but will seriously tax an international audience. Another omission is that this volume does not contain a list of contributors.

While the volume does provide a good summary of some of the issues to hand – as well as two chapters on historic bilateral relationships – it probably does not go beyond addressing the “soul-searching questions” (as promised on the jacket) of New Zealand’s engagement with Asia. Elizabeth Hoffmann’s excellent chapter on human rights’ engagement reveals that there is often a gap between New Zealand and some of its Asia/Pacific friends (let alone a few pariahs) on this issue. Rochelle Bright cites Paul Clark, Professor of Chinese at Auckland University, in his lecture on the subject of New Zealand and Asia (45). Your reviewer was present at that lecture, and if memory serves me correctly, he also made the apposite point that New Zealand and Asia may have moved closer together given the influence of the west and modernity in Asia itself. Extrapolating from this, the East Timor intervention is illustrative. In intervening, Australia and New Zealand were joined by South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand – fellow democracies – for whom East Timor had become a humanitarian issue (Singapore, although not a liberal democracy per se, was later to make a respectable contribution too). Furthermore, a number of other Asian states refused to have anything to do with the mission. This illustrates that dichotomies may fall in different directions on separate issues.

On the issue of New Zealand’s identity, Bright takes on this difficult assignment in an excellent chapter that summarizes the debate, including Helen Clark’s sensible remarks on New Zealand in Asia (38). This chapter ends by assessing that the New Zealand identity is ‘said to be “neither British nor Polynesian”. We might now add “nor Asian”’ (50). In the parlance of the Chinese foreign ministry perhaps we might summarize Bright’s argument as the “three nots” of the New Zealand identity – although she then goes on to say that all may have some currency.

In the final analysis, Australia’s and New Zealand’s attempts to identify with Asia have not only been regarded as suspicious by a large segment of domestic society, but in Asian capitals themselves. Hartdegen puts his finger on it when he states that the attempt to flag a new identity had much to do with trading trends (20), and this has not always gone down well at all. The hand wringing about New Zealand’s identity aside, as a political actor it can clearly be identified as “western” – a reference to both its political make-up and outlook, as well as the
outlook of the majority of its citizens, regardless of ethnicity – and is perceived as such within the Asia Pacific region.

Reviewed by ANTHONY L. SMITH
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawai’i


This is in effect a companion volume to Asian Nationalism in an Age of Globalization, also edited by Roy Starrs, which appeared last year through Japan Library (Curzon Press), and which was reviewed in the previous issue of this journal by Anthony Smith (4:1). Both volumes are based originally on papers delivered at the Thirteenth International Conference of the New Zealand Asian Studies Society (NZASIA) held at the University of Otago in November 1999. Both sets of papers have been updated. The most obvious difference, apart from a slight shift in focus as evidenced by the title, is that Nations Under Siege contains far fewer papers (eight as opposed to twenty-three), and that the papers are generally far longer and thus more detailed.

The thrust of the book, as the title indicates, is how nationalism in Asia — or perhaps more exactly the Asia-Pacific region — is responding to globalization, a force which necessarily tends to work against nationalism.

The first paper, by the now late Arvind Narayan Das, discusses how globalization is indeed threatening India as a “nation-in-the-making”, while on the other hand another threat is apparent in a counter-movement of localised communalism. Thus India is squeezed between supranational and subnational forces, between postmodern and premodern. Das also discusses the role of long-distance nationalism in the form of NRIs (Non-Resident Indians).

The second paper, by Prasenjit Duara, discusses the somewhat tricky relationship between “nations” and “civilizations”, and the divided loyalties that can result. He considers figures such as the German philosopher-historian Oswald Spengler and the Meiji thinker Okakura Tenshin, and the idea of an Asian civilization.

In the third paper Herman Schwarz considers matters economic, notably the impact of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis on nationalism, especially in economies in which the government becomes significantly involved and indeed encourages nationalist sentiment in order to accelerate growth. He concludes that the road ahead will not be an easy one.
In *Asian Nationalism* I myself remarked how Japanese neo-nationalism had become relatively muted after the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble, at least in terms of overt expression. But, as testimony to the strength and durability of nationalist sentiment in Japan, which I signaled in the paper, this was not to last for long, as Gavan McCormack discusses in the fourth paper. He observes how nationalism is again on the rise in Japan, but this time it is not so confined to extremists. Rather it is now more diffuse and therefore potentially more influential, merging with other streams of thought shared by many progressive and liberal intellectuals. This reflects an ongoing sense of nostalgia towards a strong Japan of the past, and rather ironically — since Japan is itself one of the major agents of globalization — a reaction against globalization, which many Japanese see as a form of further Americanization.

In the fifth paper Sarah Turner and Richard Seymour examine the unfortunate persecution of Chinese in Indonesia after the 1997-8 Financial Crisis, when they were made scapegoats. It is these very same scapegoated Chinese who are now needed to help restore the economy. The resultant emergence of a new identity, that of “Chinese Indonesian”, accompanied by a push for greater political representation, has strengthened sectarian divisions in Indonesia.

Meredith Weiss, in the sixth paper, discusses how ethnicity is a strong organising principle in Malaysia, impeding nation-building. To the dismay of non-Malays, the national character is being increasingly defined in Malay terms.

Fiji also has unhelpful ethnic/racial factors impeding its development as a nation, as Jacqueline Leckie points out in the seventh paper. Despite ousted Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudry's one-time belief that “Race has nothing to do with anything”, that would seem not to be true of Fiji.

In the eight and final paper, George Wei examines the postwar reconstruction policy of the nationalist Chinese government, highlighting the contradiction inherent in wanting to be part of the global community for its benefits but wanting to avoid becoming a victim of that same globalization. He concludes that, despite errors by the government, its involvement in a nationalistic economy was more effective than economic liberalism.

All of these papers are expertly contextualised by Roy Starrs in his introduction, an introduction that is perceptive, balanced, thought-provoking and lucid. He is balanced for example in that while so many scholars see nationalism in a negative sense, he recognises that it can have positives too, the most notable of these perhaps being that it was nationalism that helped destroy imperialism. Some of the authors of these papers also portray nationalism as having a constructive potential, a point I too stressed in my *Asian Nationalism* paper. (We do perhaps need some new terminology here, for it would seem clear that there is
good nationalism and bad nationalism, and too often scholars do not define what they mean by the term.)

Starrs feels that nationalism and the concept of national identity will survive in the short term, hopefully without taking a dangerous turn (such as ethnic nationalism), but that, as the authority of nations is eroded by ongoing and inescapable globalization, the “nation” will eventually become a thing of the past as we become a global civilization. But he is unsure as to what will form the core value of this new order. He hopes that it may be some form of humanism, but is not brimming with confidence on this, and basically leaves us with an open question.

I would like to “future-think” on possible scenarios in response to this question, but a review is not the place. Let me just say that I hope our children, or more likely grandchildren or great-grandchildren, will have a good answer.

Roy Starrs and others from Otago involved in the production of this volume and its companion are to be heartily congratulated. They have done a fine job, and made a valuable “Asian” contribution to debate on one of the most important issues facing us in the twenty-first century.

Reviewed by KEN HENSHALL
University of Canterbury


These three books are a manifestation of a growing interest in North Korea and Korean peninsula affairs, and also a broadening of approach. In the past there used to be a very strong focus on security issues, predicated on the assumption that North Korea was doomed and that in its death throes it might invade the South. Both assumptions were silly and have, so far, been belied by events, but they had wide currency.
They have been replaced, in certain quarters anyway, by a less apocalyptic vision and the recognition that the complexities of a negotiated unification need to be addressed. This owes a lot to Kim Dae-jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ which, for all its limitations, was based on the realisation that even a non-cataclysmic collapse in the North, in the style of East Germany, would be catastrophic for the South. If Germany is still labouring under the burden of reunification, with a sluggish economy and high unemployment, the consequences for Korea would be far worse. It followed, then, that engagement and a protracted, negotiated process of reunification would be necessary. He reckoned without the Bush administration, amongst other things, but the argument was sound and remains so.

The NZ Asia Institute (NZAI) is to be complimented for organising the conference of 6-7 October 2000 from which the first of these books is derived. In particular, the inclusion of two speakers from the Institute For Disarmament and Peace in Pyongyang – Choe Han Chun and Pak Hyon Jae – is very welcome. Not so much perhaps for what they said, which was inevitably a restatement of their government’s position and as such available from other sources, but because of the bridge-building it represented. It is to be hoped that NZAI continues to develop this relationship and extend it. A fellowship at NZAI for a scholar from North Korea for a year or two would offer great opportunities for developing mutual understanding between our two countries.

It was good that NZ Foreign Minister Phil Goff spoke at the conference, since it demonstrated recognition of the importance of the subject. However, it was disappointing that he displayed no fresh thinking on the role NZ could play if it took a more neutral, Norwegian-type, approach, distancing itself from the United States. For instance, he berated North Korea with the familiar charge of arms proliferation; in fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), by far the leading supplier of ‘major conventional weapons’ (which includes missiles) in 1997-2001 was the United States, at US$44.8 billion. South Korea came in at no 22 with $216 million and North Korea at 45, with $13 million, just piped by – you guessed it – New Zealand at 44, also with $13 million. SIPRI’s ‘trend-indicator values’ are not strictly comparable to actual financial values, and the figures for North Korea, at least, are admitted to be under-estimates, but it does put the business into perspective.

If the North Koreans, and Phil Goff, reiterate the government line, the other contributors do not stray very far from their government positions either. They are all excellent but it would have been desirable if they had been supplemented by some heretical voices. The exception is Terence O’Brien who provides his usual, welcome touch of scepticism and independence of mind. All the papers are from a very generalised security/geo-political perspective, except for Emma Fan’s on economic
reform and even that is broad-brush, setting it conceptually within the ‘transition economies’ but not going into much detail. No doubt all this was inevitable given the nature of the conference. The book also suffers by being tied to a specific event – the summit in Pyongyang in June 2000 – and so is prone to dating and staleness. In particular there is no discussion of US policy and the possibility that it might change. In retrospect the two years since that summit have been dominated by Bush’s abrupt reversal of Clinton’s gradual normalization policy, and the efforts of the other players – North Korea, Russia, China to a lesser extent, now Japan and most of all South Korea – to get the US back into negotiation mode.

Perhaps it was the perennial problem of lack of university funding, or the deficiencies of the publishing business in New Zealand, but the NZAI volume would have benefited from more professional publishing. At least two names are misspelt on the contents page, there are no biographic notes on the contributors, there is no index and the volume is very lightly referenced. But that is a minor quibble compared with the achievement.

*Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration*, edited by Choi, Merrill, Yang and Chang, is a very different book. Firstly it focuses on a theme, rather than a specific event. This allows the editors the leeway to bring in older, and more substantial, papers. The chapter by William Newcomb and John Merrill, for instance, dates from 1996. However, most of the book is a collection of papers presented at a conference organised by the Korea-America Economic Association in October 1999. It thus preceded news of the June summit (which was not announced until April 2000) but came at a time when the Perry report was being assimilated. It was William Perry’s mission to the DPRK in May 1999 that perhaps marked the turning point in the Clinton administration policy, which in turn allowed Kim Jong Il to respond to Kim Dae-jung’s overtures. Although the book is bi-partisan in that one foreword is by Donald Gregg, US ambassador to ROK under Bush senior, and the other by Democratic Congressman Tony B. Hall, it has a definite liberal tinge, with authors such as Leon V. Sigal and Marcus Noland – ‘liberal’ in the American sense of being anti-militaristic and questioning of US imperialism, even if that is unarticulated as such. Honest negotiation rather than bullying and bluster, or worse. Leon Sigal nicely exemplifies this approach. He points out that ‘contrary to conventional wisdom around Washington, there is significant evidence that Pyongyang is trying to cooperate with South Korea and the US’ (23). He reminds us that it is the US, and not the DPRK, that is not in compliance with the Agreed Framework. He argues:

The US must do more than just demand that North Korea stop digging tunnels, testing new missiles and exporting missile technology. Pyongyang is unwilling to give away
something for nothing. As demonstrated by the Agreed Framework, however, North Korea does not set an unreasonable price, and is prepared to live up to its end of the bargain as long as the US does as well (27).

In the three years or so since Sigal wrote that the DPRK has unilaterally suspended missile testing and has frequently offered to cease missile exports if suitably compensated. Meanwhile the construction of nuclear reactors as specified by the Agreed Framework slips further behind schedule.

This book has a twin focus. One is the geopolitical one, as represented by Sigal. The other is economic and this gets the lion’s share of papers with a good mix of mainly American and Korean authors. The Americans include Bradley Babson from the World Bank, William Newcomb and John Merrill from the State Department and Marcus Noland from the Institute for International Economics. The Koreans are largely US educated and all of them appear to be resident in America. Three of the four editors – Young Back Choi, Yung Y. Yang and Semoon Chang – are professors of economics at US universities, and the fourth, Yesook Merrill, is an economist with the US General Accounting Office.

As might be expected the economic papers are professional and well informed but now somewhat dated. There are some big gaps. There is nothing on the rejoining of the railways, which is an event long delayed but long talked about and of immense political significance and great economic potential. The Kumgangsan tourism project gets slight mention. Apart from a number of references to the Rajin-Songbong (now Rason) special economic zone, other projected SEZs – such as Kaesong and Sinuiju – are overlooked. No one would have predicted the appointment of Yang Bin, the Dutch-Chinese entrepreneur, as Governor of Sinuiju but some sort of SEZ there has been on the cards for a long time.

The book has some useful documentation, with about 30 tables, though again these are dated. There is no common bibliography and no mention of web-based resources which surely should be standard by now. The romanisation is erratic – in one place we have Najin-Sunbong and in another the more common Rajin-Sonbong. Given the confusion over romanisation, exacerbated by Seoul’s introduction of yet another system – which some Southern newspapers use and others don’t – a brief concordance of more common names might have been useful. The index is quite slight and would have warranted more effort.

The book brings together authoritative and generally benign studies of the important issue of Korean unification but unfortunately it is overshadowed by the reality of the Bush administration. As with the Auckland book, that is the big omission. There is no real attention paid to the dynamics of US policy which does, in fact, dominate the terrain.
People so often write about Seoul or Pyongyang when they should be writing about Washington.

Selig S. Harrison knows his Washington. In November 2000 he had dinner with then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and told her that cancelling the Clinton visit to Pyongyang would strengthen ‘hard-liners’ in North Korea. She agreed with him. He has had conversations with virtually everyone that matters – Kim Il Sung in 1972 and 1994, shortly before his death; he ‘found him to be a magnetic, imposing figure, with the outgoing personality of a born politician … that reminded me of Lyndon Johnson’ (59). He was ‘faced repeatedly with polite refusals to meet Kim Jong Il’ (ibid), but he has talked with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun (whom the romanisation gremlin turns to Paik Nam Soon elsewhere in the book), Chairman Kim Yong Nam and, of course, President Kim Dae-jung. As a former Washington Post journalist I presume he knows Beltway politics back to front; when he says, for instance, that ‘expectations of a collapse were still widespread in Washington in 2001’ and suggests that this lay behind Bush’s freeze, it rings true (xvii).

Harrison combines the personal knowledge and writing skills of a top-rank political investigative journalist with an academic attention to detail. The index, for instance, is excellent and whilst there is no bibliography the book is well referenced. It is forthrightly polemical in that it seeks to develop an argument for a particular policy; the subtitle is “a strategy for reunification and U.S. disengagement”.

One of the major problems that Selig Harrison identifies is one of geography and asymmetry of power. The DMZ is much closer to Seoul than to Pyongyang. The ‘forward deployment’ of the Korean People’s Army close to the DMZ allows them to threaten Seoul and their proximity to Seoul also protects them against atomic attack. Withdrawal away from the DMZ would both deprive them of their strongest card and expose them to US nuclear attack. In addition they would be deprived of the network of underground fortifications and would need to reconstruct them further back. Harrison suggests that the DPRK might be willing to pull back if the US withdrew combat aircraft from Korea. That seems unlikely. He also envisages the US ‘shifting to a new role as an honest broker’, which is even more unlikely, both in the US attempt and the North Korean acceptance. In fact, the disparity of force between the two sides is so huge that reciprocity is really not very meaningful. Even a US military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would have little impact on the balance of power. For one thing, the ROK military is superior to that of the DPRK in most respects and last year, for instance, spent ten times as much on foreign arms imports as the North. And US military spending is equal to the total of the next ten countries combined. Selig Harrison has written a superb book, but the focus on technical military matters, though interesting, misses the point because it does not sufficiently address the issue of what drives US
policy. Here he would have done well to look at Chalmers Johnson’s 2000 book *Blowback* (New York, Henry Holt) which is subtitled ‘the costs and consequences of American Empire’. Johnson, after a distinguished career as a scholar of East Asia (especially Japan, with *MITI and the Japanese miracle*) decided that he been a “spearholder for empire” and wrote this book on US imperialism in which he warned that there would be unintended and disastrous consequences, or in the CIA term, a blowback. That was before September 11.

US policy towards Korea fits within a wider imperial strategy that is only peripherally affected by what goes on in Korea. Similarly the formulation of US policy is primarily the result of political debate and struggle in Washington rather than a response to external events. Let us hope that in his next book Mr Harrison will turn his attention, and formidable talents, back to Washington because that is where the explanation lies.

Meanwhile, the saga of the Korean peninsula continues to unfold, often producing pessimism but sometimes inspiring optimism.

Reviewed by TIM BEAL
Victoria University of Wellington


*Japan's Comfort Women* is an extraordinary book. It provides revelations about the war crimes of Japanese and US forces in the years before, during, and after World War II. These crimes, the victims of which had to live with the shame of being exploited and humiliated as the sexual servants of occupying forces, have so often been covered up by authorities, ignored, or forgotten.

The opening chapter to this provocative book provides a highly descriptive background on the establishment of the comfort women system in Japan. While most of the records relating to the establishment of *ianjo* (comfort stations – the military brothels) were destroyed, the author’s meticulous research shows that they were probably set up in the early 1930s by the Japanese Navy in Shanghai, but already within an existing system of sexual exploitation. The Chinese government in 1929 banned prostitution, but Japanese prostitutes continued to be employed in such guises as waitresses at Japanese restaurants in Shanghai. The navy then set up its own brothels with the army soon to follow suit.

These brothels were well organised, highly structured, and planned as an integral part of military operations. The Japanese soon
started to abuse vast numbers of the women who lived in the lands that Japan occupied (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, China, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia). Tanaka notes that ‘the estimated 80,000 – 100,000 women involved in the comfort women system were themselves victims of systematic, institutional rape and sexual slavery’ (32).

The historical background to the comfort women system is explored in Chapter 2 in the context of Japan’s colonial ambitions in Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The reader is told of the “trafficking” of women in Korea well before the actual establishment of institutionalised military brothels. One reads about the false promises of employment given to innocent women who were then lured into a sordid sex-slave industry. This part of the book explores the life of comfort women and their experiences through testimonies that are shocking. Tables show brothel rates and the allowances of different men in the military ranks, and there is a plethora of official regulations noted concerning the military brothels.

Chapter 3 discusses the calculated violence against women in the Dutch East Indies. The statistics are sickening. About 80,000 Dutch civilians were interned in World War II, of whom 10,500 died. Throughout this chapter many stories are given about the Eurasian women forced into prostitution. Furthermore, one reads about the exploitation of local women, and about Dutch sexual abuse. While the Dutch did little to investigate the Japanese sexual crimes against Indonesian women, Tanaka explains that ‘it followed that, when the Japanese invaded, the sexual abuse of the Indonesian and Indo-Dutch women by the Japanese was probably not viewed as a serious crime against humanity’ (82). Moreover, the failure by all parties to fully prosecute crimes against women is emphasised in these pages.

Chapter 4 asks a simple question: ‘Why did the US forces ignore the comfort women issue?’ The answer given is that the US forces themselves wanted to avoid widespread VD among their own troops and thus promoted the use of organised prostitution. This, Tanaka notes, was ‘also as a means to improve troop morale with relative safety’ (109). The occupying forces, therefore, were also the perpetrators of sex crimes within an organised system created by the Japanese Imperial forces. Sex was indeed used by the military – both the Japanese and the Allied forces – as a part of their war.

The amount of sexual violence committed during the Allied occupation of Japan is recounted in Chapter 5. The author explains many cases of rape, abduction and abuse with many graphic examples. In this, Tanaka views two types of violence committed against the Japanese: physical and psychological.

The final chapter looks at how the Japanese government actually created a comfort women system for the occupation forces. The Japanese had planned this even before their surrender in order to avoid the predicted mass rape of its women (as committed by the Japanese on
Asian women). Many levels of Japanese administration were involved in setting up the brothels. The author’s contribution to the field is summarised in the epilogue. Tanaka notes that the ‘book is an initial step in the journey of research ... to critically and productively re-examine our [Japanese] own history and culture’ (182).

While the book is full of factual accounts and is extremely well researched, one is sometimes left wondering about the accuracy of some of the captions to the photographs. In the last chapter, for example, the author shows such pictures as US sailors lining up outside a comfort station awaiting their turn, and a US soldier visiting a comfort woman in Kyoto, but there are no sources for these photographs.

One is left wondering why these crimes – war crimes against humanity – have been largely ignored; why the war criminals have escaped prosecution; and why both Japanese and US authorities still fail to recognise the extent to which they have contributed to the destruction of so many innocent lives. It is, of course, particularly sad that many of the victims of these crimes were left ashamed and afraid to come forward. Based on archival research and personal testimonies, together with numerous pictures enhancing the text by adding to the shocking nature of the work, this intriguingly controversial book is a major contribution to the field. It provides a voice to those who died, those who suffered, and those who continue to suffer the brutal consequences of an evil act of terror, pain, and anguish. This is a powerful book telling an horrific story.

Reviewed by HENRY JOHNSON
University of Otago


The production of English-language encyclopedias on Japan has become something of a minor industry in recent years. The granddaddy of them all, of course, is the Kōdansha Encyclopedia of Japan, the original, nine-volume 1983 edition surely the most comprehensive, in-depth reference work devoted to a single country in the English language. More compact but on a comparable level of scholarly rigour is the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Japan (1993). More recently we have had James
Huffman’s *Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism* (1998) and Louis Frederic’s *Japan Encyclopedia* (2002). There are also a good number of smaller encyclopedic-style works that focus on particular fields or interests, such as Janet Hunter’s *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History* (1984), the *Princeton Companion to Classical Japanese Literature* (1990), and Ernest Wood’s *Dictionary of Zen*. Actually one can trace the origins of this Japanocentric encyclopedic sub-genre much further back, to the era of 19th century *japonisme*, the first period of the modern West’s encounter with Japan. In particular, Basil Hall Chamberlain’s *Things Japanese* (1890) might be regarded as the sub-genre’s charming Victorian ancestor, but one that already set a high standard of scholarship, and one that perhaps helps us to account for the sub-genre’s remarkable popularity and longevity. Obviously English-language readers have a particular fascination with Japan, partly no doubt because of the appeal of the exotic, but also because of a strong conviction that something important can be learned from studying this civilisation that is complex, sophisticated and “successful” by any Western standards, but, in its geocultural origins, about as far from Western civilisation as one can get.

At any rate, the publication of the two books under review shows that this encyclopedic tradition continues to flourish. I shall comment first on their physical properties, because these are an important consideration for reference works of this type, made for heavy and regular use. Routledge has done an excellent job in this respect: both books are solidly constructed with hard covers and sturdy, well-stitched paper; the type is clear and there is a liberal use of bold to highlight headings and cross-references. Importantly too, the books are fairly light and easy to handle, despite their bulk. In short, they should provide long years of user-friendly service.

Sandra Buckley’s *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture* is especially strong in its coverage of popular culture, in areas such as music, film, fashion, food, gender issues, sports, mass media, and contemporary customs and mores. Certainly this is enough to justify the price of admission, because previous reference works on Japan have tended to neglect some of these areas – and also, given their ephemeral nature, because we need the updating that this work provides. The entry on mobile phones, for instance, points out that by the year 2000 they had become a ‘major cultural influence’ because of the ‘linking of Internet services to cellular platforms’ (328). With 56.7 million in use, this has resulted in an overnight “‘democratisation’ of Internet access’” (328) – good news for those of us who have long found the internet in Japan rather slow and cumbersome to use.

However, I have some reservations about the work’s more “high cultural” coverage. Here its limitations begin to emerge. Ideally, of course, an encyclopedia should be a compendium of absorbing, authoritative, up-to-date articles by leading scholars in the respective
fields covered. Reading over the entries in this work, and the names of its contributors, one is given more of a sense that it is a co-production of “Sandra and friends” (and perhaps a few friends of friends). Indeed, Buckley herself writes entries on everything from “abacus” to “Zen”. This may not be a serious disadvantage for the above-mentioned entries on pop culture, and there may even be some advantages – in consistency of style, for instance – but a certain superficiality becomes evident when the subjects treated are of a more complex “high cultural” nature: the knowledge presented is sometimes second or third hand, and thus has a tendency to be outdated, stereotypical, unoriginal, and even inaccurate. In Buckley’s entry on Zen, for instance, she writes: ‘It is Rinzai that is most familiar today outside Japan.... ’ (585) No doubt this was true in the 1950s, because of the wide appeal of Suzuki Daisetsu’s writings, but it is certainly not true today, after several decades of Sōtō proselytizing in both North and South America. She also writes: ‘Sōtō rejects the use of kōan, using only zazen’ (585). Again, this is an outdated stereotype: as anyone who has read the works of Philip Kapleau will know, a number of modern Sōtō masters do, in fact, use kōan.

Another disadvantage to this kind of “coterie” encyclopedia is that its bibliographic references tend to be rather narrow or even slightly incestuous. Of the four books suggested for “further reading” after Vera Mackie’s entry on “feminism”, for instance, one is by Mackie herself and the other by a certain Sandra Buckley. Buckley’s book is again recommended by Mackie after two other entries, on “feminist publishing” and “reproductive control” – this in spite of the fact that the bibliographic entries in this work are extremely limited and many works which one would expect to be listed are strangely absent. One is given the uncomfortable feeling here that personal loyalties have triumphed over scholarly objectivity. In short, for less ephemeral, more high-cultural or historical subjects I would still recommend either the Kōdansha (even in its shortened, one-volume edition) or the Cambridge encyclopedia, both of which come much closer to the above-mentioned encyclopedic ideal. Nonetheless, Buckley’s encyclopedia is still well worth adding to one’s reference collection for its up-to-date coverage of contemporary society and popular culture.

Of Allan Bird’s Encyclopedia of Japanese Business and Management, I can write only as a layman, but as such I found it an extremely useful reference tool, enabling even a business greenhorn such as myself to understand some of the mysterious workings of the Japanese commercial sector. I have long felt the need, for instance, to understand exactly what a "sokaiya" is, since the term has often cropped up in recent years in Japanese news stories about corruption in the business and political worlds. I gathered from the context that it was some kind of shady dealer, but Terri Ursacki’s masterfully precise definition, which encapsulates the whole complex phenomenon so neatly
in a nutshell, put me much more in the picture: ‘A sokaiya is a corporate extortionist who purchases a small number of shares in order to gain access to a company's annual stockholders' general assembly meeting (sokai) and then attempts to extract money or other benefits from the company in exchange for ensuring that the meeting is short and tranquil’ (413). Only in Japan! In fact, this is a good example of why a reference work such as this is so badly needed by Western innocents who would venture into the dense and dangerous jungle of the Japanese business world.

As with Buckley's, Bird's encyclopedia includes the useful feature of a "thematic entry list" at the beginning of the book: the entry headings of the entire work are listed under fifteen general themes, so that the reader interested in a particular area can see at a glance all the available articles in that area. From these general thematic headings one can also get a good idea of what the encyclopedia covers, and certainly its coverage is extensive and comprehensive, including as it does economics, finance, general management/business administration, government institutions/business-government relations, history (as relevant to business), human resource management, industrial relations, influential industries, influential Japanese companies, influential social/business entities and personalities, Japanese business overseas, manufacturing/production, marketing and distribution, and research and development. As with Buckley's encyclopedia too, the articles here are written in an attractive, straightforward, and accessible style, with a minimal use of professional jargon, and so will make pleasant reading for the student or general reader.

Reviewed by ROY STARRS
University of Otago


This volume appears in the highly acclaimed ‘Blackwell Handbooks in Linguistics’ series. Of the eleven volumes so far published in the series, this is the only one dedicated to a specific language, rather than to various sub-disciplines of linguistics, such as morphology, phonetics, or acquisition. A volume specifically on Japanese linguistics is justified for a number of reasons. It is not so much that Japanese is a major world language, with a long recorded history, and has been subjected to intensive study from both “traditional” and “Western” perspectives. More relevant is the fact that Japanese differs radically from the better-known European languages in a number of respects. Morphologically, it
makes extensive use of agglutination and compounding rather than inflection; syntactically, it is head final, it lacks relative pronouns, it forms wh-questions in situ, and its word order within the clause is relatively free; prominent aspects of its phonology are the status of the mora and the use of pitch accent; remarkable from a sociolinguistic perspective is the use of honorifics, gender-based differences, and the marking of speaker and hearer status. All these aspects make Japanese a particularly interesting testing ground for linguistic theories that have been developed, largely, on the basis of English and other Indo-European data.

The book’s sixteen chapters, each by an acknowledged expert and active researcher in the relevant field, cover the main sub-disciplines of linguistic enquiry as applied to Japanese: phonology, morphology, syntax, lexical semantics, sociolinguistics, discourse, processing, and acquisition. Each chapter introduces the theoretical issues at stake (often on the basis of English language data) and contains a critical review of the recent literature. Major research trends are highlighted and current work (including, in most cases, that of the chapter’s author) is discussed. Each chapter concludes with suggestions for further inquiry. In spite of the book’s many authors, the sixteen chapters are remarkably homogeneous in style and presentation, testimony, to be sure, of the engagement and much hard work on the part of the editor. My only reservation about this outstanding volume concerns the explicit adoption, by the majority of the contributors, of the generative grammar (or ‘Chomskyan’) framework. The framework clearly guided the selection of topics in syntax: reflexives, passives, wh-constructions, and the like. Equally, some of the topics, such as word order (“scrambling”) and acquisition, are discussed entirely from the generative perspective. This is a pity, since the contributions of alternative approaches – functional, cognitive, and typological – to our understanding of the Japanese language are overlooked, and the relevance of Japanese data to the advancement of these approaches is not addressed. For example, there is little or no discussion of Japanese spatial expressions, of the semantics of the Japanese cases, of “non-canonical” clauses (such as topic-nominative and double-nominative clauses), or of the “conceptual metaphors” which underlie Japanese conceptualisations of abstract domains (such as the emotions and other “internal states:”). The focus on the Chomskyan paradigm also excludes discussion of such issues as the acquisition of interactional patterns, including gender-based differences in language use. It would be churlish, no doubt, to lament the absence of such topics in a book such as this. Still, if a more open approach to theoretical matters had been adopted, the value of the book to researchers who are not committed to the generative approach would have been considerably enhanced.

The first four chapters are devoted to matters phonetic and phonological. Shosuke Haraguchi (‘Accent’) offers detailed and
penetrating analyses of the accentual and tonal systems of the Tokyo and Osaka dialects. Since tonal systems were a principal motivation for the development of autosegmental phonology, it is appropriate that the author applies this framework to the account, not only of the accentual properties of isolated words, but also of inflected and agglutinated forms, compounds, and phrases. Haruo Kubozono (‘Mora and syllable’) argues that while there is justification for the claim that Japanese is a mora-based language, the syllable also needs to be recognized as a phonological unit. Amongst the many pieces of evidence cited in this regard is the fact that in loan words it is not just that the accent falls on the third last mora, the accent falls on the syllable which contains the third last mora. Junko Itô and Armin Mester (‘The phonological lexicon’) apply Optimality Theory to a study of the four-way stratification of the Japanese lexicon into native Japanese, Sino-Japanese, foreign, and mimetic (onomatopoeic). They argue that the four strata differ systematically with respect to their susceptibility to various constraints – for example, phonotactic and distributional constraints. The constraints, that is, are differentially “ranked” for the various strata. The theory is also applied to distinguishing ‘possible’ from ‘impossible’ nativisations. Junko Hibiya (‘Variationist sociolinguistics’), after exemplifying the methodology on -t/d deletion in English, reports similar research on g-nasalisation in Tokyo Japanese, and concludes by suggesting some further phonological features which might also be studied from a variationist perspective.

The next five chapters deal with syntax, largely from the perspective of the principles-and-parameters framework of generative grammar. These chapters, I fear, will be largely inaccessible to readers who are not already familiar with the terminology and formalism of this framework. Naoko Nemoto (‘Scrambling’) addresses flexibility of word order within the clause, her main concern being to demonstrate the validity of the verb phrase category, even though a verb need not be contiguous to its direct object. The issue then becomes: which items are eligible for movement from their ‘underlying’ position, and which ‘landing sites’ are available for their surface location. Conspicuously absent from the discussion is any reference to discourse-functional aspects which might motivate deviations from a canonical SOV order in the first place. Takako Aikawa (‘Reflexives’) addresses the reflexive zibun (reflexives having been a perennial topic of discussion in generative linguistics). A controversial issue concerns the supposedly subject-orientation of the reflexive zibun and, following from this, the status of the zibun-reflexive as a diagnostic of subject status. There is discussion of the proper syntactic analysis of zibun (as anaphor or pronoun), and on pragmatic-discourse factors which might override subject-orientation. Other reflexives – zibun-zisin and kare-zisin – are also discussed. Hiroto Hoshi (‘Passives’) identifies two passive constructions, the direct passive (in which the passive subject
corresponds to the active object) and the indirect passive (where the passive subject bears no grammatical relation to the passivised verb). Arguments for and against a unified treatment of the two passives are discussed and evaluated, with the author proposing a reconciliation of the two constructions. A third passive construction (the ni yotte passive) is also brought into the picture. Shigeru Miyagawa (‘Causatives’) addresses the marking of the causee with dative -ni versus accusative -o in relation to a semantic distinction between ‘letting’ and ‘making’, largely from the point of view of the appropriate syntactic analysis of the respective constructions. There is also some discussion of the proper syntactic analysis of the causative verb (s)ase. Taisuke Nishigauchi (‘Quantification and wh-Constructions’) takes up the claim that wh-phrase are generated in situ, and argues that they do in fact involve movement. A second topic concerns the scope of wh-phrases and quantifiers.

The next three chapters address issues in semantics, especially lexical semantics. Taro Kageyama (‘Word formation’) first sets out criteria for attributing word status to internally complex units. Words, thus identified, are then discussed according to whether they are formed in the lexicon (by concatenation of word-sized units, e.g. uti-korosu ‘shoot-kill’, i.e. ‘shoot dead’), in the syntax (e.g. kaki-hazimeru ‘write-begin’, i.e. ‘begin to write’), or post-syntactically (as is the case with deverbal nominalizations which retain some verbal properties). There is also discussion of ‘amphibious’ items, which share both word and phrasal properties, but which cannot be unambiguously classified as either. Examples include -suru and -te complexes, and ‘light verb’ constructions. Toshiyuki Ogihara (‘Tense and aspect’) analyses verbs in -ta and in -te iru. The former, it is argued, is properly regarded as a relative tense morpheme, denoting anteriority to a higher tense, or, by default, anteriority to the time of speaking, while -te iru is analysed as an aspect marker. Depending on the event type designated by the root verb, -te iru confers a present continuous or a present perfect reading. Natsuko Tsujimura (‘Lexical semantics’) reviews, on English data, the claim that the syntactic configurations in which a verb may occur are largely predictable from the verb’s semantics. The main body of the chapter is devoted to analysing, with respect to Japanese, the so-called locative alternation (exemplified by ‘smear paint on the wall’ vs. ‘smear the wall with paint’), which is rather less productive in Japanese than in English, and to the class of the unaccusative verbs (that is, intransitives with a non-agentive subject, as in ‘The vase broke’). There is also a discussion of the aspectual properties of verbs – a topic which links up with Toshiyuki Ogihara’s account of the aspect marker -te iru – as well as of the manner in which the various components of a motion event (cause, motion, manner of motion, direction of motion) are differently “packaged” in Japanese and English.
The final four chapters deal with a miscellany of topics. Yukio Otsu (‘First language acquisition’) addresses the acquisition of selected areas of Japanese syntax against the assumptions of generative grammar. The strategy is to demonstrate that young children, from an early age, obey grammatical constraints postulated by generative theory. From there it is inferred that the child has access to the analyses proposed by generative theory and which are made available to the child by a genetically inherited Universal Grammar. This (fallacious) argument is then adduced as proof of the correctness of the generative theory. The topics addressed are the optional dropping of the -o case marker (possible only if the case-marked nominal occurs to the left of the verb), the child’s interpretation of the language-specific properties of the reflexive zibun, and the acquisition of negated verbs. Mineharu Nakayama (‘Sentence processing’) reviews psycholinguistic research on the processing of Japanese. The matter is of special interest in view of the typological differences between Japanese and English (the language on which most processing research has been conducted). Since Japanese is a head-final language, lacks relative pronouns, and allows considerable variation in word order within the clause, parsing strategies which have been proposed for English might be expected to cause serious problems when applied to Japanese input. Yet, on the whole, Japanese is not noticeably more difficult to process than English. The chapter also contains a discussion of the processing of Japanese writing. Contrary to what one might expect, there is evidence that kanji characters may elicit phonological coding, that is to say, the relation between the character and its semantic content is not direct. Senko Maynard (‘Discourse analysis and pragmatics’) highlights differences in rhetorical style between Japanese and Anglo discourse, in business, conflict, and refusal contexts, and also with reference to the organization of expository texts. The status of the topic marker -wa, and the role of connectives, repetitions, and final particles are also discussed. The chapter by Sachiko Ide and Megumi Yoshida (‘Sociolinguistics: honorifics and gender differences’) divides into two parts. The first addresses linguistic politeness. Two aspects are distinguished – respect for status relations between participants, including the status of the interlocutor as a member of the speaker’s in-group or out-group, and face-saving and face-preserving strategies. It is argued that the former aspect (language use according to status) predominates over face preservation. Empirical data is reported, pointing to significant differences between Japanese and Anglo understandings of politeness. The second half of the chapter deals with gender-based differences. Several features of Japanese women’s language are discussed, including such topics as pitch, and the use of particles, honorifics, and pronouns. The role of gender-based differences in the dynamics of present-day Japanese society is also addressed.

This volume is likely to be a standard reference work for all researchers in Japanese linguistics for some time to come. Certainly, as
the above synoptic overview will have indicated, many chapters of the Handbook presuppose prior familiarity with specific linguistic theories. On the other hand, the richness of the data that is cited, as well as the wealth of bibliographical references (I estimate that over three quarters of the references to the linguistic study of Japanese are in English), will render the Handbook invaluable to all researchers, irrespective of their theoretical orientation. The Handbook is also likely to be of service to researchers in the various sub-disciplines of linguistics who wish to extend their investigations to a consideration of Japanese data. I can certainly imagine that lecturers giving advanced courses in syntax, phonology, verb semantics, sociolinguistics, or language typology, will want to recommend chapters of the Handbook to students undertaking projects applying linguistic theory to Japanese data.

Reviewed by JOHN R TAYLOR
University of Otago


When I read a book that is essentially an edited collection of papers, I am always curious to discover how many of the chapters actually focus on the book’s stated theme. The theme of this volume is outlined in Chapter One (A.E. Safarian and Wendy Dobson). The reader is told that the aim is to inform the reader, especially Canadian readers, about business systems in Asia, since such understanding may help companies reduce entry costs and better appreciate Asian firms as global competitors. It is noted that there are some broad differences in the way business systems operate in much of East Asia, compared to North America and Europe. However, and more importantly, there is considerable diversity within East Asia. Each of the next four chapters in the volume focuses on different countries or regions of East Asia: South Korea and Taiwan (Gary G. Hamilton), China (Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski), South East Asia (Linda Lim) and Japan (Richard W. Wright). Wright does an excellent job of keeping to the book’s aim by informing the reader about how business systems in Japan work, and things to look out for when doing business in Japan. Hamilton and Jefferson and Rawski also do a good job of discussing the issues the book seeks to address. Lim describes the historical role of different business types in South East Asia, but does not deliver as many insights about doing business in the region as the other chapters do.
It is the final chapter of the volume, “Hidden Linkages in Japanese Business” by Richard W. Wright, that best lives up to the expectations created in the opening chapter. I found this chapter to be an excellent discussion of how the relationship between various firms in a horizontally integrated keiretsu works in practice. Each keiretsu is centred around a commercial bank, a trading company and typically one or two major industrial firms. The commercial bank plays the role of central coordinator of the keiretsu and ensures the long-term viability of each firm by continuing to supply finance. If a firm has trouble meeting interest payments, these will be deferred while restructuring takes place. Each firm exists as a stand-alone firm in its own right, with the largest firms usually being listed on the stock market as single entities. However, the firms are linked together by an intricate web of cross-shareholdings.

It is by outlining the traps for new players when doing business in Japan that Hamilton links the material summarised in the previous paragraph with the book’s aim of helping Canadians do business in Japan. Several examples are given of differences between business in Japan and in the West. For example, Japanese firms often appear to have very high debt to equity ratios. However, once it is understood that loans from other members of the keiretsu are the Western equivalent of an equity stake, the picture looks very different. Foreign firms contemplating joint ventures with Japanese parent companies also need to be aware that the parent company may not seek to maximise its own profits, but will be content to let some of the profits leak to other members of the group. This has obvious implications for foreign firms contemplating entering into joint ventures with the parent company.

Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski’s chapter, “The Paradox of China’s Industrial Reform”, provides an overview of the different types of business organisations found in China. The difference between state and non-state firms is carefully explained and there is an interesting discussion of the role of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the Chinese economy. The chapter also challenges the orthodox view that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient. It is argued that SOEs have experienced increases in both labour and total factor productivity. Further, the fact that the non-state sector accounts for a larger share of output over time is due to the fact that the state-sector is not growing as quickly as the non-state sector, not that the state-sector is contracting. However, this does not change the fact that the state sector does not seem to perform as well as the non-state sector. The chapter also contains some warnings for those considering doing business in China: property rights are not well specified, the financial system is weak and corruption is fairly common. In addition, it is argued that the lure of cheap labour costs are somewhat of a mirage. Wages may be low (although they are rising in coastal areas), but the costs of training workers are often high, so low wages do not necessarily translate into
lower labour costs. These factors may help explain why a significant proportion of foreign firms operating in China report losses.

Chapter Two should also be of interest to those contemplating doing business in South Korea or Taiwan, which is the focus of Gary Hamilton’s chapter, “The Organization of Capitalism in South Korea and Taiwan”. This chapter explores the similarities and differences between business organisations in South Korea and Taiwan. In both countries family owned business networks are the norm. However, there are many differences between the two countries. The South Korean economy is dominated by the chaebol (money cliques). Each chaebol contains a large number of vertically integrated firms (i.e., one member of the chaebol produces inputs for other members of the chaebol to use in production). Taiwanese business networks, by contrast, tend to be horizontally integrated (i.e., they provide intermediate goods for firms outside the network). The South Korean chaebol attempt to create conditions of self-sufficiency, whereas Taiwanese business groups form economic alliances with other Taiwanese firms.

I found Linda Lim’s chapter, “Southeast Asian Business Systems: The Dynamics of Diversity”, to be full of interesting information, but was left with the sense that, if I was wanting to do business in Asia, this chapter would not be as much use as the others. The chapter contains useful background information on the politics, economic environment and culture of the region. It should be noted, however, that some of the information on the politics of the region is now outdated, especially with regard to Indonesia. The chapter then discusses the historical importance of different business groupings in the region: national governments, Western multinationals, Japanese multinationals, ethnic Chinese capitalists and indigenous capitalists. However, this discussion is largely historical and does not contain much information on things to look out for when doing business in South East Asia. What the chapter does provide is an understanding of the politics and culture of South East Asia, which is important for those wanting to do business there.

Many edited volumes I have read contain a large proportion of chapters that seem to have little relevance to the book’s theme. This book does not fall into that category. Anyone interested in doing business in Asia would find that this book contains useful information on how industry is organised in several of the region’s countries. The volume is a reminder that to do business in a foreign country requires an understanding of how businesses operate in those countries. The thought that also kept popping into my mind as I read this book is that an understanding of the politics and culture of the country is also important, and Lim’s chapter does address this issue quite well.

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Arthur Balfour (1848-1930) is probably best remembered today for the “Balfour Declaration” of 1917, one of the “founding documents” of the state of Israel. But his political and diplomatic career encompassed a great deal more than that. As Jason Tomes puts it in this absorbing and elegant study, for some forty years Balfour ‘belonged to the inner circle of politicians who mattered, and his views were respected to the extent that he came to be regarded as an authority on international affairs’ (2). Although Balfour served as both Prime Minister (1902-05) and Foreign Secretary (1916-19), Tomes concedes that he is not usually included among the major British policymakers of the period, on a par with Salisbury, Grey or Lloyd George. But one might say that what his career lacked in impact or drama it made up for in quiet influence and sheer longevity. And, of course, these were the glory days of British global influence, when a Foreign Secretary literally could dispose of the problems of several different countries on several different continents before breakfast (especially Balfour, who tended to have late breakfasts).

Tomes’ overriding purpose in this study is to relate Balfour’s general philosophical worldview to his political and diplomatic practice. Surprisingly, this is a rare project in Balfour studies: although he was well-respected as a “thinker”, the author of such impressive treatises as A Defense of Philosphic Doubt (1879), The Foundations of Belief (1895) and Theism and Thought (1923), he was never regarded as a major political thinker, since his philosophical treatises were not explicitly political. He was recognised as a philosopher and a statesman, but not as a philosopher-statesman – his books on philosophy were seen as a kind of sideline, a gentleman’s hobby. Tomes is determined to reverse this judgment. Indeed, he makes rather large claims for Balfour’s importance as a political thinker, contending that his thinking as a policy-maker was ‘unusually profound and coherent ... for it rested on a deliberate philosophical basis” which was “distinctly conservative’ (3).

Chapter 1, which offers a brief biographical survey, goes some way towards explaining the personal sources of Balfour’s conservatism: eldest son of a wealthy Scottish landowner, educated at Eton and Cambridge, given easy access to political power because of family connections. Indeed, if George Bush Jr. was lucky to have a father, Balfour was equally lucky to have an uncle – his Uncle Bob, none other than Robert, Lord Salisbury, the Conservative Prime Minister, who ushered Balfour into Parliament with a safe seat in 1874. From that point on the road to the top was a leisurely if rather lengthy climb. In short, it is hardly surprising that Balfour was a firm believer in hereditary privilege and in hierarchies of all sorts.
Including racial hierarchies. Tomes’ second chapter details Balfour’s views on race and, more importantly, relates these to his views on the Empire. In present-day terms, Balfour was an unashamed, out-and-out racist who believed that the superiority of some races, and the inferiority of others, was a fact firmly established by both scientific and historical evidence (thus he opposed the inclusion of a “racial equality clause” in the League of Nations Covenant on the grounds that it was simply untrue that “all men are created equal”). The “Anglo-Saxons” (among whom, presumably, Scots were included as honourary members) had proven that they were the race most qualified to rule the world (although he conceded that they were not necessarily the “cleverest race in Europe” – it was their political genius that made them world-beaters). Today, of course, such views, so openly expressed, would have relegated him to the lunatic fringe, but in his own time and class they placed him squarely in the mainstream. For this reason I think Tomes is right to report these views with detached objectivity and without any latter-day PC moralizing. This calm approach enables him to accurately discriminate differences of nuance between Balfour’s racial attitudes and those of some of his contemporaries, and also to closely examine what we might call the exact political instrumentality of Balfour’s attitudes. In this respect his approach forms a salutary contrast to that of Edward Said and his numerous followers, who tend to paint all imperialists with the same broad brush. Thus Tomes is able to refute Said’s characterisation of Balfour as the “archetypal British Imperialist” in his Orientalism: ‘Not all his conclusions are true of the man to whom he specifically relates them’ (34n). In fact, Tomes shows that Balfour was too eccentric a thinker to be an archetypal anything. At a time, for instance, when most justifiers of the Empire argued for its “civilising mission”, Balfour argued that European civilisation was entirely inappropriate for the non-European world; he scoffed at the idea that the ‘colonial apostles of Western civilisation’ could ‘manufacture an improved type of Asian or African’ (30). The true mission of the Anglo-Saxons was not to educate the world but to police it – no doubt he would have been an enthusiastic supporter of the present Bush/Blair coalition. As a conservative he also believed that it was dangerous to “tamper” with the well-established social customs and codes of any society, which were necessarily founded on “feelings and beliefs” rather than on reason. Governments should concern themselves only with maintaining social stability, which would enable artistic and scientific genius – the only source of true progress – to flourish. Thus the Western impact on the ancient civilisations of Asia would only be negative: the result would not be progress but stagnation and death; they would “lose their own pasts” and thus cease their own organic growth, becoming pale imitations of the West. For this reason the only part of the Empire whose future looked promising to Balfour was the white Dominions, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and he found it
encouraging that, as Tomes notes, the numbers of ‘Aborigines, Red Indians and Maoris were mercifully dwindling...’ (69).

But how then did Balfour respond to the rise of Japan, the first non-white nation to seriously challenge Western global hegemony? The Japanese, of course, had their own ideas about which race was number one and destined to rule the world and, although latecomers to the imperial game, they fought two quite impressive opening rounds, defeating China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. They were also accepted as formal allies of Britain in 1902, just a few months before Balfour became Prime Minister, and he was still PM when they emerged victorious from the Russo-Japanese War. Here, it seems, his opportunism gained the upper hand over his racism, and he seemed quite willing to accept the Japanese as “honourary whites”, as they were later classified in apartheid South Africa. Since the Russians had long been the principal adversary of the British in the “great game” that stretched across the whole of Asia, Balfour was more than happy to see them suffer a humiliating defeat at the hands of the feisty newcomers, regardless of how “yellow” they were: he promptly promoted the British Legation in Tokyo to an Embassy and strengthened the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (239). As Tomes writes: ‘He thought “The Yellow Peril” altogether chimerical, and willingness to contemplate 150,000 Japanese troops on the North-West Frontier (albeit in an emergency) suggests that he felt no serious apprehension about a Japanese threat to India’ (239).

In other words, between the Russians and the Japanese, Balfour saw the Japanese as by far the lesser of two evils. Indeed, he was surprised that Japan was so “moderate” in its territorial demands after its victory over Russia. Even after Japan annexed Korea in 1910, he saw no reason why Britain should object to her Far Eastern ally. As Tomes neatly puts it, Balfour was unfailingly “polite” to the Japanese – one might even say that he was their best friend in the whole of the English-speaking world. Even after Japanese intentions in China had become painfully obvious, Balfour continued faithfully to defend them — against objections from his own government, from Dominion governments, and from the US government. As late as 1921 he favoured continuation of the treaty of alliance with Japan, so that at an Imperial Conference that year an exasperated Canadian Prime Minister demanded its abandonment on the grounds that it made them all ‘criminal participants’ in Japan’s invasion of China (243).

Tomes explains this quirk in Balfour’s foreign policy as partly a consequence of his attitude to China: against the general hatred for the Japanese he opposed his own contempt for the Chinese, who he felt were not willing to fight for their own country. He also felt that British interests in China did not have much future, and so were not worth much effort to defend (249). The problem was, however, that his ‘toleration of Japanese imperialism placed Britain in an invidious position in respect of the United States’, which saw itself as ‘keeper of the Open
Door’ in China (250). A declining Britain had already taken, with Balfour’s strong support, the cultivation of ever-closer relations with the US as the cardinal principle of its foreign policy. And, as the British Ambassador to Washington pointed out, ‘many Americans viewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921 as British people should have viewed an American-German Alliance in 1913’ (251).

Although Balfour agreed that the Americans were Britain’s “natural allies”, he argued that a ‘paper alliance was most required precisely where there was no natural alliance’ and that to ‘terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be to risk turning “a faithful friend into a formidable enemy”’ (251). What Balfour particularly feared was that a belligerent Japan, already in possession of Micronesia, might turn its attention to the vulnerable South Pacific Dominions, Australia and New Zealand. Thus he was quite willing to throw China to Japan as a kind of endlessly distracting bone. Besides, since Japanese immigrants were excluded from the white Pacific Rim countries, it was ‘somewhat unreasonable to say [Japan] was not to expand in a country where there was a yellow race’ (252). A nation as energetic as Japan needed ‘a safety valve somewhere’ (252).

But the Americans would have none of this. At the Washington Conference of 1921 Balfour’s desire ‘to retain at least the shell of the Alliance’ was frustrated by American insistence that it be replaced with a watered-down “Four Power Treaty” that included France and the US as well as Britain and Japan. Seeing now the writing on the wall in regard to future Japanese-British relations, he went home to become a ‘staunch supporter of plans to build a major British naval base at Singapore’ (256). Nonetheless, as the Japanese economy experienced a downturn in the mid-1920s, he began to feel a false sense of security: ‘He had never expected an Oriental people to be able to combine both commercial and military qualities for long’ (257). And he concluded somewhat prematurely that the Japanese threat to Australia ‘was as nearly illusory as any danger could be’ (257). It must be said, however, that Balfour’s general position on Britain’s relation with Asia was prescient: ‘Not passionately committed to the Empire in Asia, he took Britain’s nineteenth-century role as “arbiter of the East” to be a temporary engagement, and rated it correspondingly low on his list of strategic priorities’ (258).

In short, there is much in this study that will be of keen interest to Asianists. Despite its general excellence and usefulness, however, I do not think that Tomes succeeds in his central aim of establishing Balfour’s importance as a political thinker, and I am certainly not convinced that Balfour’s thinking as a policy-maker was ‘unusually profound and coherent ... for it rested on a deliberate philosophical basis’ (3). Rather I came away from this book persuaded that the traditional consensus – that Balfour was a political opportunist with an amateur interest in philosophy – was actually closer to the mark. This is not intended as
any particular criticism of Balfour: what Tomes calls his “powers of adaptability” obviously made him a very skillful diplomat, perhaps the Kissinger of his day, as he proved at the Washington Conference, where his adroit manoeuvering enabled him to salvage much that was in Britain’s interest, despite the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Nor is this meant to imply that he had no sincerely held principles – certainly he was passionately convinced, for instance, that “Anglo-Saxon” global dominance was for the good of the world and should be maintained at all costs; but, in his own terms, these guiding principles were founded on “feelings and beliefs” rather than on reason, and thus can hardly be regarded as profoundly “philosophical”. Balfour might have subscribed more to one of Kipling’s mottoes (“East is East and West is West”) than to another (“the white man’s burden”), but ultimately his beliefs derived from the general Kiplingesque credo of his age and class. Indeed, it is for that very reason that Tomes deserves thanks for making them more understandable to those of us who live in today’s very different mental climate.

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